

THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER QUESTION
A HISTORICAL REVIEW

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P R E F A C E

The present volume is a collection of papers read at the Fifth Annual Conference of the Institute of Historical Studies held at the Panjabi University, Patiala, in December 1967. For various reasons the publication was delayed. The Volume consists of two papers on frontier problems in general, one long paper on the history of the Himalayan States, three papers on the Western, Central and Eastern Sectors of the Sino-Indian border, and finally, one paper on the role of Tibet in Sino-Indian relations. It is to be hoped that these seven papers put together will provide a fairly comprehensive historical background to the Sino-Indian border dispute.

The sudden hotting up of relations between the two Asian giants, India and China, about the middle of the present century has naturally attracted the attention of historians, journalists and publicists. As a result many books have been written on the subject during the last one decade by Indians as well as foreigners. But practically all of them take a very narrow view and concentrate on events from 1950 to 1962, with brief historical backgrounds going back to the last decade of the 19th century. Starting with such a limited perspective, they naturally came to conclusions which are not borne out by nearly two thousand years of history. It is because of this overconcentration on the recent past that some foreign writers like Alastair Lamb or Neville Maxwell have been led to give a ridiculously distorted view of history.

The purpose of the present volume is to correct the perspective of viewing the border problem, by delving deep into the past history of the entire Himalayan region from the NEFA to Ladakh. It will rectify many of the misconceptions based on inadequate historical knowledge and undue concentration on the events of the last seventy or eighty years, and will bring out in clearer perspective India's relations with the region and the hollowness of Chinese claims which some of the Western writers blindly accept as substantially valid. In the present volume

an attempt is made to lay before the readers the full history of the Himalayan belt from the days of remote antiquity to the middle of the present century in order to enable them to understand the border problem as it evolved from time to time. Those who attach importance to history as the essential background to present day issues will, it is hoped, find this volume to be extremely useful, indeed the first of its kind, in understanding the Sino-Indian border question as it developed from 1950 to 1962.

December 1, 1971.

S. P. SEN.

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INTRODUCTION

India and China, the two biggest countries of Asia, had no doubt come in contact with each other since very old times. But this contact was not that close, direct and regular as many in India would like to imagine from an emotional and wishful view of history. Buddhism, no doubt, spread to China from India and with it went some intangible elements of Indian culture. Some Chinese pilgrims and travellers, no doubt, came to India to visit the holy places and study the scriptures. They were keen observers of men and things and left valuable accounts of their travels which are useful in reconstructing Indian history in the ancient period. There was some trade contact also both by the over-land route through Central Asia and by the sea route. But even these irregular contacts virtually came to an end from the beginning of the medieval period. By and large, India and China stood separate and developed each in her own way. It had to be so, because the two were separated by the high Himalaya and by a buffer territory, Tibet. The boundaries of India and China never touched each other, until China eliminated the Tibetan buffer by force in recent times. Far from there being any close and friendly relations, there had been going on a keen competition and conflict between Indian and Chinese cultures not only in the Himalayan buffer area but also all through South East Asia where the two cultures came in contact.

India-China relations came into sudden prominence only after China's first step in 1950-51 in eliminating by force the Tibetan buffer. The relations grew steadily worse, reaching a climax in 1962 with the outbreak of hostilities all along the 2,500 miles of the border. The cessation of hostilities did not improve relations and for the last one decade the two Powers have been facing each other across the border in a sullen mood and unsure about the future. The sudden hotting up of relations between the two Asian giants has naturally attracted the attention of historians, journalists and publicists. As a result, many books have been written on the subject during the last one decade by Indians as well as foreigners. But practically all of them take a very narrow view and concentrate

on the border dispute in recent years. In getting the proper historical perspective the furthest back they go is to the last decade of the 19th century. Naturally they view the question in the light of the political conditions existing at the time—the so-called Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, Anglo-Russian rivalry, British attempts at frontier-making, Outer Line and Inner Line in the north-east tribal area etc. Starting with such a limited perspective they naturally came to conclusions which are not borne out by nearly two thousand years of history. The political status of Tibet or the question of India's northern border did not suddenly come into existence with the treaties of 1890 and 1893 or Younghusband's expedition. One has to go far back in history to ascertain the correct position of Tibet and India's close relations with the Himalayan States which the Chinese Communists claim as the five fingers of the Tibetan palm. It is because of this over-concentration on the recent past that many a foreign writer, like Alastair Lamb or Neville Maxwell, has been led to give a ridiculously distorted view of history.

The purpose of the present volume is to correct the perspective of viewing the border problem, by delving deep into the past history of the entire Himalayan region from the NEFA to Ladakh. It will rectify many of the misconceptions based on inadequate historical knowledge and undue concentration on the events of the last seventy or eighty years and will bring out in clearer perspective India's relations with the region and the hollowness of Chinese claims which some of the Western writers blindly accept as substantially valid. In the present volume an attempt is made to lay before the readers the full history of the Himalayan belt from the days of remote antiquity to the middle of the present century in order to enable them to understand the border problem as it evolved from time to time. Some Western writers, like Neville Maxwell, are of course inclined to dismiss past historical evidence as myth or local tradition and therefore undependable in judging the present day issues. This is no doubt understandable in journalists who cite or dismiss history as evidence according to their convenience and the needs of the story they want to give out. Those, however, who attach importance to history as the essential background to present day issues will find this

volume to be extremely useful, indeed the first of its kind, in understanding the Sino-Indian border question as it developed from 1950 to 1962.

One obvious thing that emerges from a careful study of the history of the Himalayan region along the entire northern boundary of India is the close relations of India, religious, cultural and commercial (also political from time to time) with this region, belying spurious Chinese claims unquestioningly accepted by China's new-found friends among Western writers. Incidentally these friends of China would have given a different version if they had been writing before 1947 or if the British empire in India had not been liquidated. There is a common misconception that because of their physical features the people living in the Himalayan belt are more akin to the Chinese than to Indians. Only a close study of history will bring out that these people are far different from the Chinese ethnologically, linguistically and culturally. If any comparison is made between the Indian and Chinese influence in this region, including Tibet, it will be found that the extent of India's influence far outweighs that of China. It is again erroneous to hold that Indians' knowledge of this area was negligible compared to that of the Chinese, but this is claimed by only those who have little knowledge of Indian literature. A student of India's religion, literature and tradition would clearly recognize the extent of the awareness of Indians of the Himalayan region.

Another significant thing that emerges from a study of the history of the Himalayan States through the ages is that it is not possible to apply principles of modern International Law while considering the political status of these States or inter-State relations. For instance, modern ideas of suzerain and vassal States are hardly relevant for ascertainment of the real position. A State supposed to be a vassal of another State would, for a time, claim suzerainty over another neighbour. Again a vassal State would wage wars with neighbours or conclude treaties without any reference to, or intervention of, the supposedly suzerain State. Also a vassal State would be concluding a treaty with the supposedly suzerain State on a footing of equality. Or, a supposedly suzerain State openly admitting its inability to impose treaty obligations on its vassal.

It is the failure to appreciate this fallacy that many of the Western writers, like Neville Maxwell, drew absurd conclusions about Tibet's relations with China on the one hand and with Ladakh, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim on the other. If these writers had taken off their unhistorical glasses and delved deep into the history of this region, they would have realised how unreal their basic assumptions are.

The problem of the Sino-Indian border hinges on Tibet, its own political status, its border with India, and its relations with the other Himalayan States. China's claims rest primarily upon her so-called suzerainty over Tibet. Before taking up the particular case of Tibet it is worth while examining Chinese brand of suzerainty which defies any rational comprehension. If the Chinese claim of suzerainty is to be taken seriously and in the modern sense, it would extend over an incredibly large part of Asia. It would include many areas which might have been held under temporary military subjection in some remote period but had established complete independence long ago. The truth of the matter is that China in her periodic days of military greatness would carry her armed domination over a wide area extending far beyond her original and natural boundary and bringing under subjection peoples who had nothing in common with the Chinese. Then as the central military power declined the empire would be rolled back to the original boundary and the outlying parts held under temporary subjection would assert independence. But even then the Chinese would not give up their theoretical claims but maintain the fantastic theory that all these areas were integral parts of China and the inhabitants were Chinese. To the Chinese the motherland extends permanently to wherever Chinese arms had been carried at one time or other in their long history. It is in this sense that the Chinese consider Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet as parts of China. They might as well claim Korea and much of South East Asia. It is interesting to see many of the new-found friends of China among Western writers taking the Chinese claims seriously and equating the Chinese brand of suzerainty with the modern conception of that term, forgetting that the peoples of the outlying areas are wholly non-Chinese and that for long periods they had lived an independent life.

Coming now to Tibet's status in particular, one has to note

that all through the ancient period Tibet was not only independent of China but on occasions had even an upper hand over China, defeating China and dictating terms on her. It was only after the establishment of Mongol rule over China (13th century) that Tibet could be said to have some connexion with China. But even then it was not a political connexion between Tibet and the Imperial Government of China but rather a personal relationship between the Dalai Lama of Tibet and the Mongol Emperor of China. It cannot be called by any stretch of imagination as suzerain-vassal relationship but may be termed more correctly as 'patron-priest' relationship, the Dalai Lama being accepted as the spiritual leader of the Buddhist Church throughout the Mongol empire and the Mongol Emperor of China as the secular patron of the Dalai Lama. This personal relationship came to a close with the end of the Mongol rule in China. It must, however, be noted that throughout this period there were no Chinese troops in Tibet and the Government of Tibet functioned as a fully independent Government.

The Manchus came to power in China about the middle of the 17th century. Their interest in Tibet was only to prevent a hostile combination between Tibet and Mongolia. It was not till 1720 that the Manchu Emperor of China established a military domination over Tibet. By the end of the century, however, that domination virtually came to an end. In the 19th century Tibet was independent for all practical purposes, waging wars, concluding treaties and conducting relations with the neighbouring Himalayan States without any reference to China. By the end of the 19th century Tibet had asserted her independence to such a degree that she openly refused to accept the treaties of 1890 and 1893 concluded between Britain and China. China's presence in Tibet was confined only to two Ambans and the Chinese Government frankly admitted its inability to impose its will on Tibet. At the turn of the century Tibet could carry on secret relations with Russia and not a mouse stirred in Peking. When Younghusband led his expedition into Tibet, Peking remained totally unconcerned.

In truth, the myth of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet at such a late hour was created by Britain and Russia because of their

own mutual suspicion and hostility. Each of them, in an anxiety to thwart the other, was glad to find an *alibi* in Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. But for this Russo-British rivalry nothing would have been heard of the so-called Chinese suzerainty. This explains why the Treaty of Lhasa was later confirmed by a treaty with China in 1906. This also explains why Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was re-affirmed in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The *alibi* at the moment was most convenient, as China was in no position to assert her right of suzerainty and as it seemed at the time she would never be able to do so. Neither Britain nor Russia could foresee 1950-51. Even so, in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 severe limitations were placed on China's rights of suzerainty, to eliminate any possibility of her unilateral intervention in Tibet even in the guise of scientific exploration.

Younghusband's expedition and the subsequent pull out created a dangerous vacuum in Tibet which was promptly taken advantage of by China to establish for the first time after 1720 her complete military domination. But this was for a very short period, and by 1912 Tibet had freed herself again. All the Chinese troops were driven out and there was not even a nominal vestige of Chinese suzerainty left after that. Till 1950 Tibet remained fully independent. She conducted her own foreign relations, concluded treaties and sent trade delegations to several foreign countries. She stubbornly maintained her neutrality during World War II despite strong Anglo-American pressure to allow the transport of war material across her territory for the relief of China. Thus by all standards of international law she was independent, although through ignorance or negligence she failed to make any move to secure *de jure* recognition from other countries. Part of the blame for this failure lies with the British Government which for ulterior purposes wanted to keep Tibet in a peculiar political status, treating her as fully independent of China in internal and external matters and yet not publicly tearing up the myth of Chinese suzerainty. Till 1947 the British Government did not visualise a time when a strong and militaristic China would emerge and claim her control over Tibet on the basis of this myth. The Tibet policy did not create any inconvenience for the British Government in India but it restrained the hands

of its successor Government and exposed Tibet to the Chinese onslaught in 1950. Once the buffer position of Tibet was removed, even India was exposed to Chinese aggression. It was after the Chinese conquest of Tibet that China could claim to have a common boundary with India, which provided an easy excuse for dispute when it suited the Chinese.

The Sino-Indian conflict since the early 'fifties of the present century was not due entirely, or even largely, to claims and counter-claims regarding the border. The roots of the conflict lay in the traditional Chinese aggressiveness and expansionism whenever China had a strong Central government, as borne out by her entire history, and also in the victory of militant Communism creating a fanatic zeal to carry the revolution to other parts of Asia. Communism, however, was to serve only as a means to achieving the national objective of Asian hegemony. It is significant to note that the so-called border dispute with India was taken up seriously only when China felt that she was strong enough to demonstrate to India and the smaller nations of Asia the indisputable Chinese military superiority. Although she had equally important border claims against U.S.S.R., China did not press them till she had humbled India and terrorised the smaller nations of Asia.

China did not raise the border dispute with India when she first moved into Tibet in 1950-51 because her commitments elsewhere put her at a disadvantage in a military confrontation with India at the time. In the early 'fifties Chou-En lai always parried India's complaints about Chinese maps by saying that these maps were drawn up by the earlier regime and would be duly looked into and corrected by the new Government. It was only after the middle of the 'fifties, when she had consolidated her position in Tibet, conquered Sinkiang and secretly constructed a strategic road through the Ladakh territory of Aksai Chin to connect Sinkiang with Western Tibet that China raised the question of boundary with India. So far as the boundary dispute was concerned, China's main motive was to secure India's acquiescence to Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin in return for a formal Chinese acceptance of the McMahon Line in the east.

The details of the Chinese and Indian claims are to be

found elsewhere in this volume. For the present we may only notice briefly the crux of the problem. India's position was that, so far as the eastern sector was concerned the McMahon Line had been accepted as the official boundary between India and Tibet since 1914. This line was not just arbitrarily drawn by a British bureaucrat but was based on earlier history, tradition and general acceptance by the people of the region; therefore there was no need to revive the question of the boundary after nearly half a century. Maxwell has curiously twitted the Indian Government for clinging to the legacy of British Imperialism. He might as well have twitted Communist China for clinging to the legacy of Manchu Imperialism. China, shifting her position considerably in the later stage of the dispute, claimed that she had never signed the Simla agreement and had never accepted the McMahon Line. This was really intended to force a concession from India in Aksai Chin. It is hardly worthwhile to go into the question of Chinese participation in the Simla Conference. China did participate and the Chinese delegate did initial the draft. His withdrawal at a later stage was not because of disagreement with the Indo-Tibetan boundary line but with the Sino-Tibetan boundary line or the boundary line between Inner and Outer Tibet. Anyway, Tibet had attended the Conference on a footing of equality with China and had concluded a boundary agreement with the Government of India which had been internationally confirmed by the lapse of half a century. No power would have agreed to re-open the question at such a late hour. Maxwell has sought to cast doubt on the validity of the agreement by arguing that it was kept a secret by the British for many years. This is ingenuous advocacy, but would hardly convince anybody.

So far as the Western sector was concerned, the boundary claimed and held by India is also borne out by history, tradition and treaties. The boundary between Ladakh (now part of Jammu and Kashmir State of India) and Tibet was first determined by the Treaty of 1684 between Ladakh and Tibet. This was confirmed, after the Dogra conquest of Ladakh and the Dogra war with Tibet, by the Treaty of 1842. These treaties were further confirmed by an agreement concluded in 1858

between Kashmir and Tibet. There was and could not be any confusion regarding Aksai Chin, the principal bone of contention between China and India in the recent dispute. Till almost the close of the 19th century China did not raise any complaint regarding the boundary either in the Sinkiang sector or in the Western Tibetan sector. It was the Anglo-Russian rivalry again in the Pamir region as in Tibet, which brought China into the picture. Significantly when in 1896 China, at Russian instigation, protested against British maps she claimed Aksai Chin as a part of Tibet but in the recent dispute with India she claimed it as a part of Sinkiang. It is not the place here to go into the details of successive British boundary-making proposals, which will be found in the appropriate chapter in the volume. We may only note here that it was the fear of Russian expansion in the Pamir region which motivated some of the British proposals, and in disregard of the rights of the Kashmir State, Britain even invited China to claim the area between the Kuen Lun and the Karakorum which China repeatedly refused till the end of the 19th century. Much has been made by writers like Lamb and Maxwell of the MacDonald Line proposed by the British in 1899 which offered substantial territorial concession to China. Although the offer was rejected by China these writers would use this offer in their argument in supporting the Chinese territorial claim 60 years later. In fact during all this period China remained totally unconcerned and did not make any territorial claim on Aksai Chin. It was only after the occupation of Sinkiang at the end of 1949 and of Tibet in 1951 that Aksai Chin as the connecting area between the two assumed a new importance. Even then China did not put forward any open claim until the completion in 1957 of the road she had secretly started constructing in Aksai Chin in 1956. It was only then that China made an official claim to Aksai Chin and offered to recognize the McMahon line in the east in return for India's acceptance of the Chinese claim in the west.

On the recent border dispute between India and China many works have come out in the last few years by both Indian and foreign writers. They concentrate mostly on events from 1950 to 1962, with brief historical backgrounds going back

to the last decade of the 19th century, and try to give a factual account of the events of the period. There are a few, however, which give a distorted view by interpreting events in an openly partisan spirit. The most notable of these is 'India's China War' by Neville Maxwell (1970). Maxwell has arranged facts and sought to interpret them in his own way with the skill of a professional lawyer arguing his case and not with the objectivity expected of a historian. Anyone who reads his amazing account cannot avoid feeling that he started with a definite purpose—to show that history, sweet reasonableness and spirit of accommodation and friendly co-operation were all on the Chinese side and that the armed conflict of 1962 was due wholly to India's stubborn refusal to negotiate and aggressive moves across the border with China. He comes to this conclusion on the basis of the material he could get from the Indian side but he had no access to corresponding material on the Chinese side. Although bold enough to inflict on his readers his one-sided conclusions, he curiously admits the obvious 'imbalance in the book'. He states in the Preface: "The Indian Government has perhaps suffered by its openness. A close scrutiny of the relationship between public words and private—indeed secret—attitudes rarely puts any government in anything but an invidious light. In contrast, no government is more secretive as to its inner processes than that of the People's Republic of China, and in tracing Chinese policy formulation I have had nothing to go on beyond what is on the public record." How candid!


The object of the present volume is to give a historical background to the Sino-Indian border dispute and naturally the events of the period from 1951 to 1962 have not been given as fully as one would find in other books on the subject. From a study of this volume it will be clear that history and tradition were on the Indian side and justified India's contention regarding the border. This is not, however, to minimise the short-sightedness and even blunders on the part of India in the decade preceding the armed conflict of 1962. For this, unfortunately, a large part of the responsibility lay with Nehru. It was his obsession about British imperialism and the wrongs it had done to States on India's frontiers which led him to sacrifice the Tibetan buffer so easily. It was his blind faith in Sino-

Indian friendship which made him close his eyes to the realities of the situation till he was rudely disillusioned in 1962. It was his ambition to play the role of a World statesman and make India's voice heard in all international issues that made him neglect issues which concerned India more directly. It was his unrealistic conviction that if India remained peaceful no other power would drag her into war which made him concentrate on economic development to the extent of totally neglecting defence preparedness. It was again his fond hope that the justice of India's stand in any dispute would be readily accepted by all non-aligned powers, specially Afro-Asian powers, which made him neglect timely diplomatic moves to show up China's real intentions and to form an organised Asian opinion against China. In short, both in foreign affairs and in defence, India's policy, during the first decade after independence was wrong, unreal and weak, and India had to pay a heavy price for it in 1962. What made matters even worse after 1959 was the incredible muddleheadedness in deciding to confront the Chinese in the disputed areas along the border and yet refusing to admit the necessity of making suitable defence preparations for the showdown which, it was apparent by 1959-60, was inevitable.

The 1962 debacle had one historical lesson,—it is not enough to have the right on one's side, one must also have the strength to assert it. It appears that the lesson has gone home and India's policy has undergone the needed change in the decade following 1962.

S. P. SEN.

INDIA-CHINA BOUNDARY



Based upon Survey of India map with the permission of the Surveyor General of India.

FRONTIER STUDIES IN INDIA

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Since the partition of India, we have been spared the debilitating luxury of trouble-free boundaries. Right from 1947 onwards, every year and often several times a year, problems have been arising about the alignment of Indo-Pak boundary. Each of these has been the subject matter of prolonged correspondence between the two Governments and in some cases solved amicably. Unlike most boundary disputes, the differences between India and Pakistan had till recently to do with the ascertaining of facts only. There was little of any general principle of boundary formation involved. In fact, the only exception was that of how riverine boundaries should be fixed. Otherwise, it was always a question of finding out what the boundary between one district or other, or between one tehsil or other was or one village and another was, prior to independence. The Kutch case has of course changed all this; but that is a recent development. It is, therefore, only after the Sino-Indian and Indo-Tibetan boundaries became a live issue that interest has come to be taken in the technique of boundary studies; on how boundaries are formed; of acceptance being the main criteria for traditional boundaries; what constitutes administrative control etc.

The type of evidence required to be collected and analysed in a frontier question will vary with whether it is a boundary claim or a territorial claim that is involved. In the former, what is required is primarily a verification of facts and the possibility of an agreed solution on their basis alone is implicit. In a dispute regarding the boundary in a backward area, the right to ownership will be claimed to have been exercised through agencies which primarily may not be Governmental, and private ownership rights may very nearly approximate the exercise of sovereignty. In a territorial dispute, normally ownership rights of agencies or institutions primarily non-Governmental, does not tend to arise

** The views expressed in this article are entirely the author's personal ones.*

and the evidence will mostly be that of direct acts of exercise of sovereignty. Boundary problems themselves can, however, be of different types. A dispute regarding facts alone is likely to occur mostly with regard to limits of administrative control. In the case of traditional boundaries, on the other hand, one has to find out what all the facts are as well as how to interpret them. There are, therefore, the problems which arise primarily from a difference of opinion on whether a particular item of information is a fact or not. Then there will be those wherein the problem is one of interpretation; of the relative importance to be given to each of a number of factors. An example will make this clear. During the last 100 years, there have been a very large number of adjustments made to the United States-Canada boundary and the Nepal-India boundary. Each of the disputes settled by these adjustments concerned some specific and fortunately minor point : whether a ground feature referred to in an earlier decision by a particular name was the stream 'X' as claimed by US; or stream 'Y', claimed so by Canada. Or, it was a question of whether boundary pillar 101 was or was not earlier located at some given angles from pillars 100 and 102. It is a different type of problem altogether when the issue is a boundary which was along the *thalveg* and the river shifts its course; or whether a punitive expedition can be regarded as exercise of administrative control. One way of describing the difference between the two types of boundary problems is perhaps that in the former the student is finding out a fact or facts concerning administrative actions connected with local boundaries. In the other he is trying to find out the degree to which there has been acceptance in practice of the frontier. Doubts regarding the location of an administrative boundary, specially when dealing with thickly populated areas, can be solved by ascertaining facts; as in the Berubari dispute. The problem is something which any administrator or for that matter any lawyer can probably tackle with fair competence. No particular techniques of boundary study are involved. When one gets to a traditional boundary on the other hand, the examination of the data that has to be used can involve almost the entire gamut of

knowledge; from anthropology, archaeology, botany and cartography to ancient history, international law, revenue settlements and zoology. In fact, of almost anything. For a traditional boundary is the boundary which is accepted by the people concerned and the Governments concerned; with the acceptance reflected in the totality of the activities going to form their daily life and no part of these activities can be regarded as automatically irrelevant while determining the validity of a specific alignment. It is the study of this latter type of boundary problem that is most exacting and also most interesting.

Boundaries of sovereign States are fixed either by agreement between the States concerned, by the pronouncements of an authority recognised as such by the parties concerned or by prescription. Acceptance over a period of time of a boundary will itself be the legal basis of that boundary and what will be required will be, ascertaining of these limits, in the case of a difference of opinion. The study of the validity of a boundary already claimed (or the more limited aspect of its location when no claim has been preferred by the State concerned) will thus, in the beginning, be the finding out upto what extent there has been a demarcation, delineation, definition or formal delimitation of the boundary. If none of these processes have been gone through, the enquiry will shift to the next step of ascertaining the limits accepted in practice, by the people (if not the Governments) on both sides of the boundary.

It can happen that in a boundary dispute the alignment claimed or publicised by one or both parties has varied from time to time. A concomitant of any study of boundaries is the listing and cataloguing of these various boundary alignments, plotting them on a single map sufficiently detailed and studying them in chronological order. Such work can yield clues to the thinking which is going on behind the scenes. It may show the Government concerned to be in the mood to study the line and ascertain the correct boundary, as different from the boundary which they desire to claim. Apart from this comparing of various lines, there can be a study of the alignment in a small sector on a detailed map based on rigorous surveys or prepared by

an explorer from first hand knowledge. It can be extremely rewarding to do so. Study of boundaries, however, should not become a mere plotting of the various boundary lines claimed from time to time (an exercise capable of being a long drawn out one, seeing the practice with some States is never to show the boundary in detailed maps and to give a different line in each semi-official or private small-scale map released). Weaknesses will exist in all studies of boundary lines not backed by a knowledge of the factors which lead to the depiction of that line in that particular fashion.

Ascertaining a traditional boundary's valid location on the basis of acceptance by the people concerned is essentially a field job. Unless the primary data has already been gathered by others, the collection of information has to be done on the spot by local officers at the lowest level. A boundary is something that is located on the ground. It is something physical, should be possible of location by the naked eye automatically and can be studied only in specific stretches. It is not possible to state why a particular line is the boundary, if one studies a boundary 'generally' or taking its location as a whole. If one is thinking of the boundary of NEFA, it is the boundary between Tawang and Tsona, the boundary between Kaloriang and Chayul, between Tasking and Lung, between Longju/Maja and Migyitun, between Mechuka and Gasa, between Tuting and Dangam and between Hayuliang and Sanga Choling. It is an even more specific question like whether the boundary between Timang in Tsona and Lumpo in Tawang is at Kenze Mane or at Drokung Samba. If one were thinking of the UP-Tibet frontier, it is a question of whether the boundary between Harsil in Tehri and Tashigong in Purang district of Ngari Korsum is at Gungum Nala or at Tsangchok La. It will be a question of whether the boundary between Shipki village and Hopsang is at Shipki La or not. It is only a study of the data on these detailed boundary problems that can go to show whether the boundary as a whole is correct or not. There is no easy way out, of ascertaining the validity of a frontier and the only possible technique for study of a boundary is to take it stretch by stretch, mile by mile, village by village and

pasture by pasture and determine where exactly the boundary line is in each stretch and in each mile.

Actually, a detailed study of a boundary's alignment in a specific locality enables one to avoid many of the pitfalls that a person trying for a broader approach will encounter. It may be permitted to digress a little here. There have been a number of references in Indian academic circles to Alastair Lamb's recent *McMahon Line*. When his earlier work on *British and Chinese Policies in Central Asia* was published, one felt it to be as important an addition to our knowledge of the region as Lattimore's on Sinkiang, or Fritter's on Mongolia. The subsequent *China-India-Border* brought out by Chatham House was, therefore, a disappointment. *McMahon Line* is an enlarged version of the Chatham House essay. If the aim was to give an impartial and unbiased account of the Sino-Indian boundary problem, the normal thing would have been to use as the source material, the numerous, often verbose, official reports and exchanges. On the curious plea that the Indian case is better backed by factual data, however, Dr. Lamb announces himself as deciding to ignore the official reports and instead study the subject on the basis of confidential and secret records of the British period of Indian history, available in UK. The danger of relying exclusively on records not meant for the public and intended to be the sole concern of the policy-planners has not been touched upon by him. The posture publicly adopted by a Government is not always that considered necessary by them in private. Nor does every plan of action considered by them mean that they really wanted to follow it; or that the actual course adopted must necessarily be a cloak to hide the real plans. There is compulsion for any great power, or for that matter any State, (in fact it is their duty) to consider all the alternatives available before deciding on any course of action. They have to do, if I may use jargon, this contingency planning; preparing for eventualities which may or may not ever come up. A good Foreign Office or a good Commonwealth Relations Office like a good General Staff has to assume that every friend may become an enemy and every enemy may come to be considered sometime

as a friend. The existence, for instance, of plans for the invasion of Italy by France, need not necessarily imply enmity towards Italy. The official secret records of the British period to which Dr. Lamb had access did consider many alternatives, while taking decisions from time to time, on the problems which come up in their relations with China, the local authorities of territories recently conquered by the Chinese or of the Himalayan States. The decisions taken may or may not have been in consonance with the stand publicly taken by that Government. There are then the appreciations of the attitudes of various States towards Britain herself; or of the relations which the India Office felt should obtain or are obtaining with States in whom they are interested. The degree of validity of such appreciations or studies, while being considered after the lapse of a century, has always to be in the context of the thinking then prevailing; and the degree of secrecy attendant on the document in question when it was drawn up. We have had at least one example of how important this is; since the Second World War. I am referring to the appreciation of the feelings of important circles in Britain towards Germany, as revealed by the archives of the Third Reich. The attempt to read into facts more significance than they actually have, on the ground that confidential or secret records of one side had more than one aim in the policy that they adopted towards a particular situation, is a self-defeating exercise. Action and the motive or motives leading to that action have each to be judged in the context of the other. This weakness of technique adopted by Dr. Lamb, of relying predominantly on secret records, is enhanced by the fact that he has had no access at all to Chinese confidential records; and in fact uses very little, even the published Chinese material.

Very sensibly, the ignorance prevailing in India regarding the Himalayan areas is dwelt upon less now-a-days; though it was a topic which most speakers on the Indo-Tibetan border seemed to find it difficult to resist. The fact that certain sections of the people of India did not have any knowledge, or perhaps, did not have adequate knowledge of the Himalayas, does not mean that such a knowledge was not there. The people inhabiting

the Dihang Valley in Assam or the Indus Valley in Ladakh, those staying in Bhutan or Sikkim or Mustang certainly knew what was going on in the plains. They had intimate commercial and political contacts with the people in adjoining Assam, Bengal, Bashahr, Oudh or Kashmir, as the case may be. Similarly, the people lower down, whether those of Darang in Assam or Jalpaiguri in Bengal, knew what was going on in the adjoining Himalayan areas. If the charge of ignorance is, for instance, against the people of Tanjore or Mathura or about those of Calcutta or Patiala not knowing what was going on in the Himalayas, obviously such lack of knowledge is not relevant, howsoever well-read may be the Punjabi, Bengali or Tamilian otherwise. Even now, for instance, how much would somebody in Madhya Pradesh know regarding developments in Kerala? I mean, if he was not specially interested in the subject. The charge is even less valid if we are talking about the Governments concerned not being knowledgeable. One need only remember the series of wars which the authorities in Kashmir Valley had to wage in Ladakh in the extreme west; the Gorkhas against the Tibetans; or in the east the Ahoms with the NEFA tribes. It is also easy to see that, even before the British came, the Governments existing in the Brahmaputra Valley, the Indus Valley, etc. certainly had a good deal to do with the adjoining mountains. Once we come to the British period of history, the position is even better. It is another matter that these accounts are till now buried in *Vamsavalis* and monastic *Namdars* or for the British period in technical journals, obscure articles by even less famous travellers, official reports by unknown administrators or Survey of India records. But their non-accessability or the ignorance of their existence does not mean that the data is not there. Knowledge, by its very definition, has to be judged in the context of relevance. People who were concerned with the Himalayas knew about the Himalayas. There were many such people and they had a lot to do with the area.

Then, there is the question of non-existence of regular administration; another favourite of the popular and non-academic student of these areas. The type of administration

in an area has obviously to depend upon the type of area involved. It is also intimately connected with what is the prevailing concept of the Government's duties and functions. These are, in fact, accepted principles of International Law. If by, 'regular administration', we mean a school and a dispensary, a police chuki, Community Development blocks, labour troubles and MLAs, it is true that such regular administration did not exist over most of the Himalayas till a decade or two ago. In fact even now there are a few areas where it does not. But surely such a concept of what administration should be, is projecting to the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, concepts of little relevance to those periods. To the Moghul Subadar in Srinagar, administration meant the collection of taxes and maintenance of law and order. That certainly was being done in Mustang by the authorities in Patan and in NEFA by the authorities in the Brahmaputra Valley, two centuries ago. In any case, there should be no talk now at least of no regular administration and troops only staying in the interior. The First, Second and Third Five Year Plans were framed taking into account the needs of NEFA, Uttara Khand, Himachal Pradesh and Ladakh. The Second and Third Five Year Plans were very vigorously implemented in NEFA and Ladakh and the Fourth Five Year Plan in fact sets very ambitious targets for all these areas. Sikkim and Bhutan started slightly late. But, on the other hand, Sikkim and Bhutan are also proceeding very much faster than NEFA and Ladakh. It would be doing much less than full justice to the doctors, engineers, agriculture officers, and botanists, who have been serving in these areas since independence (and why exclude them, policemen and the administrators also) to ignore all this. In fact, over several parts of the Himalayas, it is the school teacher and the doctor and agricultural demonstrator who first set up the outposts of the regular administration. The administrator and the police come next, and then the Army. There were plenty of occasions when some of us wished that this dubious distinction of being the first did not fall on the civilians so monotonously and that an Army unit was around.

What I have been trying to urge for consideration

is that since independence the study of our frontiers has become a subject of vital importance. The problems that have arisen have been in some cases due to territorial claims by Pakistan or China. In some other cases, they have been boundary problems only. The difference is that in a territorial claim the area involved will have an identity of its own; whereas in a boundary claim it does not. There can be two types of disputes. Disputes whose resolving depends entirely on ascertaining the correct position regarding a very few facts or even a single fact. There will be other boundary problems wherein the issues involved will be of a general nature and not only one has to ascertain what are the facts, but also settle the criteria used in assessing the value of the various facts. Study of boundaries often becomes a cataloguing of the various boundary alignments claimed or enforced from time to time by the parties to the dispute. This is useful. But more important is the study going to show why a particular alignment should be a valid boundary. This study is essentially a field job and should concern itself with particular and limited stretches of the frontier. This cardinal principle has been ignored in a recent comprehensive study of the McMahon Line by a distinguished foreign scholar. Another weakness of that particular study is that confidential and secret records of the British period are exclusively relied upon. Such records may, on the other hand, not represent the correct picture or the complete picture. The complaint is often voiced that the plainsmen of India know little regarding the Himalayan region. This attitude is transposing to an earlier period the requirements of the present situation. At least during the last 15 or 20 years, vigorous efforts have been made to extend normal administration to all parts of our country; efforts attended with considerable success.

SOME PROBLEMS OF WATERSHED BOUNDARIES

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Watersheds have exercised peculiar fascination on geographers and explorers. Holdich and Fiore are witnesses to the popularity they had during the 19th and early 20th centuries to statesmen attempting to draw frontiers; or officers in the field attempting to translate those frontiers into boundary pillars on the ground¹. This popularity is matched only by the disrepute into which they have fallen during the last few decades; with S. Boggs², for instance, feeling that it was the ignorance alone of geography in the 19th century, that led to the adoption of such mountain ranges as boundaries. The credit for first attempting a balanced study of the place of watersheds in boundary formation and boundary location goes to V. Adami³. According to him, the greatest advantage that the watershed line possesses over all others is that, "granted a precise definition of this term, it is a line which is always theoretically capable of being found and marked at the ground by the rigorous application of a precise scientific measure; that is to say, that it cannot properly give rise to a technical dispute regarding the position of the line which will be of sensible magnitude on the ground". Adami then lists the difficulties that can nevertheless crop up, as five:—

- (i) A marshy flat drains off into two adjoining basins at the same time and one discovers an alternative watershed.
- (ii) The water-parting, being traced, traverses an alluvial plain, in which the torrent has not been artificially kept in a permanent channel.
- (iii) The natural watershed would have been at a particular place; but the works of man changed the course of nature.

* *The views expressed in this article are entirely the author's personal ones.*

- (iv) There are difficulties caused by water interests and the necessity for preservation of all the rights vested in them. This is particularly the case where underground waters of any importance have to be considered.
- (v) Wholly inadmissible conditions could again be produced by the watershed line as a boundary, owing to the absence of any connection between the causes which produce the windings of the water-parting and those which govern the natural lines of economic cleavage between two peoples on either side of the general line of boundary. Townships and villages in their development or plans as readily straddle the line of a waterparting as not.

Property boundaries in flat country have no tendency to fall into line with lines of water-parting, although it might be supposed that in mountains with a well-defined crest-line, they would almost without exception be found there. Adami feels the reverse is actually, as a rule, the case; for, while the main crest-line of a mountain range does undoubtedly always broadly mark an important economic line of cleavage⁴, still the property boundaries of the smaller economic units mostly cross the watershed to include those parts of the upper valley and pastures which are more easy of access from the further side than from the side on which they themselves lie.

A logical corollary to this spill-over of economic interests over watershed lines is an enquiry into the zonal nature of frontiers as compared with linear political boundaries; which is attempted by A. E. Moodie⁵ in his (really neglected) primer of political geography. Moodie looks at the subject from the point of view of mountain ranges in general and watersheds in particular, acting as barrier to communications. He faces squarely the built-in contradiction of frontier zones wherein populations belonging to two contiguous States exhibit marked similarities⁶ while the boundary itself seeks to accentuate the differences; but is unable to reconcile the contradiction.

As said above, studies of watershed frontiers have emphasised the difficulty that can arise in locating a watershed on the ground. This is a valid objection. Frontiers often tend to be difficult terrain, since historically they will be located along barriers⁷, to communication. Where the frontier is not historic, but is one arrived at by a recent agreement even, the same advantage of obstacle to communications and defensibility can again lead to difficult ground being chosen for its location. If such a frontier is to be regarded as a watershed frontier also, it is possible that the watershed, or the frontier area in general, is broken ground in which the precise location of the continuous highest line may not be easy; and needs rigorous ground survey. In practice, however, one used to depend till a few decades ago on route surveys or reconnaissance surveys⁸. Photographic surveys, have recently become more popular. In case of broken ground, none of these can be regarded as likely to be free from error and should always be supplemented by rigorous ground survey. From personal knowledge, I can give an example wherein, very competent technical personnel had located the water-parting in not very broken area on the basis of two inch vertical photographs of a 15,000 feet high range; and reconnaissance on the ground showed the alignment of the water-parting to be completely inaccurate.

The other issue is that of the frontier zone⁹. There is rarely an abrupt change-over either culturally or economically just because a political boundary separates two contiguous areas. This will be so, even if the boundary is a historic one; or to use a phrase which has now fallen into disrepute, a 'natural' one. It will be still less so, in case the boundary is a recent development. The existence of this transitional frontier zone in the vicinity of the boundary, cannot be regarded as contradicting the necessity for a boundary. A generalisation is relevant always in the context of data on the basis of which it has been arrived at, and the specific phenomenon that it seeks to clarify. A boundary is a legal concept meant to clarify the exercise of the attributes of sovereignty, for political (and more particularly administrative) purposes¹⁰. Frontier zone is a cultural phenomenon explaining the evolution

and existence (or lack of existence) of specific cultural factors in a particular geographic milieu.

There can be a difference of opinion on what actually constitutes a watershed also. As far as the text-book definition is concerned, all are agreed on how to define the term watershed¹¹. It is also used as entirely synonymous with water-parting or divide. Three authoritative technical dictionaries describe the usage of the term as following:—

“A summit or boundary line separating the adjacent drainage basin”: *Multi-Lingual Technical Dictionary on Irrigation and Drainage*. Published by the International Commission on Irrigation (New Delhi 1967). (p. 81).

“The divide between drainage basins”: *Nomenclature for Hydraulics—ASCE Manuals and Reports on Engineering Practices No. 43* (New York 1962). Published by the Hydraulics Division of the American Society of Civil Engineers (p. 470).

“The dividing line between drainage basins”: *Glossary of Irrigation and Hydro-electric terms*. Publication No. 5 of the Central Board of Irrigation and Power, Government of India (New Delhi 1954) (p. 114).

The concensus¹² on how a watershed is to be defined has not meant any unanimity on the details of the connotation of the term; or the identification of particular mountain ranges as watersheds. During the Sino-Indian border talks of 1960, the Chinese delegation felt that a true watershed should be one which entirely excluded two adjacent drainage basins from each other; and in case, the drainage basins were connected, it would cease to be a watershed. The Indian side said that any mountain range which divides the major part of the drainage in an area into two halves could be a watershed¹³. Whatever may be the authority for these, the Chinese view does seem to exclude from the purview of the term most mountain ranges till now regarded as watersheds, which cannot be reasonable; and one could properly regard a watershed as the dividing line between drainage basins wherein all or most of the waters falling on the slopes of the divide flow in different directions and do not

join except at a considerable distance. What seems essential is that the water should flow in different directions.

The difficulties which can be caused by confusion between a watershed and the crest-line where these are different ranges are known; and the Argentina-Chile¹⁴ dispute highlights the type of pitfalls to be avoided. The further differentiation is made in a recent study by A. O. Cukwarah, a distinguished African jurist, between hydrographic, orographic and transportational water-partings for establishing the point that confusion between them vitiates the utility of watershed boundaries or frontiers¹⁵. This may be difficult to accept. A watershed boundary is obviously the hydrographic boundary only. The orographic is the crest line and one can rarely mistake one for the other. The problems created by failure to spell out whether one is dealing with the watershed or the crest-line has been repeatedly dealt with and Ireland's two monumental works on the Americas furnish numerous examples¹⁶. One is not aware of a transportational boundary, that is, an insuperable obstacle to line communications, being mistaken as a water-parting either.

When a dispute does arise as to whether a boundary is along the crest-line or a watershed-range (which is different from the crest-line range), attempts are sometimes made to determine the superiority of one over the other. Such a consideration generally involves the three factors of clarity in delineation/demarcation, economic implications and military interests. Watersheds are claimed as easy to identify/delineate. A boundary along a watershed permits the head-waters of river system to be under the control of the State through which the rivers pass. This can be important, as one can see from Indo-Pakistan relations¹⁷. The main argument in favour of a crest-line is that it will be higher in elevation than a water-shed and be militarily a more defensible barrier¹⁸. All these considerations of clarity, economic implications and defensibility are of value only if very broad generalisations are being attempted and, on the ground, each situation will have to be judged on its own. Not all watersheds are easily visible on the ground; nor need the inclusion of the head-waters in a State's territory always be vital to the State's interests. The

river system which is separated from another such system by the watershed in question need not pass through one State only. Similarly, a crest-line may not always be an obstacle to communication. The very fact that it is different from a watershed means that the crest-line is crossed by various river-courses and where these courses are, channels of communication tend to run along them. *A priori*, there can be nothing to choose between a watershed as a boundary or a crest-line as a boundary. One may just as well seek to decide whether a river is a better boundary or an ocean; and which of them is superior to a mountain range. Excellence has to be judged in the context of the criteria relevant to the purpose, which the excellence has to achieve. Granted these, still one prime consideration can be postulated. Whatever is chosen to serve as a frontier, it should be a boundary and an obstruction. Whether it is civil administration, military defensibility or cultural homogeneity, all of them are bound to be affected by barriers to communications. If the barrier is a major one, they will tend to stop at that barrier instead of spill-over. Where the barrier is crossed, it is unlikely that the State crossing it would be halting immediately at the foot, on the other side of the barrier either. It will instead tend to surge forward.

The question whether the crest-line should be the boundary or the watershed line, where these two lines are different, should properly arise only when the dispute involved is a boundary dispute and not a territorial one. It is likely to be of the nature of a boundary dispute where the two lines are located near each other and the territory falling between them is not substantial; and the area is either not populated or very sparsely populated, as well as lacking any administrative or cultural identity of its own¹⁹. In such cases, the alternatives available should be regarded as three. The boundary can be along the crest-line, it can be along the water-parting or it can be at some point in-between. If the problem is truly a boundary problem, the question of the boundary being located in between the two lines of the waterparting and the crest-line should normally not arise. The solution would therefore appear to lie in who is able to show better title or less inchoate title to the area lying between the two regions.

Data on occupational limits or other of the citizens belonging to the two States should normally be available²⁰. If the occupational rights indicate that the area between the two ranges belongs to one State either wholly or mostly, it will indicate that the entire area should be regarded as belonging to that State and the line properly becoming the boundary automatically indicated. The problem however remains, the evidence of utilisation and of occupational limits concerning the area between the two ranges may not be clear; that is, utilisation or occupational rights are enjoyed by both sides. *Prima-facie*, one may then have to take the view that one alone of the States involved is really having utilisation or occupation rights to the area between the two ranges; and whatever use is being made by the inhabitants of the other State is of a trans-border nature²¹. For, one or the other of the two mountain ranges should be a sufficiently important barrier to communication, for the area between the two ranges to belong to one of the populations only. If the area properly belongs to one side, then the other should be the side having trans-border rights. The case where both sides are utilising the area and both the mountain ranges are serious barriers to communications or not barriers to communications at all, should rarely arise. Where it does, the mountain ranges cease to have the primary quality of being barriers to communications and the boundary need not, therefore, be along either of them. It could properly be drawn along the actual lines of occupational limits in between the two.

The question of watershed boundaries is not one of theoretical interest only. During recent years, a major Asiatic power has taken the view that not only watersheds and other major mountain ranges need not tend to be frontiers; but that even attempts to seek a coherent pattern in the formation of traditional boundaries are illogical. Watersheds, by their mere existence, do not automatically constitute international boundaries. A substantial part of the world's boundaries, however, are along watersheds. A glance at the World map can help one to list as such the boundaries of Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Afghanistan, Sardinia, Russia, China, Sikkim, Tibet, Vietnam, Panama,

Congo, Alaska, Nepal and Burma. An exhaustive list would probably include boundaries of most members of the United Nations. The difficulties that crop up in ascertaining the location of watershed boundaries should not detract from the facility with which they are already serving as boundaries. Watersheds also need not result always in two completely separate river-systems and may deal only with the bulk of the waters drained. The frontier zones which occur in the vicinity of a boundary are not peculiar to watershed boundaries and cannot affect their utility or validity. When the crest-line and the watershed differ, the ascertaining of the correct boundary will depend on other factors such as legal title and occupational limits²². If what is being sought is a fresh determination of boundaries, the range which has to a greater extent the qualities of a barrier may be the best boundary.

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3. V. ADAMI, *National Frontiers in relation to International Law*, tr. by Lt. Col. T. T. Behrens (London 1927), pp. 109-16.
4. ERIC FISHER, "Nature and functions of boundaries", *Principles of Political Geography*, ed. Hans W. Weigert (New York 1957), p. 96. Also pp. 203-04. The Case studied by Prof. Fisher is western Czechoslovakia.
5. A. E. MOODIE, *Geography behind politics* (London 1947), p. 89 and p. 82.
6. There is a somewhat startling suggestion by Dr. R. Peattie that the transitional area on the two sides of a mountain range should be separated from the two states and be formed into a new state. *Look to the frontiers—A geography for the peace-table* (New York/London 1944), pp. 119-36.
7. The barrier-effect is the first of a frontier's characteristics to receive detailed attention as in Col. Holdich's hands. *op. cit.*, pp. 46, 94 & 123. The view continues to hold good. Prof. Jean Gottman, for instance, regards it and strategic necessities as the basic considerations for frontier-makers. "Les frontieres et les marches" in *La Politique des etats et leur geographie* (Paris 1952) pp. 121-22.

8. It is not being suggested that reconnaissance and route surveys are not useful or must not be the basis for ascertaining or settling the location of boundaries. They have in fact been invaluable for the purpose in a large number of cases. There is a risk in the use of any material, made without appreciation of the limitations of that material. See "Boundaries and Maps", *Indian Journal of International Law* (July 1964), pp. 367-88.

9. Both the proponents as well as opponents of the organic view of the State have subscribed to this zonal conception, once it was spelt out by F. Ratzel in "Die grenze als periferisches organ" and "Grenze und gestalt", *Politische Geographie* (Munich/Leipzig 1897), pp. 501-30. For instance, Jacques Ancel, *Geographie des frontieres* (Paris 1938), pp. 194-95.

10. Ladis K. D. Kristof, "The nature of frontiers and boundaries", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* (1959), pp. 276 and 281. Also R. Y. Jennings, *The Acquisition of territory in International Law* (Manchester 1963), pp. 3 and 14.

11. One can perhaps quote here what an authoritative dictionary has to say, as different from the technical experts. According to the OED, *watershed* is the equivalent of the German *wasserscheide* and became common as a scientific term about 1800 AD. The English word which first appears about the same date was perhaps formed in imitation of the German synonym. Three meanings are given : (i) The line separating the waters flowing into different rivers or river basins ; a narrow elevated tract of ground between two drainage areas, thus meaning a water-parting ; (ii) loosely, (a) the slope down which the water flows from a waterparting and (b) the whole gathering ground of a river system. *A New English Dictionary on Historical Principles ; Founded mainly on the materials collected by the Philological society*, Ed. Sir James A. H. Murray and others, (Oxford 1928), Vol. X. Part II, p.v. 178.

12. This is not to suggest that the confusion (apparently inevitable in all use of technical terms not specially invented) between a terminology which in popular usage connotes a multiplicity of phenomena and the different/distinct identity of the phenomenon, does not exist in the case of the *watershed*. The OED has been referred to above. Among others, W. L. Marsh's *Landscape vocabulary* (Los Angeles 1964) regards the area which supplies water to a stream as a *watershed* ; and synonymous with *interfluve* and *divide*. *Interfluve* is the ridge between adjacent stream valleys, (pp. 172 and 311). Prof. F. J. Monkhouse's *Dictionary of Geography* (London 1965) equates *watershed* with *divide* and *water-parting*, except that in the United States a *watershed* means the gathering ground of a single river system (pp. 326-27). The British Association for the Advancement of Science's *Glossary of Geographical terms* (2nd ed. London 1966) compares the standard English and American usage and throws up its hands at the way *watershed* is used to denote different things on the two sides of the Atlantic. *Water-parting* is however a safe enough term everywhere (p. 484). *Longman's Geographical Dictionary* (London 1966), also edited by Sir Dudley Stamp, follows the *Glossary* in respect of *watershed*, *divide* and *water-parting* ; and is clear that *interfluve*, *crest* and *escarpment* are quite different from them (pp. 137, 204 and 458). W. G. Moore's *Dictionary of Geography—Definitions and Explanations of terms in Physical Geography* (London 1967) also equates *watershed*, *water-parting* and

divide; though noting the different use of *watershed* in America. It adds that since rivers encroach upon each other's territory, any *watershed* should be regarded as temporary ; and *watersheds* need not be along the ridge (*crest?*) of a range of hills or mountains (p. 238). J. C. Swayne's *Concise Glossary of Geographical terms* (London 1968) which is the latest in the field is happy to have *watershed* the same as *divide*, which latter is the line of separation between two adjacent drainage basins (and does not worry about American usage). (pp. 50 and 149).

13. *Report of the Officials of the Government of India and the Peoples Republic of China on the boundary Question* (New Delhi 1961), pp. 37-39 ; 235-37 ; cr. 177-178.

14. A dispute which has dragged on for over a hundred years despite considerable good-will on both sides ; and apparently settled now. *Award of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II for the Arbitration of a Controversy between the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Chile* (London 1966).

15. A. O. Cukwurah, *The Settlement of boundary disputes in International Law* (Manchester 1967), pp. 181-84. The point is dealt with in the review article of the *Indian Journal of International Law* (January 1968), pp. 130-32. Dr. Cukwurah briefly notes also the Court's observation in the *Preah Vihear Case*, that the adoption of a watershed as the frontier pre-supposes the knowledge that it may differ from the crest.

16. G. IRELAND, *Boundaries, Possessions and Conflicts in South America* (Cambridge, Mass. 1938); *Boundaries, Possessions and Conflicts in Central and North America and the Caribbean*. (London 1941).

17. The best brief account is by Ludwik A. Teclaff. *The river basin in history and law* (Hague-Martinus Nijhoff 1967), pp. 163-65.

18. The ability of the watershed to be a barrier will naturally depend on the technological level of the State involved and will differ from State to State and period to period. Jean Brunhes and Camille Vallaux, *La Geographie de L'histoire*, (Paris 1921) p. 355.

19. The persistence of the cultural and administrative identity, inspite of political changes can be easily lost sight of. See the Wales-England boundary's study in Prof. W. Gordon East's *The Geography behind history* (London-Nelson 1965), pp. 103-14.

20. T. S. Murty, "Evidence on traditional boundaries", *Indian Journal of International Law* (October 1968), pp. 479-514. One can usefully add to the evidence cited : Max Gluckman, "The Kingdom of the Zulu of South Africa", *African Political Systems* ed. M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard (London 1940), (5th impression 1955), pp. 29-30 ; C. K. Meek, *Land Law and Custom in the Colonies*. (2nd edition, London 1949), pp. 13-31 ; 272-74 ; T. Olawale Elias, *The nature of African customary law* (Manchester 1956), pp. 296-97.

21. J. R. V. Prescott deals with the problem posed by pastoral populations who migrate seasonally in his 'Somali Problem'. *The Geography of frontiers and boundaries* (London 1965 ; reprint 1967), pp. 139-46.

22. The issue here is how a traditional boundary in hilly areas is to be located on the ground, where the evidence regarding the location of the boundary does not yield a clear conclusion ; and it is not being suggested that wherever there are several minor water-partings close to each other, the boundary should be drawn according to occupational limits. If the boundary has been formalised

by diplomatic processes, the question of superseding it by occupational limits does not arise. It should also normally not arise if what is involved is the identification of a water-parting ridge, specified in a diplomatic document. The exception will be when the formalisation purported to be a clarifying and confirming of a traditional boundary ; and doubt arises on the correct interpretation of the document. In such a contingency, the ascertaining of occupational limits will be relevant for determining what ridge the traditional boundary was along or adjacent to ; and hence could have been that intended by the framers of the diplomatic document in question.

Faced with (what seemed to him to be) such a contingency, Dr. Alastair Lamb suggests the formation of a joint-commission. *McMahon Line. A study of the relations between India-China-Tibet 1904-1914.* (London 1966), vol. II, p. 581. In that particular case of the Namkha Valley, fortunately, the map to be interpreted was vastly clearer than Dr. Lamb was prepared to give credit for. A practising diplomat would also be less hopeful of a joint-commission's capacity for deciding such an issue. One recalls Richlieu's despatches on the 1725 Franco-Austrian Frontier Commission, quoted by G. P. De Lapradelle. *La Frontiere* (Paris 1928), pp. 43-44.

THE HISTORY OF THE HIMALAYA

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Kamarupa (ancient Assam, 100 BC-650 AD), Nepal, Kartripur (ancient Kumaun-Garhwal), Kuluta (Kulvat, ancient Kulu) and Kashmir find frequent mention in the epigraphs and literature of the early dynasties of North India (320 BC-550 AD).

Dissolution of the unifying forces in North India after the death of Harsha of Kanauj in 647 AD resulted in the upper Himalaya, from Kamarupa to Kashmir, succumbing to the growing influence of Tibet. In the beginning of the sixth century several chiefs of Central Tibet combined to support the head of one clan as their leader. The creation of the nucleus of a strong Tibet led the Tibetans successfully to press on into the adjacent regions. Song tsan gampo (Srong btsan sgampo r. 605-50), first great king of Tibet, invaded China in 635 and eventually received an imperial Chinese princess, Wenchung, as his bride. He then challenged the Chinese in Turkistan. The struggle to dominate Central Asia did not remain confined to China and Tibet alone; it involved most of the neighbouring countries like Ladakh, Baltistan and Gilgit. Except Kashmir, then under the rule of the powerful Karkota Naga dynasty, Song tsan gampo conquered all of them and stationed military garrisons in a few of them. Yasho Varma of Kanauj (700-740) and Chandrapida Vajraditya and Lalitaditya Muktapida of Kashmir successfully checked the Tibetan advance in the south and west in 700-750 and even marched deep into the north-western region of the Tibetan empire.

During the period of the ascendancy of Tibet in Central Asia from the mid-seventh to the early ninth century, the first foundations of Buddhism in Tibet were laid by Buddhist scholars from India. The extensive Tibetanization of the cultural and ethnical structure of the lands in the upper Himalaya also

started during this period. Chiefs from Central Tibet, who founded the independent kingdoms of Bhutan in the east and Ladakh including Purang, Guge and Spiti in the west, accentuated this process of acculturation.

The advent of Muslim invaders in North India in the eleventh and twelfth centuries transformed the entire socio-political set-up in North India. Under the pressure of new forces, all major states there collapsed one after another. Muhammad-bin-Bakhtiyar Khalji, one of the commanders of the first Muslim dynasty founded by Qutub-ud-din Aibak in 1206, even attempted an invasion of the Eastern Himalaya, especially Bhutan, in 1205. Muhammad Shah Tughluq (1325-51) attempted an invasion of the Western Himalaya, but he could not advance beyond the foothills. The Himalaya, however, maintained its frontier character. Rajput princes migrated to the Central Himalaya, where a large number of independent principalities like Gorkha sprang up as a result of their adventures. Medieval Hindu culture and ethnic traditions swept the entire lower Central Himalaya, absorbing or compromising with the local cultural and ethnic complexes. Most of the newly founded principalities in the Central Himalaya recognized the supremacy of the Sultans and Emperors of Delhi. The Mughals developed a policy of freezing the Himalaya frontier, but they extended their suzerainty over all principalities in the Himalaya from Assam to Kashmir. In order to maintain this policy, Akbar (r. 1556-1605) brought Kashmir under his control in 1586. Jahangir (r. 1605-27) and Shah Jahan (r. 1627-58) tried to extend their frontiers up to Baltistan and Ladakh in order not to allow any invasion of Kashmir from Central Asia. Assam suffered several invasions of the Mughal Subedars of Bengal in the seventeenth century. Mir Jumla marched on Assam in early 1662. The peace treaty concluded in January 1663 provided for the cession of all territory west of the Bharali river to the Mughals. Ladakh became a feudatory of the Mughals in 1665 in the time of Aurangzeb (r. 1658-1707).

The apogee of the Mughal power in India coincided with the re-emergence of Tibet under the spiritual and temporal leadership

of Dalai Lama V (blo bzang rgya mt sho 1617-82) in 1642, as the most important factor in Central Asia. Through subtle diplomacy and the backing of the Mongol Prince Gushri Khan, he established the supremacy of the Gelugpa Sect of the Buddhism of Tibet over the entire country. The Mongol-Tibet war with Ladakh in 1681-83 led to an alliance between the ruler of Ladakh and the Mughal Governor of Kashmir about the same time. Intervention by Tibet in the internal affairs of Bhutan in 1728-31 ultimately led to the imposition of a suzerainty of sorts over Bhutan.

The British, who became interested in the great commercial potentialities of the Himalaya border countries and those beyond the Himalaya from the second half of the eighteenth century, sought to establish commercial relations with them after they reached the foothills of the Eastern Himalaya in 1767. All early attempts designed to achieve this objective failed; only the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1814-15 provided the British with the first major breakthrough in the Himalaya. While this made the British frontier of Kumaun and Garhwal contiguous to Tibet, the British sought to open trade channels through Sikkim and the Western Himalaya progressively for increased intercourse between British India and the countries beyond the Himalaya. Special treaty relations with Punjab and Kashmir between 1815 and 1870 led to the consolidation of the British position in the Western Himalaya and the extension of their influence into Central Asia. Increased contacts with Central Asia, growing Russian influence there and the isolationist policies of Tibet towards the end of the nineteenth century gave a new turn to the British policy in the Himalaya. The British fought Tibet in 1888-1889 (on the Sikkimese territory) and 1903-1904 and secured a buffer position for Tibet on the Himalaya borders by three consecutive agreements with Tibet, China and Russia on 7 September 1904, 27 April 1906 and 31st August 1907 respectively.

This situation in the Himalaya continued until the British withdrawal from India on 15 August 1947. Sovereign India entered into fresh treaty relations with Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal and formulated a frontier policy, based on both political and strategical considerations as well as needs of planning and

development in the Himalaya. A new element of urgency for a proper understanding of the importance and problems of the Himalaya emerged with the changed status of Tibet under the control of People's China in the summer of 1951. Both China's aggressive activities along the entire Himalaya borders since the summer of 1959 as well as her invasion of India in the winter of 1962 have had a far-reaching impact on the course of history in the Himalaya.

NEFA

The present area of NEFA has always been a part of Assam since the earliest times. The early rulers of Kamarupa exercised a political control of sorts over it. Bhagadatta's dominion before the first century AD touched the confines of South-West China at a distance of about a month's journey from the capital of Kamarupa. According to Sanskrit sources and the travel account of Yuan Chwang, the northern limits of Kamarupa including Bhutan extended much beyond the frontiers of modern Assam.¹ The dynastic change in Kamarupa after the death of Bhaskar Varma (r. 599-650) in 650 AD and the consequent political instability in north-eastern India reduced ancient Assam to its natural confines in the Eastern Himalaya. The rulers of the Pala dynasty (1050-1228), the last important dynasty of Kamarupa, had authorized the northern hill chiefs to levy certain dues on the villages on their southern periphery in return of which they paid tribute. The Kamarupa rulers also used other means, such as contracting matrimonial alliances, for forging closer relations with the northern hill tribes.

The decline of the Pala dynasty occasioned the rise of a number of chieftains and Assam suffered several invasions from the east and the west. These invasions neither induced the Assamese to unite nor reduced their territory. Sukapha (Hso ka hpa, r. 1228-68) from the Ta'i kingdom of Mong Mao in Upper Burma, founder and first ruler of the Ahom dynasty in Assam, conquered Upper Assam in 1228. Through force and stratagem, Sukapha and his successors consolidated their power over all the tribes of Eastern India like the Naga, Kachari and

Chutiya. Ahom contacts with the northern hill tribes started only after the annexation of the Chutiya country around Sadiya in 1523-24. An officer, known as the *Sadiya Khowa Gohain* (Governor of Sadiya), looked after the Ahom relations with the tribes around Sadiya. The raja (king, chief) of Darrang and special agents were responsible for the Ahom relations with the northern frontier tribes².

The Ahoms, however, did not always have a smooth position. The tribes, which strongly resented denial of their traditional rights and privileges in the foothill villages, frequently resorted to raiding their foothill neighbours. The Ahoms, even with their superior force and weapons, could hardly punish them. For, though equipped with primitive arms like bows and arrows only, they had the advantage of the wild mountain terrain. Many times when the Ahom armies, ignoring these disadvantages, marched into the northern hills, the results were heavy casualties and defeat for them³. This led the Ahoms to develop a policy of conciliation by assigning to each tribe certain number of *paiks* (tax-paying households or settlements) and giving it the right of realizing a certain amount of cereals, cloth, iron and salt, called *posa*, and manual labour from those *paiks*. The Mishmi rights over the hills near the Dibong river were confirmed in return of tribute including four baskets of *tita* (poisonous herb) by an official deed of grant in the time of Raja Suhunmung (r. 1497-1539). The Adi tribes which did not receive any *posa*, received regular presents from the gold washers employed by the Ahom government to extract gold from the riverine sands of the Adi hills. Peace in the foothill region was also ensured by specifying the passes by which the tribesmen could come down to the plains, and by erecting embankments along the foothills. The Ahoms also took recourse to armed action against the menacing tribes whenever circumstances permitted. The Ahoms received tribute from all frontier hill tribes as a token of acknowledgment of the Ahom sovereignty. The Bhotiya tribes (that is, the Sherdukpa and Monpa), however, owed no allegiance to the Ahoms. The Sherdukpas, the in-between people, were independent of both the Ahoms and Tawang. The Monpas, with

their nucleus at Tawang, were under the control of the abbot of the Tawang monastery.

The history of the North-East Frontier entered a new phase with the rebellion of the feudal chiefs and the Moamaria tribe and the Burmese involvement in Assam towards the end of the eighteenth century, when the policy of westward expansion of the Burmese King Bodawpaya (r. 1781-1819) led to the conquest of Assam. Eventually, British intervention in Assam led to the first Anglo-Burmese war of 1824-26 and the expulsion of all Burmese influence in Assam. By the peace treaty of Yandabo, signed on 24 February 1826, the whole of Lower Assam and parts of Upper Assam, like the Matak and Sadiya territories, were annexed to the British dominion in India. For the administration of the annexed districts, the British appointed an Agent to the Governor-General on the North East Frontier of Bengal. For controlling the affairs of Upper Assam, and more especially the tribes of the North-East Frontier, they also appointed a junior commissioner.

Experience gained in the period post-1826, especially from the dealings with the Khamptis and Singphos in the east and the Bhutanese in the west, made it clear to the British government that, with scanty knowledge of the northern tribes and their hills, any attempt to bring them under effective administration through military measures might be futile, if not disastrous. For this reason, the government refrained from advancing its boundaries over all the tribes around the northern districts of Assam and maintained the *status quo* so far as both the claims of the tribes and British political relations with them were concerned. However, to promote closer relations with the tribes, the government developed a few trade marts along the administrative frontier at Sadiya, Mazbat (present Charduar) and Udalgiri (Kariapara Duar)⁴. Free entry allowed to the tribesmen into the plains led to complications. The Adi and Dafla tribes claimed all the Miri *bahatia*, *posa* paying households or settlements that had sprung up in the adjacent British territory as a result of the security and stability ensured there.

Local British officers strongly advocated a policy of per-

manent occupation and control of the northern frontier tracts. But both the Government of Bengal and the Government of India ruled it out. In their view, the problem was not so much of effecting the permanent occupation of those frontier tracts as how and where to stop the British advance. They advocated conciliation and persuasion and not coercion for bringing the northern hill tribes into the framework of British administration in India. By constant persuasion, the Government took away from the Aka and Dafla tribes in 1844 and 1852-53 their right of direct dealing with the paiks for realizing the *posa* and made them accept lump sum payments from the Government in lieu of the *posa*. The Government promised annual subsidies in kind to the Adi tribes by concluding three agreements with them in 1862, 1863 and 1866. The administration also encouraged the tribesmen to join the army or police. The administration took recourse to economic or military blockades only when absolutely necessary. John Lawrence, Governor-General of India (1864-69), warned in 1865 that if at any time it was found necessary to advance into the hills beyond the administrative border, the British troops should be there only so long as necessary for the attainment of the object and no longer.

Many hostile events of varying degrees of intensity occurred between the Government and the tribes before 1873 when for the first time a restriction was sought to be effectively imposed by the Government on the free intercourse between the hills and the plains by the Inner Line Regulation Act. There was also the question of the security of the British officers deputed to carry out explorations and surveys in the northern frontier tracts. An administrative line, formulated in 1873 and called the Inner Line, denoted the northern extent of the areas under the effective control of the Government and regulated intercourse between the people of hills and plains for purposes of trade or collection of the forest produce and so on. The hostile attitude of the Adi tribesmen towards the Survey parties in 1876-77 and their interference with the trade route to Sadiya and the Bebejiya (Chulikata) Mishmi raids in the plains in 1878-79 led to the establishment of three advance outposts at Nizamghat,

Bomjur and Bhisemnagar in the Adi and Mishmi hills. The Government also prohibited the Padam tribesmen from coming down to Sadiya with arms on their person.⁵

The Assam administration created the post of a special officer in 1882 in charge of the relations with the frontier tribes bordering Sadiya and appointed J. F. Needham of the Bengal Police and designated him Assistant Political Officer for the purpose. The arrangement regarding location of frontier outposts, their supplies, the patrolling between them, etc., as well as political relations with the Adis and Mishmis were carried on through him as soon as he acquired sufficient frontier knowledge.

In 1906-7, the Assam administration advocated a forward policy in the region of the North-East Frontier. The Government of India, however, permitted the Assistant Political Officer only to tour the frontier areas in the Adi and Mishmi hills. In 1911, when the Government was faced with two major issues of internal and external origins on this frontier, (1) the murder of Noel Williamson, Assistant Political officer (1905-11), and his party at Komsing by the Minyong tribesmen and (2) the threat posed by the Chinese incursions at some points of the frontier, it adopted the policy rejected in 1906-7.

The murder of Williamson reflected the persistently defiant attitude of the Adi tribes towards the British authority. The Chinese had been sighted well within the Adi and Mishmi borders contiguous with Tibet. Although there was no doubt in the mind of the administration about the northern limits of the frontier hills, which also constituted the extent of the territory of India in that direction, lack of proper exploration and survey in the remote northern parts of those hills had heretofore prevented the Government from defining India's external frontier there in exact and explicit terms. In July 1909, Charles A. Bell, Political Officer in Sikkim (1908-20), cautioned the Government of India regarding the dangers inherent in leaving this frontier undefined and unascertained. For, he feared, Tibet or China might advance a claim to the whole or a part of the areas beyond the Inner Line. Therefore, the Government despatched a strong punitive force called the Abor Expedition under Major-General

Hamilton Bower in 1911 both to obtain redress for Williamson's murder as well as to utilise the opportunity to survey, explore and map as much of the north-eastern frontier country as possible with a view to formulate and define a suitable frontier line on the north and north-east of Assam.⁶

The dangers of an undefined, unsurveyed frontier being pressing in view of the recent Chinese activities impelled the Government to take up an intensive programme of survey and exploration in the Assam borderland with Tibet in 1911-13. Towards the close of this programme in 1913, Captains F. M. Bailey of the Foreign and Political Department and H. T. Morshead of the Survey of India crossed the Dibong-Dihang watershed into Pome and mapped the entire southern catchment area of the Tsangpo river up to Tsona Dzong near the Assam-Bhutan-Tibet trijunction. The Government of India's anxiety to demarcate the areas under its jurisdiction from those under Tibet was not of recent origin. Ever since the British set foot in Assam in 1824, they had made constant efforts to explore the frontiers of Assam and prepare topographical surveys of those areas. Explorations in the Adi and the Mishmi country throughout the nineteenth century had greatly increased the geographical knowledge of the north-east frontier. From the 1860s, the Survey of India had started systematically collecting information regarding the topography of the areas on the Assam-Tibet frontier.

On the basis of the topographical information thus gathered and maps prepared as a result of these reconnaissance surveys, the Government of India sought to negotiate the delimitation of the Assam-Tibet boundary at the tripartite conference between India, Tibet and China held at Simla in 1913-14, originally convened to discuss the political status of Tibet vis-a-vis China. In February 1914, Henry MacMahon, the British Plenipotentiary, submitted to Lonchen Shatta (bLon chen bShad agra), his Tibetan counterpart, for his acceptance two sheets of maps showing the common, traditional boundary between India and Tibet extending from the Isu Razi Pass in the east to the Assam-Bhutan-Tibet trijunction in the west, along with an

explanatory note. On 25 March, Shatta informed MacMahon, in reply to the latter's letter of 24 March, that the Government of Tibet after careful study had agreed to "the boundary as marked in red in the two copies of the maps". The agreed boundary was accepted by the Chinese delegate, Ivan Chen, on 27 April. On 3 June, the British and the Tibetan representatives signed the Convention along with the two maps attached to it, showing in red and blue respectively the external positions of Tibet and the boundary between the Inner and Outer zones of Tibet. The boundary between India and Tibet was shown in red.

The North-East Frontier was again forgotten until the proposal, in the wake of the Government of India Act of 1935, to classify the Sadiya and Balipara Frontier Tracts as Excluded Areas for the purpose of administration in view of their special conditions. The Political Officer of the Balipara Frontier Tract on a visit to Tawang in 1938 found that in spite of Tawang's location to the south of the 1914 boundary Line, hence within India, officials of the Tsona Dzong of Tibet pretended to possess tax collection and judicial authority over the Monpas of the area. When he called for an end of these illegal activities, the Tibetans first pleaded ignorance of the 1914 boundary agreement. Later they sought to explain their activities by pointing out that they had been allowed to maintain estates like Mago south of the 1914 Line. It took a lot of patience and perseverance on the part of the frontier and political officers of the Government of India to explain to the Tibetans the true import of the 1914 agreement and to point out to them that they had been intruding into the territory of India all these years. In October 1944, the Foreign Office of Tibet conveyed to Basil Gould, Political Officer in Sikkim (1935-45), that much against the Chinese wish Tibet fully accepted the validity of the Indian claims up to the 1914 Line⁷.

BHUTAN

The early history of Bhutan is rather obscure. In the early periods, Bhutan did not have a separate status outside the political framework of India or Tibet. According to both

the Bhutanese and Indian traditions, a line of Indian chiefs under the tutelage of Kamarupa ruled Bhutan up to the middle of the seventh century AD. Bhutan separated from Kamarupa after the death of Bhaskar Varma of Kamarupa in 650 AD, which exposed Bhutan to incursions from Tibet, and ultimately to its occupation, which began the process of the disintegration of Kamarupa and which disturbed the political arrangement in the Eastern Himalaya. A Tibetan garrison controlled the occupied areas of Bhutan in the time of King Thi Song de tsan (Khri Srong lde btsan, r. 755-97), a descendant of King Song tsan gampo.

Tibetan sway in Bhutan ended with the collapse of the central authority in Tibet in 841 A.D., but Bhutan had been so extensively colonized by the Tibetan soldiers and their descendants by that time that a thirteenth century Muslim historian, Minhaj-us-Siraj, characterized Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar's invasion of the hill country north of Lakshnavati (North Bengal) and Kamarupa as a military campaign against Tibet. Undertaken probably in 1205 A.D. and intended to be against Bhutan, Bakhtiyar's expedition extended only to one of the southern valleys of Bhutan, whose brave archers engaged the invaders in a fierce fight and compelled them to retreat after suffering heavy casualties⁸.

After the ending of the Tibetan sway, no organized political power operated in Bhutan; only nominal temporal control was exercised by some lamas who had originally come to Bhutan from Tibet for missionary work. In the thirteenth century, Lhapa, a lama from Tibet, brought the whole of Bhutan under his leadership. Phago Dujom Shigpo, another lama from Tibet, and his five companions challenged Lhapa's authority and successfully ousted him. Lhapa escaped to the Tromo (Chumbi Valley), where he was well received by a group of Tibetan merchants who promised him monetary aid in consideration of the services he had rendered them while in Bhutan by facilitating communications with Bengal. In his anxiety to secure Tibetan support, Lhapa gave the Chumbi Valley (which belonged to Bhutan at this time) to Tibet.

Nar Narayan (1555-87), second and most powerful ruler of

Cooch Bihar (he extended his sway over all Lower Assam), occupied the Bhutanese territory between the rivers Hindola and Sankosh in the middle of the sixteenth century⁹.

The rise of the Gelugpa sect and its proselytizing activity in Tibet in the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries compelled the lamas of the older sects to seek fresh pastures in the southern countries. In the beginning of the seventeenth century (in 1616 to be precise), Nawang Namgyal Dujom Dorje (Ngag dbang rnam rgyal bdud jhoms rdo rje, 1593-1651), a high lama of the Ralung monastery of the Kargyu Sect in South Tibet, came to Bhutan for prosecuting his religious activities. In a short time he ousted the existing authority of the Nyingma lamas and established himself as the theocratic ruler of Bhutan with the title of the Shabdung Rinpoche (Shabs drung Rin po chhe, Precious Feet), known as the Dharma Raja in India. In his struggle for power, he faced opposition from both the hierarch of the Ralung monastery, Pema karmo, and the ruler of gTsang, Depa. His success against the internal rivals and Tibetans greatly impressed his neighbours and he received many friendly missions from the princes of Cooch Behar and Gorkha. He introduced law into lawless Bhutan and appointed *Pen lep* (dPon slop, Governor of province) and *Dzongpen* (rDzong dpon, District officer) to administer the country¹⁰.

Sikkim, Nepal and Ladakh where the Kargyu Sect had its strongholds recognized the spiritual authority of the first Shabdung Rinpoche and his successors. The king of Ladakh, a disciple of the Shabdung Rinpoche, granted him a number of villages in Western Tibet (such as Tarchhen, Nyanri Gonpa and Zuthul Phuk Gonpa around the holy Mount Kailas ; Dengmar, Rinpung, Doba, Khochar and Ge Dzong near Gartok and Itse Gonpa, Gonpu, and a few other places) for purposes of meditation and worship there. Up to 1959, a Bhutanese monk officer administered those villages from his summer headquarters at Tarchhen and winter headquarters at Khochar with the assistance of a layman.

Shabdung Rinpoche II retained only the spiritual authority for himself. For attending to the general administration of

the country, he created the office of the *Desi* (sDe srid, Regent/temporal ruler) of Bhutan, known as the Deb Raja in India. Investiture of the supreme authority in two persons and the elective nature of the post of the *Desi* greatly influenced the subsequent course of the history of Bhutan. Frequently civil, internecine wars broke out over the issue of succession to the position of the Shabdung Rinpoche or over the question of the election and promotion of officers to superior posts, with the result that internal peace in Bhutan was a rare thing until the creation of the hereditary monarchy in 1907.

In 1642, Central Tibet was conquered by Gushri Khan, who after expelling all the Karma Kargyu lamas from Lhasa, appointed his Gelugpa preceptor, Dalai Lama V, as the religious head of Tibet. He also determined to destroy the strongholds of the Kargyu resistance on the southern periphery of Tibet from Assam to Ladakh. He invaded Bhutan thrice in 1644, 1646 and 1648. But the sympathies of the ex-rulers of Tsang, with whom Bhutan had close religious affinities, being with Bhutan, the Mongol-Tibetan troops had to retreat without achieving their objective.

In 1729-30, a civil war over succession to the position of the Shabdung Rinpoche eventually led to Tibetan intervention in the Bhutanese affairs. Defying the wishes of the leading Bhutanese clergy, Desi Wangpo (Dbang po) installed his own chief councillor, Chhole Namgyal, as the Shabdung. The high Bhutanese lamas replied to this action of Wangpo by resorting to arms and threatening to slay him. From his refuge in North Bhutan, he sought Tibetan military support. But he was traced and murdered. The high lamas reinstalled their nominee and also appointed a new Desi. Po lha nas, the Tibetan commander, soon again intervened in the quarrel between the two rival Bhutanese factions, led respectively by the new Desi and hero Dondub of Kabi (dKar sbis) immediately north of Pangri Sampa near Thimphu. Tibetan troops, supported by a column of Mongol soldiers, invaded Bhutan towards the end of 1730. The intercession of Panchen Lama II and some Karmapa lamas, then pilgrimaging in Bhutan, led to an armistice. The armistice terms

were negotiated in Paro but the two-article peace agreement was signed in Thimphu. According to the terms of this Agreement, the lamas gave up their action against Desi Wangpo and he sent a representative to Lhasa to assure non-infringement of the Agreement. Thus the Bhutan-Tibet agreement of 1730 firmly stipulated imposition of the suzerainty of Tibet and China over Bhutan. For Tibet was a protectorate of China then¹¹. Of course, this superiority over Bhutan soon became purely fictional.

Checked from expanding in the north, Bhutan tried to expand in the south and west. In 1770, in the time of Desi Shidar, Bhutan again invaded Sikkim and occupied all the land east of the Tista river. It withdrew only after a severe reverse at Phodong.

After the Nepal-Tibet rupture in 1788, the Swayambhunath temple in Kathmandu came under the protection of the Shabdung Rinpoche, who was then most friendly with the rulers of Nepal¹².

Cooch Bihar, a buffer between Bengal and Bhutan, often suffered inroads from Bhutan, which grabbed large tracts of the territory of Cooch Bihar along the foothills after the death of the powerful Raja Nar Narayan in 1587. In the factional feuds in Cooch Bihar, Bhutan frequently supported the Raikat (also called Raja) of Baikunthapur, hereditary minister of Cooch Bihar, against the Nazir Dev of Balarampur, hereditary commander-in-chief of Cooch Bihar. The Bhutanese established firm influence in the affairs of Cooch Bihar in 1711 after an uneasy compromise between the Nazir Deo Shanta Narayan and his ally, the Mughal governor of Bengal, on the one hand and Raikat Darpa Deo and the Bhutanese on the other. The decline of Mughal power in Bengal in the early part of the eighteenth century enabled the Bhutanese to strengthen their position in the affairs of Cooch Bihar. The Bhutan Darbar even stationed an agent along with an escort in Cooch Bihar. The Bhutan Darbar struck the Chatika Ningtam/Nyutam (Bhutanese silver coin of the value of a rupee) for circulation in Cooch Bihar. In 1766, Nazir Dev Rudra Narayan contrived the murder of the infant Raja Debendra Narayan (r. 1764-66), then under Bhutanese

protection. When the question of succession to the throne of Cooch Bihar came up, the Bhutanese not only successfully put up a candidate, a step brother of the late Raja, but also compelled the Nazir Deo, who was intending to raise to the throne his own nephew Khagendra Narayan, to leave Cooch Bihar. At this stage the British for the first time appear in the dispute between Cooch Bihar and Bhutan. The Nazir Dev sought the assistance of the government of the East India Company against the Bhutanese, the Bhutanese retaliated by raiding into the British territory adjacent to the Cooch Bihar-Bengal borders. In the clash between the Bhutanese raiders and the British troops under Captain Dennis Morrison, the former were beaten back¹³.

The confusion in the south proved ominous to Seklu, the Desi of Bhutan since 1749. In 1767, he was overthrown by Shidar, who had conducted several operations against the neighbouring countries of Assam, Cooch Bihar and Sikkim and had served in the high offices of state. Shidar owed his position of the Desi more to the dread of his power than to the choice of the clergy headed by the Shabdung Rinpoche ; he even defied the authority of the Shabdung Rinpoche by virtually keeping him in confinement. In order to strengthen his position, independent of the clerical hierarchy, he forged alliances with Panchen Lama III of Tibet (Dpal ldan ye shes 1738-80) and Prithvi Narayan Shah of Nepal (1742-75). These alliances were mainly the result of the growing interference of the East India Company in the affairs of the northern countries, evident from the extensive reconnaissances by British surveyors on the frontiers of Bengal with Bhutan and Nepal and the frequent despatch of British troops to the frontier regions in Assam. James Rennell, Company's surveyor, while trying to cross into Bhutan through Rangamati on the Rangpur-Goalpara frontier, was driven back by the Bhutanese frontier guards in 1767.

On the Bhutanese interference again in Cooch Bihar, especially the kidnapping of the prince and the rani (queen) of Raja Dhairjendra Narayan in 1771 and the Raja himself in 1772, Nazir Dev Khagendra Narayan approached the British for the second time on behalf of the dethroned Raja for help against the

Bhutanese. On 5 April 1773, he signed a nine-point agreement with the government of the Company by which he undertook to pay immediately Rs. 50,000 to the Collector of Rangpur to defray the expenses of the troops sent to assist him, and subsequently to pay one half of the state revenues to the Company. This agreement also provided for the annexation of Cooch Bihar to Bengal. Warren Hastings, Governor-General of the Company, who had already been convinced of the necessity of possessing Cooch Bihar as it was within the natural boundaries of Bengal, accorded protection to Cooch Bihar at once by sending an expedition under Captain John Jones to drive away the Bhutanese. In addition, there were other gains at the expense of Bhutan in the event of the expedition being successful. The British drove the Bhutanese out of Cooch Bihar in April 1773 and occupied their forts of Daling, Chicha and Passakh.

While Desi Shidar was thus confronted against the British troops on the Bhutan-Cooch Bihar borders, his ally Prithvi Narayan Shah, a foe of the British, called the attention of the Panchen Lama to the plight of Shidar and persuaded him to intercede with the British on behalf of the Bhutanese. Prithivi Narayan Shah's and the Panchen Lama's rushing to the help of Shidar had also become imperative in the meantime because of a successful coup against him during his presence at Buxa Duar for conducting operations against the British troops. Both Prithvi Narayan Shah and the Panchen Lama refused to recognize the new regime in Bhutan. In order to relieve the dethroned Shidar from his unhappy engagement and fight against the rebel regime, the Panchen Lama hastened to seek clemency for him by petitioning to Warren Hastings. By the time of the receipt of the Panchen Lama's letter in Calcutta on 29 March 1774, Hastings had already received another petition from the new Bhutanese rulers soliciting peace, offering to give up the whole open country, requiring only the possession of the woods and the low lands lying at the foot of the mountains and the liberty of trading duty free as formerly to Rangpur. Hastings, who had already made up his mind to stop hostilities against Bhutan on receiving the Bhutanese request, gave special credence to the letter of

the Panchen Lama. For by offering easy peace terms to Bhutan, ostensibly on the request of the Panchen Lama, he now found a good opportunity for establishing British relations with Tibet. The granting of the request of the Panchen Lama was also given much importance in view of the reports that Raja Chait Singh of Varanasi had been negotiating with the Panchen Lama and that an unresponsive attitude of the British might well encourage the Panchen Lama's diplomatic interchange with the other rajas in India¹⁴.

Thus, in anticipation of friendly relations with Tibet, Hastings concluded peace with Bhutan on 25 April 1774, by which Bhutan agreed to pay to the British government an annual tribute of five horses and to deliver up the Raja of Cooch Bihar. In order to create a good impression upon Bhutan, Hastings returned to Bhutan a part of the disputed Duar territory on the Bhutan-Bengal frontier. This opened the gates of Bhutan and Tibet to Hastings, who deputed George Bogle to visit both Bhutan and Tibet in order to explore possibilities of trade in that direction as well as to obtain political intelligence. The British sent another mission to Bhutan, with Samuel Turner at its head, in 1783-84.

There was almost no intercourse between Bhutan and the East India Company until 1826, when the Bhutanese and the British confronted each other again on the question of the Duars. There were seven Duars on the Assam-Bhutan frontier, two in Darrang and five in Goalpara. These Duars were normally the property of the erstwhile Ahom rulers of Assam. The Bhutanese had come to possess them in the eighteenth century. [This is the British view. According to the Bhutanese the Duars had belonged to them historically and that they were neither intruders nor poachers there.] The Ahoms had not been able to vindicate their claim before their fall, but they had received an annual payment of yak-tails, ponies, musk, gold-dust, blankets and daggers of the (estimated) value of Rs. 4, 785 as tribute from the Bhutanese for holding the seven Duars. Irregularity in the payment of this tribute strained the relations between Assam and Bhutan. During the Moamaria rebellion and the Burmese invasion of Assam,

the Duars became a refuge for all sorts of runaway criminals from Assam. In 1802, an Assamese embassy, led by Pratap Ballabh Barphukan, visited Bhutan to adjust mutual relations. The Bhutanese reciprocated by sending a 36-man friendship mission with letters from the Shabdung Rinpoche and the Desi which stressed the friendly and historical ties between Assam and Bhutan. The Bhutanese envoys especially complained of the oppression committed along their borders by the Kamrup officers. [There is no mention of these embassies in the Bhutanese historical tradition.] This was the status of the Assam-Bhutan relations in 1826.

In 1837-38, the British government deputed R. B. Pamberton to Bhutan to settle the dispute regarding the seven Assam Duars. According to the British sources, one of the obstacles for opening negotiations with Bhutan was the attitude of Jigmi Namgyal (1825-1881), the Tongsa Penlep, who shared the supreme power in the country with Chhewang Norbu, the Paro Penlep, and whose interests were sure to be affected by the new arrangement regarding the Assam Duars. In 1841, the British government decided to annex permanently all the seven Assam Duars in lieu of the annual payment of Rs. 10,000 to Bhutan as compensation. The British rejection of the Bhutanese demand for increase in this amount in 1854 resulted in the resumption of hostile activities in the Assam and Bengal Duars. To settle the differences, the British government sent Ashley Eden, Secretary to the Government of Bengal, to Bhutan in the cold weather of 1863 against the wishes of the Bhutanese. Eden could not bring the Bhutanese to accept the British stand in the matter. Instead he provided them with an opportunity to extract from him an agreement which postulated surrender of all the Duars to Bhutan as well as all runaway slaves and political offenders. [This is the British view.] The Government of India, which at once repudiated the agreement, declared war on Bhutan on 22 November 1864. The peace treaty, concluded in Sinchula on 1 November 1865, stipulated free trade and the right of the Government of India to arbitrate in all disputes between Bhutan on the one hand and Cooch Bihar and Sikkim on the other.

The British agreed to pay to Bhutan a subsidy of Rs. 25,000 in the first year, Rs. 35,000 in the second, Rs. 45,000 in the third and Rs. 50,000 in every successive year.

The British retained possession of the entire strip of the low, fertile country lying along the foot of the Bhutan hills together with the hilly tract of Daling/Dalimkot or Damsang co-extensive with the Western Duars and to the east of the Tista river. The country so annexed was formed into the two Districts of the Eastern and Western Duars. The Eastern Duars were later incorporated into the co-extensive Goalpara district of Assam. On 1 January 1867, the Daling tract was transferred to the Darjeeling district. On 1 January 1869, the Western Duars together with the Morang strip at the foot of the Darjeeling hills formed the district of Jalpaiguri.

Recrimination and internal feuds, in which group alignments changed frequently, marked subsequent Bhutanese history. The Tongsa and Paro Penleps were major figures in this wrangle. Jigmi Namgyal, Tongsa Penlep, was Desi twice in 1870-73. He retired and appointed his brother Kipchhelpa as Desi ; Kipchhelpa was Desi up to 1879. In the civil war in 1876, the Paro Penlep and the Punakha Dzongpen took shelter in Kalimpong where they received a pension of sorts from the Government of India which also refused their extradition demanded by the Tongsa Penlep, Jigmi Namgyal, on behalf of the *Lhengye Chho* (Lhan rgyas, Council), the Bhutan Darbar. Jigmi Namgyal also defeated Dzongpen Darlung Topgyas, the strong man of Wangdi phodang. In 1876-77, when the Desi informed the Government of Tibet that the British had asked him to construct a road through Bhutan, some Chinese and Tibetan officials visited Bhutan to support him against both the British and the Bhutanese rivals. In late 1884, the Paro and the Tongsa Penlep, Ugyen Wangchuk (who were related to each other), revolted against the Desi, who was supported by Phuntsog Dorji and Alo Dorji, Dzongpens of Punakha and Thimphu respectively. The battle of Chang limi thang, immediately below Thimphu on the right bank of the river, fought in May 1885, in which Phuntsog Dorji was killed and Alo Dorji defeated (he fled to

Tibet), established the supremacy of the Tongsa Penlep, Ugyen Wangchuk, so firmly that no important civil or internecine strife occurred in Bhutan thereafter. dNgos dub again came to fight in Ugyen Wangchuk's time but escaped to Baxa¹⁵.

Thus completely humiliated, Alo Dorji appealed to the Regent of Tibet, Takser Rinpoche. To settle the dispute, the Chinese Amban in Lhasa called a conference of the leading Bhutanese chiefs and the ruler of Sikkim at Galing near Yatung in the Chumbi Valley in 1886. Ugyen Wangchuk, the Tongsa Penlep veered round to the Chinese proposals for the settlement of the dispute. Alo Dorji died in Yatung after some time (he is alleged to have committed suicide). A Chinese and a Tibetan officer, who were sent to Bhutan to execute the settlement in 1888, could not complete their task, owing to the outbreak of hostilities on the Sikkim-Tibet frontier in that year.

During the Anglo-Tibetan war of 1888-9, Bhutan did not give any assistance to the Tibetans. But as soon as peace was restored in 1890, Chinese interest in Bhutan revived and, on the recommendations of Kwang hsu, Assistant Amban in Lhasa, the Emperor of China conferred upon the Tongsa and Paro Penlep titles of the chief and sub-chief of Bhutan respectively. In 1891, the Amban also visited Paro and carried with him a golden letter, with the seal of the Emperor of China, for the Tongsa Penlep.

British frontier officials viewed with great concern the increase in the Chinese influence in Bhutan. As a consequence of the Bhutanese outrages committed on some villages on the Goalpara border (no such dispute according to the Bhutanese), the Government of India stopped the annual subsidy to Bhutan for a time. But friendly relations between the two governments were resumed in 1894 when the payment of the subsidy in full was restored, especially through the good offices of Ugyen, the Bhutanese agent at Kalimpong. Success of the British military expedition to Tibet in 1903-4 was to an extent owing to the cordial relations with Bhutan. While Ugyen Wangchuk, the Tongsa Penlep, assured full co-operation to the British and allowed a part of Western Bhutan to be surveyed for a road up the Amo

Chu, the leader of the British expedition, Colonel Francis Younghusband, confirmed the friendly Bhutanese attitude at a meeting with the Thimphu Dzongpen in the Chumbi Valley in early 1904. Through this Bhutanese officer he also communicated with local Tibetan officers¹⁶. The Paro Penlep, who exhibited a hostile attitude, was reported to have instructed his frontier officer, "If the Sahibs come with but few soldiers, you must beat them, and turn them out, and do whatever is necessary. If they come with many soldiers, I will send a high officer from here with soldiers to oppose them"¹⁷.

However, but for this initial inclination towards the Tibetan point of view, all available evidence points to the full Bhutanese co-operation with the British mission. Lama Kunzang, head of the *Ta tsang* (Grva tshang, monastic colleges of Punakha, Tashi Chho Dzong i.e. Thimphu, Wangdi Phodang, Paro and Tongsa) and a relative of the Tongsa Penlep, and the Tongsa Penlep himself accompanied the expedition to Lhasa. The great respect in which these high Bhutanese leaders were held there helped Younghusband in getting a convention signed by the high monks and senior officials of the Government of Tibet on 7 September 1904. The Government of India conferred the insignia of the Knight Commander of the Indian Empire on Ugyen Wangchuk in recognition of his services to the British mission of 1903-4. In April 1906, the authorities also formalized the transfer of the conduct of foreign relations with Bhutan from the Bengal administration to the Government of India during the advance of the British expedition to Tibet in 1903.

In 1904, both the Shabdung Rinpoche and the Desi of Bhutan died and for the second time in the history of Bhutan both the spiritual and temporal authority of Bhutan were vested in Yeshe Ngodub of the monastery of Sanga Chhokhar, who was then Je Khenpo (nJe mKhan po, Lord Abbot). However, Ugyen Wangchuk, the Tongsa Penlep, managed in actual practice all temporal affairs, with the help of his council. Yeshe Ngodub died in 1907. This time the Bhutanese, the high lamas and the lay chiefs, elected Ugyen Wangchuk, the most influential

chief amongst contenders for the office of the Desi, as the hereditary ruler of Bhutan, *Druk Gyalpo* (Druk rgyal po, King of Bhutan), called the Maharaja of Bhutan in India. For some time, a few local chiefs, who owed allegiance to Dao Pajo, Paro Penlep and Ugyen Wangchuk's erstwhile adversary, remained practically independent. Druk Gyalpo Ugyen Wangchuk ensured the loyalty of all chiefs to himself subsequent to the death of Dao Pajo, the Paro Penlep.

From the first Druk Desi in the life time of the first Shabdung Rinpoche up to 1904, a long line of 56 ecclesiastical and lay regents ruled Bhutan. Up to the time of Desi Shidar, the regents were all ecclesiastics. The first regent was a lama of the hierarchical rank of *umzet*.

Developments in Tibet in the post-1904 period were rather ominous for Bhutan. For no sooner Chao-Erh Feng, Warden of the Szechwan Marches with Tibet, had occupied Lhasa in February 1910 and compelled Dalai Lama XIII (Thub bstan rgya mtsho 1876-1933) to seek refuge in India, he laid claim to Bhutan along with Nepal and Sikkim. He even tried to lure the Bhutanese with the promise of Chinese aid against the "wicked aggressive" foreigners. In view of the Chinese claim on Bhutan, the Government of India revised the 1865 treaty on 8 January 1910. The most important features of the 1910 treaty were : (1) British promise of non-interference in the internal matters of Bhutan; and (2) Bhutan's readiness to abide by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations. The annual subsidy was also increased from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 1,00,000. The Government of India also paid Rs. 2,00,000 annually to Bhutan in lieu of the excise collected on the goods traded between Assam/Bengal and Bhutan.

Bhutan's status in relation to sovereign India remained a matter of conjecture on the morrow of the British withdrawal from India on 15 August 1947. Up to 1947, Bhutan was autonomous ; unlike Nepal it had been under tighter British control and unlike Sikkim, it was more free of the British control. However, towards the end of 1948 a Bhutanese delegation visited India to discuss the matter with the Government of India. India

assured respect of Bhutan's internal autonomy provided Bhutan maintained the same relationship with sovereign India as with British India. Druk Gyalpo Jigmi Wangchuk (r. —1952) renewed Bhutanese connexion with India by signing a ten-article treaty on 8 August 1949 whereby Bhutan agreed to be guided by India's advice in regard to its external affairs in lieu of India's pledge of non-interference in Bhutan's internal affairs. India also agreed to pay to Bhutan a subsidy of Rs. 5,00,000 per annum, and returned the 32-square mile Dewangiri area. Other articles of the 1949 treaty related to free import by Bhutan with the approval of the Government of India, from or through India, arms, ammunition and machinery required for the development and welfare of Bhutan. Bhutan also undertook not to allow any export of such items by the Government of Bhutan or by any private individual.

The 1949 treaty was, however, deficient in several respects. For example, it had no clause relating to Bhutan's defence nor did it make India's advice in the matter of foreign affairs binding on Bhutan.

Cordial and friendly relations had subsisted between Bhutan and India since the 1949 treaty. Druk Gyalpo Jigmi Dorji Wangchuk (r. 1952—) visited India in the summer of 1954. Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, visited Bhutan in September 1958. Since 1949, India had been paying to Bhutan *ad hoc* grants for various development purposes. In September 1959, a Bhutanese delegation headed by Jigmi Dorji of Ha visited New Delhi for discussing with the Government of India the development needs of Bhutan. Accordingly India gave Rs. 15,00,00,000 as aid to Bhutan for taking up major road projects in the country. King Jigmi Dorji Wangchuk again visited New Delhi in February 1961, especially for discussing India-Bhutanese relations and Bhutan's defence and economic development. In June 1961, an expert team of the Planning Commission of the Government of India visited Bhutan for examining the prospects of initiating a planned development programme in various fields in Bhutan and formulated a five year development plan involving a total outlay of Rs. 17.2 crores, to be completely

financed by the Government of India. The actual expenditure estimates, however, put the cost of the Plan at Rs. 10.5 crores. Its implementation started on 1 July 1962.

India-Bhutan relations have been put to a great strain in recent years, especially after the India-China border conflict exposed the Chinese designs in the Himalaya, including Bhutan. While the Prime Minister of India ruled out any pressure on Bhutan, which might impair the independent status of Bhutan, in a public address in Bhutan on 23 September 1958, the Chinese maps showed at least 200-square miles of the Bhutanese territory as China's. On India's protesting to People's China about these outrageous claims, China replied that it respected the proper relations between India and Bhutan. However, Jawaharlal Nehru, realizing the implications of the Chinese stand stated categorically in the Lok Sabha on 28 August 1959 that the protection of the territorial integrity and borders of Bhutan was a responsibility of the Government of India and any aggression on Bhutan would be considered aggression on India¹⁸.

The internal situation of Bhutan, peaceful since King Jigmi Dorji's accession in October 1952, suddenly became disturbed after the murder of Jigmi Dorji of Ha by an agent of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Bhutanese army, Brigadier Chhapdah Namgyal Bahadur, on 5 April 1964. A group of Bhutanese officers again attempted an unsuccessful coup in December 1964, despite full assumption of all state powers by the King. They later escaped to Nepal and are now endeavouring to return to power in Bhutan. Undoubtedly, the King is the most loved and respected leader of the people, but the seeds of discord are surely present in the political situation of Bhutan, largely controlled by feudal groups.

SIKKIM

Sikkim does not appear in the historical complex of the Himalaya border countries until the early 1640s. Prior to this large parts of Sikkim formed parts of the neighbouring countries in the east, south and west. Therefore, its early history is

mostly legendary and mythical. Phuntsog Namgyal (1604-70), appointed first ruler of Sikkim by the three lamas of the three Nyingma sub-sects in 1642, brought under one authority all Lepcha clans. He organized the first centralized administration in the country and created twelve districts, namely, Lassu, Yangthang, Gangtok, Rhenok, Dallom, Barmiak, Tashiding, Song, Living, Maling, Simik and Pandom, each under a Lepcha Dzungpen. Phuntsog Namgyal's dominions extended from Tagona La near Paro in Bhutan in the east to the Tamar river in Nepal in the west and from Titaliya near the Bengal-Bihar border in the south to Thang La near Phari in the north. Sikkim was dispossessed of the greater part of its Tarai by the Muslim governors of Bengal in the third quarter of the seventeenth century.

Fratricidal quarrels in the time of Chador Namgyal (Phyag rdor 1686-1716), third ruler of Sikkim, led to further reduction of the Sikkimese dominions. Peldon Wangmo, Chador Namgyal's step-sister allied with Bhutan in a bid to dethrone and murder him in 1700. The Bhutanese invaded and occupied the whole of Sikkim as far west as Rabdantse and compelled minor Chador Namgyal to seek refuge in Tibet for eight years. The Government of Tibet, which evinced great interest in Chador Namgyal, granted him some estates near lake Yamdok Tso and Shigatse in Central Tibet. The Tibetans, however, did not show any special inclination to help Chador Namgyal immediately, apart from asking the Bhutanese to leave Sikkim alone. The Bhutanese eventually evacuated Sikkim except the south-east areas like Rhenok in 1708. Chador Namgyal's presence in Tibet for eight long years from 1700 to 1708 was utilized by the Government of Tibet for serving the political ends of Tibet. Actually this reduced Sikkim to the position of a mere dependency of Tibet¹⁹. [There is no mention of this incident in the Bhutanese historical tradition.]

Chador Namgyal founded the great monastery of Pemiongchi (Padma yang rtse) in Western Sikkim in 1715 on the model of the great Nyingma monastery of Mondoling in South Tibet and devised a script for the Lepcha speech. The Chamgon Rinpoche,

the abbot of the Pemiongchi monastery and the head lama of Sikkim, has the prerogative of anointing with holy water the reigning sovereign of Sikkim. The monks of Pemiongchi enjoy the title of *Ta thsang*, State monks.

The reigns of Gyurme Namgyal (1707-33) and Namgyal Phuntsog (1733-80) were marked by growing Tsong revolts against the Bhotiya rulers. To secure the eastern frontier of the country from frequent Bhutanese raids, Gyurme Namgyal conscripted large number of Tsongs to work on extensive fortification on the frontier. The Tsongs revolted against the conscription policy ; some of them migrated westwards to the areas now comprising Eastern Nepal.

After Gyurme Namgyal's death, a dispute regarding succession arose between the Bhotiya and Lepcha groups. The Lepchas supported Namgyal Phuntsog's accession. After five years of the dispute, Rabdan Sharpa, a Tibetan who acted as regent during the minority of the king, reached an agreement with the Lepchas, which confirmed Namgyal Phuntsog on the throne of Sikkim and which gave the Lepchas a greater share in the administration of the country. Rabdan Sharpa also introduced several administrative measures like the codification of laws, preparation of lists of tax-payers and levy of land tax on all households in the country. A Tsong uprising in 1752 against the policies of the administration was put down immediately by Chandzod Karwang (Phyag mdsod dkar dbang) and their loyalty won back by tactful diplomacy.

Internal instability in Sikkim coincided with the rise of Desi Shidar in Bhutan and Prithvi Narayan Shah in Nepal in the late 1760s. Bhutan invaded Sikkim in 1770 and occupied all territory east of the Tista river. The Sikkimese eventually expelled the Bhutanese and even obtained the restitution of Rhenok and its neighbouring areas. About the same time Sikkim lost its territory west of the Tista to Nepal. A settlement negotiated at the intervention of Tibet in 1775 fixed the Sikkim-Nepal boundary at the Sango Chu, Sangdi Dzong, Malliyang and the Lha Chu (Kanika river).²⁰

Notwithstanding the boundary settlement of 1775, the

Gorkhas again occupied Ilam on the Kankayi river, a western tributary of the Mechi river, and Taple Dzong on the left bank of the Tamar river in 1788. The Gorkha General, Damodar Pande, also occupied the whole of lower Tista basin in 1788-90. Tenzing Namgyal (1769-93), ruler of Sikkim, escaped to North Sikkim for reassembling his troops and for soliciting aid from Tibet. Tibet, which was already involved in a conflict with Nepal, could render no assistance. Eventually, the Chinese, who came to the rescue of Tibet, imposed a harsh treaty on Nepal in 1792. The Government of Tibet appropriated Tenzing Namgyal's ancestral fiefs in Tibet and annexed the Chumbi region making the Chola-Jelep range the northern and eastern boundary of Sikkim. On the western side the Gorkhas were left in possession of the Sikkimese territory up to the Singali La ridge. Tenzing Namgyal's successors blamed Bhutan for causing the trouble between Nepal and Sikkim²¹. According to the Bhutanese version, Bhutan offered Sikkim Ningtam/Nyutam 1,200 (Bhutanese silver coins equal to Rs. 1,200), 1,200 maunds of rice and cloth, lac and tea which Sikkim did not accept.

Sikkim turned to the British for help against the Gorkhas. Owing to Sikkim's strategic and commercial importance, the British accepted its collaboration in their war with Nepal in 1814-15. After the successful conclusion of the war with Nepal, the treaty ceded the Morang portion at the foot of the Sikkim hills, which originally formed a part of Sikkim but had been annexed by Nepal in 1788-90, to the British. But the British Political Agent on the Purnea frontier Captain Barre Latter, concluded a ten-article agreement with the representative of Sikkim at Titaliya on 10 February 1817, which restored the whole of Sikkim, bound on the west by the Mechi river and the Singali La ridge, to Tsugphu Namgyal (gTsug phug rNam rgyal 1800-63). The British secured the right of arbitration in disputes between Sikkim and Nepal²².

Security against aggression into Sikkim did not, however, end the old internal feuds. The Lepchas, who had formed the vanguard of the Sikkimese resistance to the Gorkha invaders,

opposed any sort of domination by the Bhotiyas. The ruler and his group not tolerating the Lepcha revival got a Lepcha minister assassinated in 1826, whereupon about 1,200 Lepchas migrated to the Ilam area of Eastern Nepal. Abetted by the Gorkhas, they frequently raided Western Sikkim, thereby causing several border disputes between Nepal and Sikkim. In pursuance of the terms of the 1817 treaty, Sikkim referred the question for arbitration to the Governor-General who deputed J. W. Grant, the British Commercial Resident at Maldah and Captain George William Aylmer Lloyd, commanding the British frontier force at Titaliya, for the settlement of these internal factions in 1828. As a result of their intervention, the Lepcha inroaders from Eastern Nepal were compelled to return to Nepal.

A by-product of the Grant-Lloyd tour in the southern hills of Sikkim was the selection of the present Darjeeling (rDo rje gling, place of rDo je) hill as a suitable site for a sanatorium for the convalescence of the British troops as well as for a base for pursuing the British political and commercial designs in the Eastern Himalaya. The British proposal for the exchange of the site did not first find favour with the Sikkim Darbar. However, compelled by the circumstances of the constant Lepcha unrest and the passive attitude of Tibet towards Sikkim, Tsugphu Namgyal presented to the British government on 1 February 1835, in the language of the grant deed, "all the land south of the Great Rangit river, east of the Balasan, Kahel, and Little Rangit rivers, and west of the Rungnu and Mahanada rivers." Instead of an equivalent tract in exchange, the British government sanctioned an annual subsidy of Rs. 3,000 as compensation to Sikkim in 1841, increased to Rs. 6,000 per annum in 1846.

The British government placed this tract under a Superintendent, who, besides the administration and development of Darjeeling, also looked after the political relations between the British and Sikkim. In 1850, the designation of Superintendent was changed to that of Deputy Commissioner.

The development of Darjeeling under the Superintendency of Dr. A. Campbell (1839-64), a former Assistant Resident at

Kathmandu, became closely connected with the worsening of British relations with Sikkim. Darjeeling provided numerous facilities for free trade in both mercantile commodities and labour ; its extensive forest lands, which could be reclaimed for cultivation, lured large numbers of the Lepchas and the Nepalese to migrate and settle there. Such developments not only threatened the traditional privileges of certain Bhotiya families of Sikkim, who had enjoyed the monopoly of trade in this part of the Himalaya so far, but also disturbed the age-old population balance and the inter-tribal relations in Sikkim. Presence of the British close to Sikkim also became a source of embarrassment to the Sikkim Darbar, so far as its relations with Bhutan, Nepal and Tibet were concerned. Tibet gave vent to its displeasure by restricting the Sikkim ruler's visit to Lhasa and by curtailing grazing rights of the border people of Sikkim in Tibet. In such circumstances, the Sikkim ruler appointed Tokhang Namgyal, a Tibetan of strong anti-British convictions and a relative of the ruler of Sikkim by marriage with an illegitimate daughter, as his Chief Minister in 1847.

Tsugphu Namgyal's retirement from state affairs due to advanced age provided an impetus to Tokhang Donyer Namgyal's ambitions. In 1848, he refused permission to J. D. Hooker, a botanist, to explore Sikkim. Permission was granted when Dr. Campbell, the Superintendent, threatened to report the matter to the Governor-General of India. Towards the end of 1849, Campbell and Hooker, who had been travelling in Sikkim with the prior permission of the raja, were arrested and imprisoned near the Sikkim-Tibet border by the order of Chief Minister Namgyal. This action had, in fact, been precipitated by the British government's reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of the Sikkimese demands to stop the collection of tax in the Sikkim Morang, the settling of the Nepalese on the Sikkim side of the Darjeeling-Sikkim frontier, allowing the entry of merchandise from Sikkim into Darjeeling and to restore the runaway slaves of Sikkim. However, finding no support for his action from either Tsugphu Namgyal or the Tibetans, Namgyal released Campbell and Hooker on 24 December 1849, six weeks after

their seizure. The British government retaliated by annexing the Sikkim Morang and the hill tract around Darjeeling bounded by the Ramman river on the north, by the Bara Rangit and the Tista rivers on the east and by the Nepal frontier on the west and by stopping for a time the annual allowance of Rs. 6,000 to Sikkim. And Darjeeling no longer remained an enclave in the Sikkimese territory.

In 1860, following incidents of the kidnapping of British subjects in violation of certain articles of 1817 treaty, Campbell laid siege to the Sikkim territory between the Ramman and Rangit rivers. Heavy casualties impelled him to retreat from Rinchingpong in Sikkim and fall back on Darjeeling. To avenge the disgrace, the Government of India despatched a strong military force under Colonel J. C. Gawler, accompanied by Ashley Eden as Envoy and Special Commissioner, in early 1861. The hostile Namgyal, the source of all the trouble, fled Tumlong, then capital of Sikkim. Tsugphu Namgyal abdicated in favour of his son, Sidkyong Namgyal (1861-74), who accepted peace on British terms, including recognition of the British protectorate over Sikkim, settlement of the trade and extradition matter, right of the Government of India to construct roads through Sikkim to the Tibet border, banishment of Tokhang Donyer Namgyal and his relations to Tibet and removal of the seat of government from Chumbi in Tibet to Sikkim for at least nine months in a year. The twenty three-article peace treaty, signed in Tumlong on 28 March 1861, embodied all these provisions.²³

The Government of India were then in a position to annex Sikkim, but did not contemplate such a step in view of the British disinclination to involve in any conflict with Tibet, which had claims over Sikkim. The 1861 treaty checked Tibetan influence in Sikkim for a time. Sidkyong Namgyal visited Darjeeling and met the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal in 1873. Disputes with Bhutan and Tibet over grazing rights were solved in mutual interest in Sidkyong Namgyal's time.

In 1874, Tokhang Donyer Namgyal resumed intrigues on behalf of Tindle Namgyal, half-brother of the deceased ruler,

Sidkyong Namgyal. The treaty provisions, especially the one relating to roads, large scale influx of Nepalese settlers and farming out of the Sikkim copper mines to the Nepalese merchants from Darjeeling were given out as detrimental to the interest of Sikkim. John Ware Edgar, Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, deputed to investigate the possibility of the re-establishment of the British trade with Tibet, brought to the notice of the Bengal administration, on his return from a visit to the Sikkim-Tibet frontier along the Chola range in 1873, a communication from the Chinese Amban at Lhasa to the ruler of Sikkim, calling upon him not to encourage road building in his territory and to prevent the British officers from crossing the frontier of Tibet.²⁴ However, the British overlooked these protests in view of Edgar's other favourable observations and the conclusion of the Sino-British Convention in Chefoo on 13 September 1876. A road was constructed through Sikkim to the Jelep La on the Tibet frontier. In 1878, Ashley Eden, Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, proposed to Thutob Namgyal (1874-1914), the ruler of Sikkim, an arrangement limiting the Nepalese settlement to the south of a line drawn across Sikkim from east to west just a few miles to the north of Gangtok, capital of Sikkim. An influential section of the Bhotiyas of Sikkim vehemently opposed this proposal ; there were riots at Rhenok between the Bhotiya and the Nepalese groups in 1880. Rapprochement was, however, brought about by the joint efforts of Dorje Lopen (rDo rje sLop dpon), Abbot of the Phodong monastery, and A. W. Paul, Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, by slightly modifying the 1878 proposal.

Despite the fact that Thutob Namgyal had come to power with the British support, he drifted away from the British influence and succumbed to pressure from the anti-British Bhotiyas and Tibetans. Early in 1886, he abruptly disavowed his subordination to the Government of India, as enjoined by the 1861 treaty. In July 1886, he condoned the Tibetan occupation of the territory of Sikkim up to Lingtu south of the Jelep La. This action of the Tibetans had followed the withdrawal of the mission of Colman Macaulay, a Secretary

to the Government of Bengal, to Tibet in 1886 for exploring the possibilities of trade with that country, in deference to the Chinese wishes.

Unable to invoke the 1861 treaty in the face of this attitude of Thutob Namgyal, the Government of India resorted to a military solution of the situation. Operations commenced in March 1888 and the Tibetans were driven out of Lingtu by September. After the Anglo-Tibetan war of 1888, the Government of India exercised effective influence in the administration of Sikkim by appointing a Political Officer at Gangtok in June 1889, primarily as a British observer on the Tibet frontier and eventually as the British representative for Bhutan and Tibet. The first Political Officer, J. C. White of the Public Works Department, reorganized the entire system of administration in Sikkim. He created a State Council to advise Thutob Namgyal in the administration of the State, conducted land and mineral surveys and settled unoccupied waste land and land occupied by the monasteries.²⁵ Thutob Namgyal, however, continued to defy the Government of India and tried to flee Tibet through Nepal in March 1892. But before he could reach the Nepal-Tibet frontier, the Nepalese authorities, friendly to the British, intercepted him and escorted him back to Sikkim. The Government of India took the opportunity to retire him from his administrative functions. Until November 1895, Thutob Namgyal remained under surveillance at Kurseong in the Darjeeling district; the Political Officer carried on the administration of Sikkim with the assistance of a three-member State Council.

The Government of India also entered into negotiations with the Chinese Amban in Tibet for the settlement of the issues relating to Sikkim and Tibet. In his proposals, the Amban insisted upon retaining *de jure* dependence of Sikkim on Tibet and China, a position which was wholly unacceptable to the Government of India. However, a new set of Chinese proposals, recognizing amongst other things sole British protectorate over Sikkim and the right to discontinue the practice of sending presents by Sikkim to Tibet, became the basis of the settlement. On 7 March 1890, Lord Lansdowne and Amban Sheng Tai signed

at Darjeeling, on behalf of the British and Chinese governments respectively, an eight-article convention, whereby the Government of India was made solely responsible for the internal and external affairs of Sikkim and the upper waters of the Tista river system were accepted as marking the Sikkim-Tibet boundary. The British also secured a supplementary agreement—Trade Regulations (1893)—concerning the India-Tibet trade on 5 December 1893.

Tibet, however, considered both agreements as imposed upon it by China. In view of frequent border violations by the Tibetans, it was agreed in consultation with the Chinese in the summer of 1894 to appoint a joint boundary commission to demarcate the Sikkim-Tibet boundary on the ground. In April 1895, when a British party led by White reached the frontier to start the work of demarcation, the Chinese and the Tibetans did not appear at the site of demarcation. White, however, erected a few boundary pillars on the Jelep La and the neighbouring passes leading into the Chumbi Valley. Demarcation of rest of the border especially around Giagong was temporarily postponed. In June 1902, a military party, accompanied by White expelled Tibetan intruders from Giagong and also took the opportunity to complete the work of boundary survey and demarcation left uncompleted in 1895. British relations with Tibet, however, continued worsening, culminating in the British military expedition to Tibet in 1903. A ten-article Anglo-Tibetan convention signed on 7 September 1904 at Lhasa, consequent upon the success of the British expedition, obtained the Tibetan endorsement of the Sikkim-Tibet boundary as defined in the 1890 convention as also of the British commercial rights in Tibet.

At the time of the despatch of the British expedition to Tibet in 1903, conduct of the Sikkimese affairs was transferred from the Bengal administration to the Government of India.

There occurred no important event until the British withdrawal from India in the summer of 1947. A standstill agreement governed Sikkim's relations with sovereign India until 5 December 1950 when the thirteen-article treaty concluded between the Maharaja of Sikkim and the Government of India

at Gangtok re-established Sikkim's position as a protectorate of India. The 1950 treaty put Sikkim's external relations, defence and strategic communications under the Government of India and entitled Sikkim to receive Rs. 3,00,000 a year from India "so long as the terms of this Treaty are duly observed by the Government of Sikkim".²⁶ Article XI of this treaty authorized the Government of India to appoint a Political Officer as its representative in Sikkim. The status accorded to Sikkim vis-a-vis India by the 1950 treaty was no departure from the status of Sikkim vis-a-vis the pre-1947 British government in India. As a native state of India, Sikkim was under the paramountcy of the British Crown. By making Sikkim its protectorate, India secured for itself rights compatible with Sikkim's internal autonomy. The Government of India would have been within its rights if absorption of Sikkim in the Indian Union had been contemplated, as was done in the case of other princely states in India. In fact, in the early years of the Indian independence, a dominant section of democratic elements in Sikkim, led by the Sikkim State Congress and the Swatantra Dal, wanted Sikkim's full accession to India or gradual extension of the Indian Constitution to the State and Sikkim's representation in the Lok Sabha on the pattern of Jammu and Kashmir.

The post-1947 years have witnessed the growth of a strong movement of democratic forces in Sikkim. The socio-political set-up of the country is such that, despite their minority position in the total population of the country, the Bhotiyas control the government and own large landholdings. Obviously the people of Nepalese origin (major bulk of the Sikkimese population) largely controlled the movement, initially inspired by the Indian National Congress and the Praja Mandal movements. It demanded democratic rights for the masses and abolition of forced labour and zamindari in Sikkim. In May 1949, a major demonstration against the Maharaja was organized at Gangtok in order to obtain a democratic set-up for the country. India intervened in the matter. Subsequently, a popular ministry was formed. It was soon afterwards dismissed and a senior Indian official was appointed to act as Dewan (Chief Minister)

in the State. Owing to pressure from India and the local political parties, three general elections had been held in Sikkim between 1954 and 1960 but no elected body could run its full span. Declaration of emergency in 1962, because of the troubles on the Sikkim-Tibet border, vested all powers in the Maharaja, the Chogyal of Sikkim.

NEPAL

The mythical history of Nepal, according to the *Vamsavalis* containing geneological accounts of Nepal, begins from the time when the Kathmandu Valley was totally submerged in water. Tradition reserves the name "Nepal" to the Valley of Kathmandu, Bhatgaon and Patan. The whole area comprising present Nepal came to be thus known after the annexation of entire Nepal by the Gorkhas in the second half of the eighteenth century. Perhaps the Kathmandu Valley was drained due to some tectonic movement towards the end of the pleistocene era and the flat alluvial bottom of the dried lake was colonized by the Kirat tribes in the beginning of the first millenium B.C.

The more or less systematic history of Nepal starts only with the establishment of political authority by the first Kirat king of Nepal about 600 B.C. The institution of the Nepal era by the Lichchhavis in 100 A.D, in which most of the early Nepalese inscriptions are dated, marked the expulsion of the Kirat authority from the Nepal Valley. The first phase of the Lichchhavi power did not last long, probably due to the rise of the Imperial Gupta dynasty in Magadh (Bihar, south of the Ganga) in the beginning of the fourth century A.D. Initially, the Guptas sought support from the Lichchhavis, as is evident from the marriage of the Lichchhavi Princess Kumaradevi with Chandragupta I (—320 A.D), the founder of the Imperial Guptas, and the representation of that event on his gold coins. By the time of Samudragupta (A.D 320-75), the Lichchavis had been reduced to a mere vassal status, retaining their internal autonomy only.²⁷

Manadeva (462-505), whose achievements in various spheres

have been recorded on the pillar inscription at Changunarayan near Kathmandu, overthrew the yoke of the Gupta subordination on the weakening of their power in the second half of the fifth century and spread his kingdom beyond the Nepal Valley. Even though his kingdom did not extend south of the Tarai, it is not unlikely that his strong position in Nepal proved to be a check to the expansionist schemes of the later Gupta or the Maukhari monarchs of the Ganga basin.²⁸

Manadeva's successors not being strong enough, much of the power was taken over by their *Mahasamanta* (Prime Minister). This process reached culmination in 576 when Anshu Varma (598-636), the Mahasamanta of Thakuri descent, installed the puppet ruler Manadeva II, followed by Gunakamadeva and Shivadeva. Anshu Varma grabbed all power for himself and even dropped the title Mahasamanta from his name in 609. He also assumed full royal titles for himself.²⁹

Anshu Varma's reign marks one of the brightest periods in the ancient Nepalese history and culture. The large number of coins and inscriptions of Anshu Varma and the account of the kingdom of Nepal by Yuan Chwang, who was at Vaishali in North Bihar in 637 A.D (when Anshu Varma was already dead), speak highly of his military, administrative and literary genius. Suppression of the unruly *samanta* (military) governors in the east and south, the Gupta feudatories controlling the Nepal Valley and the Tarai and the tribal chiefs of Eastern Nepal constituted some of his achievements that restored the loyalty of all feudal lords to him and the Lichchhavi sovereign. The effective frontiers of Nepal in his time reached up to the Tarai in the south and intervened between Nepal and the empire of Harsha of Kanauj. The nature of his relations with Tibet, which had just entered into an empire-building phase under King Srong tsan gampo, is rather obscure. However, while there might have been attempts from Tibet to expand southwards, there is no evidence to suggest Anshu Varma's acceptance of any kind of subordination to Tibet. This must doubt the correctness of the Tibetan tradition regarding the marriage of Srong tsan gampo with Bhrikuti, Anshu Varma's daughter. Could an entire tradition be wrong? The admission

of Yuan Chwang and the Chinese annals of the Tang dynasty regarding Anshu Varma's independent position dispels all doubts about his acceptance of Tibetan suzerainty.

After Anshu Varma's death in 636, the Lichchhavis recovered control over Nepal, but they could not resist Tibetan threat from the north so much so that by the year 638-39 Nepal accepted the suzerainty of Tibet. With the growth of close relations between Nepal and Tibet, Nepal became well known to China as well. In 647-48, the Nepalese and the Tibetan forces combined to avenge the insult of the Chinese embassy, led by Wang Hiuen Tse and proceeding to Harsha's court, by a petty chief of Tirabhukti/Tirhut, whom the Chinese accounts have exaggeratingly and incorrectly styled as the usurper of Harsha's throne. Tibetan supremacy over Nepal remained unchallenged until its natural collapse following the civil war in Tibet in the middle of the ninth century. There were, however, certain exceptions. In 703-5 a Tibetan attempt to absorb certain frontier districts of Nepal was foiled and the Tibetan king was killed in an encounter by the Nepalese ruler Shivadeva II (640-705), who had close relations with Magadh and Gaur (North Bengal).

Dharmapala (770-810), the Pala king of Gaur, conquered Nepal in the later part of the eighth century.

The second phase of the Lichchhavi supremacy in Nepal ended in the last years of the twelfth century, when Arideva (r. 1207-16), founder of the Malla dynasty, took over their kingdom.

The Karnata King Harisimha Deva of Simraun, once the capital of Mithila, in the Eastern Tarai subordinated the Mallas in the 1320s; his ancestors had been exercising a sort of suzerainty over Nepal. The army of Sultan Shams-ud-Din Ilyas Shah of Bengal invaded Nepal in 1350, after subduing Tirhut, and plundered, looted and ransacked the towns and temples of the Kathmandu Valley.³⁰

Terror and insecurity caused by the Muslim raid of 1350 helped Raja Sthiti Malla of Kathmandu (1380-1422) to assert his superiority over other local chiefs. His position became stronger after the death of Arjun Malla (1361-82), another

influential chief of the Valley, in 1382. The Nepalese historical tradition remembers him as a patron of literature and initiator of many social and economic reforms. Yaksha Malla (1428-82), grandson of Sthiti Malla, conquered all territories around the Kathmandu Valley including Mithila in the south and Gorkha in the west. His reign is a great landmark in the history of the Kathmandu Valley. After his death the Valley was divided into four principalities. Bhatgaon was taken over by his eldest son Raya Malla, Banepa by the second son Rana Malla, Kathmandu by the third son Ratna Malla and Patan by the daughter. Later, Banepa was absorbed in Bhatgaon. In the sixteenth century, Kathmandu again split into two houses.

The Malla kings always prefixed the title *Jaya* (victorious) to their names.

The history of Nepal before the occupation of the Bagmati (Kathmandu) Valley by Prithvi Narayan Shah in 1769 is not representative of the whole of Nepal as understood today. In addition to the Kathmandu Valley, there were also other centres of power, which occupied an equally important place in the history of Nepal. On the eve of the rise of the house of Gorkha, the main groups of states in Nepal between the Mechi river in the east and the Kali in the west were (1) the Lepcha and the Limbu groups under the king of Sikkim, (2) the Kirati chiefs and the raja of Makwanpur, (3) the Tarai chiefs and the raja of Butwal, (4) the Newar rajas of the Bagmati Valley, (5) the *Chaubisi rajais* (twenty-four principalities) of the Sapta Gandaki basin, including the chiefs of Palpa, Gorkha, Lamjung, Navakot and Pyuthan and (6) the *Baisi rajais* (twenty-two principalities) of the Karnali basin, chief of whom were the rajas of Doti and Jumla.

The early history of most of these principalities still remains obscure. The principality of Doti, oldest amongst them, was in ancient times a part of the Katyuri kingdom of Kumaun-Garhwal. On the break up of the Katyuri kingdom in the eleventh century, Doti was taken over by a scion of the Katyuri line, whose descendants styled themselves first as *Deva* and later as *Shahi*. They controlled the Shor, Sira, Askot, Darma,

Byans and Johar parts of Kumaun, besides the territory between the Kali and Karnali rivers. After some time the line split into two ; the senior branch, known as *Rainka*, ruled over Doti with its capital at Dandeldhura and the junior branch, known as *Bamma* or *Varma*, was in possession of the western territories. The Gorkhas conquered Doti in the year 1785. Before this all these principalities including Bajhang recognized the supremacy of Kumaun.

Jumla, the nucleus of one of the largest early medieval kingdoms in the Himalaya extending from the Bheri river, an eastern affluent of the Karnali, and the Maryum La in Western Tibet in the north to the upper Satluj basin in the north-west, was conquered in the twelfth century by a Khas chief from Garhwal, Nagadeva or Nagaraja, whose inscription occurs on a brass statue at Uttarkashi in Garhwal. Pushing northwards from North Garhwal, he occupied the principality of Guge, then under the rule of a collateral branch of the ruling dynasty of Ladakh. He also overcame the chiefs of Purang, Jumla and Doti. While Semja/Simja, near Dullu in Western Nepal, became the southern capital of his descendants, Taklakhar/Taklakot in Western Tibet was perhaps his northern capital. Ashoka Challa and Krachalla conquered whole of Kumaun and Garhwal in the thirteenth century and held them for almost half a century. Originally worshippers of Shiva, these rulers embraced Buddhism under the strong influence of the Buddhist environment of Western Tibet. Prithvi Malla (1338-58) added other territories in the east and south-west, increased contacts with the plains, accentuated a process of Sanskritization and forged an economic unity between the countries to the north and south of the Himalaya through Jumla. Jumla had already sustained great territorial losses through the breakaway of Doti, Kumaun and Garhwal, which had fallen to the immigrant Rajput princes from the plains, whose influx in Western Nepal later created a power imbalance in Prithvi Malla's kingdom itself and consequently hastened its collapse.³¹

Unification of the principalities between the Gandaki and the Karnali was first undertaken by Drabya Shah (r. 1559-70),

who according to the Nepalese historiography, belonged to a branch of the Rana family of Chitor. Coming originally from the Tarai area near Palpa, Drabya Shah conquered the town of Gorkha in 1559. His work was further carried on by Ram Shah (r. 1606-33), Prithvipati Shah (1669-1716) and Narbhupal Shah (1716-42). Courageous and ambitious as he was, Narbhupal Shah was quick to see his chances of conquering the Kathmandu Valley, then badly ridden with internal feuds and factions. But Narbhupal's very first attempt at capturing the fort of Nuwakot, leading to the Valley from the west, was foiled after a bitter fighting with the garrison of the fort which was assisted by Raja Prakash Malla of Kathmandu (r. 1735-68).

In 1742, when Prithvi Narayan Shah (1722-75) ascended the throne of Gorkha, the Gorkha dominions merely touched the western periphery of the Bagmati Valley. After coming to the throne, he imported modern weapons from Oudh in the south. From 1742, he set out to conquer the three principalities of the Valley. Disruption of trade, consequent to his invasion of the Valley, annoyed the British, who responding to an appeal of Raja Prakash Malla unsuccessfully tried to drive out Prithvi Narayan Shah from the Valley in 1768. Kathmandu fell to Prithvi Narayan Shah on 14 September 1768 and, by November 1769, the rest of the Valley also surrendered to him. Prithvi Narayan Shah thus became the first Gorkha sovereign of entire Nepal and established the present Shah dynasty, by conquest, in 1769. By 1772, he annexed the entire Sapta Kosi basin, bounded on the east by the Mechi river, to the Gorkha dominions. After the death of King Prithvi Narayan in January 1775, his son Heir Apparent Prince Pratap Singh (1751-77) came to the throne, who for the most part of his reign was engaged in a war with the chief of Morang. King Pratap Singh, who died in 1777, left a minor son of three and half years, Prince Ran Bahadur (1775-1805) to succeed him which occasioned a tussle for the regency between the minor King's mother Rani Rajendra Lakshmi and uncle Bahadur Shah, ending in the latter's exile in India. The Queen Mother died in 1785, leaving Bahadur Shah to act as regent up to 1794.

Bahadur Shah further extended the area of the Gorkha kingdom by annexing the *Baisi* and *Chaubisi* groups of western principalities in 1785-87. In 1788, Nepal occupied the greater part of Western Sikkim. The Gorkhas found a pretext for advance into Tibet in the violation of the traditional Nepalese commercial interests by the Tibetans. Tibet accepted peace on Nepal's terms in 1788. Following the question of asylum to the brother of Panchen Lama IV (bsTan pa'i nyima 1781-1852), the so-called Svamarpa Lama, who had sought refuge in Nepal, Tibet was again invaded in 1791. The border villages of Kuti and Kirong in Tibet were occupied. When the Gorkhas reached Shigatse to loot and plunder its rich monasteries, China, suzerain of Tibet, intervened. Chinese armies chased the Gorkhas right up to the northern gates of the Kathmandu Valley, compelling them to accept peace on Chinese terms. The treaty, signed in Nuwakot in September 1792, accorded Nepal a subsidiary status and China the status of suzerain. Nepal also undertook to send every fifth year a tribute mission to China.

The Gorkhas were not inclined to set at rest even after this debacle in the north. Raja Ran Bahadur, who had taken over the control of the country in his hands in 1794, was not very enthusiastic about the military adventures. Therefore, he abdicated the throne in 1799 in favour of his infant son of one and a half years, Prince Girban Juddha (1797-1816), in the face of the strong opposition of the feudal and military leaders of the country, who, incidentally, also did not like Raja Ran Bahadur's marrying Kantavati, a Brahmin widow. The Pandes, who became ministers after Ran Bahadur's abdication and retirement to Benaras in 1799, and the Thapas, who succeeded the Pandes in 1806, made external expansion an important plank of their State policy. Between 1803 and 1809, Nepal annexed Western Sikkim in the east, the long strip of the Tarai including Gorakhpur in the south and Kumaun, Garhwal and other hill states in the west. Eventually it came in conflict with the East India Company over the possession of certain parts of the Purnea, Saran, Gorakhpur and Bareilly districts and also over the matter of the surrender of dacoits and runaway criminals.

When attempts to eject the Gorkhas failed, the British declared war in November 1814. At first, the odds were against the British, but successful campaigns on the Kumaun and Western Himalaya fronts compelled the Gorkhas to surrender. By the treaty signed at Sugauli on 2 December 1815, Nepal renounced all claims to lands in dispute before 1814, including the trans-Mechi and the trans-Kali territories. Above all, the Nepalese agreed to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the British, who stationed a Resident in Kathmandu, capital of Nepal.

Bhim Sen Thapa, Prime Minister of Nepal since 1806, who did not reconcile himself to the humiliation implied by the 1815 treaty, conspired with other native states in India against the British. The death of the Queen Mother Lalita Tripura Sundari, Regent of Prince Rajendra since 1816, weakened Bhim Sen Thapa's position [Rajendra had attained majority in 1831]. The British Resident, B. H. Hodgson, instigated King Rajendra (r. 1831-47) and other opponents of Bhim Sen Thapa to overthrow him and put the authority in the hands of the King himself. In 1837, both Bhim Sen Thapa and his nephew Matbar Singh Thapa were arrested and the Pandes were appointed new ministers. Bhim Sen Thapa committed suicide in 1839. The chaos that reigned since 1832 aggravated further and culminated in the Kot massacre of 15 September 1846, in which more than thirty one influential political leaders were killed. Jang Bahadur, a blood relation of Matbar Singh Thapa, played a significant part in the Kot massacre.

There being none to challenge his power, Jang Bahadur became Prime Minister and obtained hereditary rights to that office from King Rajendra. In 1847, he exiled both King Rajendra and the intriguing Queen Rajyalakshmi Devi and installed Prince Surendra (1830-81) on the throne. In the summer of 1855, Jang Bahadur invaded Tibet making repeated misbehaviour and insults inflicted on the Nepalese traders in Tibet as the pretext of the invasion. After a short period of hostilities and protracted negotiations, the Nepalese and Tibetans concluded on 24 March 1856 a peace treaty by which the Tibetans bound themselves annually to pay Rs. 10,000 to Nepal and encourage

trade between the two countries. The treaty also stipulated certain extra-territorial rights to Nepal in Tibet for the first time. Nepal continued to enjoy those rights until their voluntary renunciation by Nepal in 1956 by the Sino-Nepalese treaty of 20 September 1956.³²

Jang Bahadur continued in office till his death in February 1877, except for a brief interval (August 1856-April 1857) when, on his tendering resignation, his brother Bam Bahadur became the Prime Minister. Ranodip Rana, who had succeeded Jang Bahadur, was murdered in 1885 and Bir Shamsher, the assassin, became the Prime Minister. Succession to the office of the Prime Minister continued to be determined by conspiracies and coups until 1901 when Chandra Shamsher became Minister (1901-28). After this, succession became an orderly affair.

In Jang Bahadur, the Prime Minister and de facto ruler of Nepal, the British found a trusted friend. Nepal, unlike Bhutan and Sikkim but like some of the native states of India such as Hyderabad and Patiala, gave most valuable military aid to the British in 1857-58. Jang Bahadur personally marched with a fine Gurkha army of ten thousand troops to aid the British in suppressing the rebellion in Oudh in 1857. The British rewarded him suitably for his valuable personal services. The British government in India also restored the Western Tarai to Nepal, which it had annexed from India during 1800-14 and had ceded to the East India Company in the treaty of Sugauli in 1815.

From the time of Jang Bahadur, Nepal's relations with the British remained mostly cordial. It extended all help to the British both at the time of the British military expedition to Tibet in 1903-4 despite the Nepal-Tibet treaty of 1856, which specifically provided that "...the Gorkha Government will in future give all assistance that may be in its power to the Government of Tibet, if the troops of any other Raja invaded that country", and again during World War I and Anglo-Afghan War III (1919). The British government reciprocated these sentiments by revising the status of its Resident in Nepal to "British Envoy at the Court of Nepal" in 1920. In 1923, it also cancelled Article II of the 1839 engagement by which Nepal

had been prohibited from having any intercourse with the dependencies of the British government beyond the Ganga. These steps did not, however, amount to recognition of Nepal as a fully sovereign State.

Except for the abolition of the practices of *sati* and slavery by Chandra Shamsheer (1901-29), the establishment of the bureaus of agriculture and industry by Juddha Shamsheer (1932-45) and the enactment of the Government of Nepal Act 1948 by Padma Shamsheer (1946-48), the Rana period of the history of Nepal cannot be considered a bright period. For the absolute authority vested in the Rana Prime Minister was invariably used for perpetuating their own position and power in the country. In fact, the first Rana Prime Minister had aimed at achieving sovereign position in Nepal but had failed in that end. He was, however, successful in achieving for himself the complete *de jure* sovereignty over a part of Nepal and partial *de jure* sovereignty over the whole of Nepal. This position was inherited by his successors. Chandra Shamsheer even obtained formal consent of King Prithvi (1875-1911) to accept in advance all public acts of the Prime Minister as having the "full royal approval".³³

Isolated from politics, the King gradually became a virtual prisoner of his Rana Prime Minister. A group of discontented nobility consisting of the non-Rana families staged an unsuccessful revolt against Rana despotism in 1882. A similar attempt by King Prithvi in 1903 also failed. The freedom movement in India and the social reform movements in Nepal in the first part of the twentieth century deeply affected the Nepalese public against the Rana totalitarianism. Foundation of socio-political parties like the Prachand Gorkha League, Nepal Nagarik Adhikar Samiti and Nepal Praja Parishad both within and outside the country in the 1920s and 1930s was indicative of the popular upsurge against the Rana regime. The ruling Rana clique, which spared no efforts to suppress these organizations and the individuals connected with them or behind them, even charged King Tribhuvan (1906-1935) of complicity in a plot against Prime Minister Juddha Shamsheer, who then made an unsuccessful

attempt to dethrone King Tribhuvan and enthrone the Heir Apparent Prince Mahendra in his place in 1940.³⁴

In the 1940s, a stronger opposition developed against the Rana regime. Nepalese youngmen like Tanka Prasad Acharya, M.P. Koirala, B.P. Koirala, D. R. Regmi, Surya Prasad Upadhyaya and others, who were then in India and had either witnessed or participated in the "Quit India" movement in the summer of 1942, started such organizations as the Nepali Sangh (Benares), Gorkha Congress (Calcutta) and Nepali National Congress (Patna). In March 1947, a non-violent agitation was launched at Biratnagar by the Nepali National Congress. Gradually the agitation spread to other important towns in the Tarai and ultimately to the Kathmandu Valley. Under the pressure of their demand for a democratic form of government in which the monarchy had a legitimate place, Padma Shamsher promulgated the Government of Nepal Act in March 1948. However, this Act, which had been drafted in consultation with two eminent jurists from India, Shri Sri Prakasa and Dr. R. U. Singh, contemplated no change in the prerogatives of the Rana Prime Minister as vested through the instrument of the sacred Panjapatra by Shree Panch Maharajadhiraja of Nepal, although it did provide for a council of ministers and a bi-cameral legislature and judiciary. Since the 1948 Act simply pretended to fulfil the popular demand, agitation in the Kathmandu Valley continued. There also emerged other political parties like the Nepal Praja Panchayat at Kathmandu and the Nepal Democratic Congress at Calcutta, the latter consisting of the exiled C Class Ranas and having at its disposal all their material resources. Padma Shamsher abdicated his office in April 1948.

In April 1949, the Nepali Congress, formed by merger of the Nepal Democratic Congress with a section of the Nepali National Congress, decided to launch an agitation against the regime until the establishment of a fully democratic government. The attitude of the Nepali Congress towards the Rana regime was further hardened by Prime Minister Mohan Shamsher (1948-51) who, while dubbing them as anti-national and subver-

ting Nepal's independence with the help of India, sought closer links with Britain and America. Mohan Shamsher perhaps misunderstood India's advice to make an effort to keep pace with the rapidly changing world and accused her of influencing and interfering in the Nepalese affairs.

In September 1950, for the first time King Tribhuvan refused to approve an order of Mohan Shamsher sentencing to death some persons charged with conspiring against his life. Consequently more restrictions were placed on the movements of the King. On 6 November 1950, King Tribhuvan escaped to the Indian Embassy at Kathmandu along with the Heir Apparent, Prince Mahendra. This event coincided with an armed anti-Rana revolution by the Nepali Congress in Eastern Nepal. Between November 1950 and January 1951, a large number of important areas in the east, south and west of Nepal were aflame with revolt. The revolutionaries seized several administrative headquarters. Mohan Shamsher announced some administrative reforms, but the revolutionaries rejected them on legal grounds. In February 1951, Mohan Shamsher abdicated power. On 18 February King Tribhuvan who had full support of the anti-Rana elements as well as the Government of India, proclaimed Nepal as a constitutional monarchy and abolished the hereditary rule of the Ranas.

The period between 1951 and 1959 was marked by political instability and a rapid succession of governments, but it was also a period of persistent efforts for the development of democratic institutions culminating in the general election of February 1959. A regular constitution was proclaimed on 12 February 1959. The Nepali Congress emerged victorious at the polls and formed the first representative government in the country. However, dissatisfied with the activities of the elected government, King Mahendra dismissed the 1959 Constitution (on the ground that democracy had not been functioning well under this government) and jailed Prime Minister B.P. Koirala of the Nepali Congress and the other ministers of his 19-month old government on 15 December 1960. He also dissolved the Parliament and suspended the fundamental

rights guaranteed under the Constitution of 1959. In July 1961, he announced plans for a partyless Panchayat system of administration called the Panchayat democracy for the country and proclaimed a new Constitution on 16 December 1962. The *gram panchayat* (village council) is the basic unit of this form of democracy.

The family name of the present dynasty is Shah. Beginning with Girban Juddha (r. 1799-1816) the appellation Vir Vikram Shah Deva always follows the King's personal name. The people commonly address the King by the honorific Shri Panch (Five Shris) and the His Majesty's Government Panch Sarkar (Government of Five Shris). Various other honorifics also go with the King's name.

UTTARAKHAND

In ancient times Uttarakhand was known by the name of Brahmapur with its capital first at Kartripur (present Joshimath) and later at Kartikeyapur (Bajjnath since the fifteenth century) on the left bank of the Gomati river. According to the *prashasti* (eulogy) of Samudragupta, the Katyuri chief of Kartripur retained his autonomy under the Gupta suzerainty.

The Katyuri dynasty, first historical dynasty of Kartripur (ancient Kumaun-Garhwal) which was partially eclipsed after the seventh century A.D, regained its full power in the middle of the ninth century with the help of the Pratihara kings of Kanauj. The Katyuris reigned supreme in Kumaun-Garhwal from c. 850 A.D to 1,050 A.D, the boundaries of their dominion extending from Doti in the east to Kangra in the west and from the Bhabar in the south to the passes of the Great Himalaya in the north. During this period Brahmanism came to supersede Buddhism in every aspect of life, including art and sculpture. It was probably one of the last rulers of the Katyuri dynasty who attacked Tibet around 1,000 A.D and imprisoned Yeshe 'Od, the Buddhist king of Guge. On the decline of the Katyuri dynasty in the second half of the eleventh century, when the royal scions made several successful attempts to set up independent principalities for themselves, Garhwal separated from Kumaun. In

a short time there sprang up a number of *garhis/thakurais* (fortresses/chieftainships) throughout Garhwal and Kumaun. Doti, one of them, also wielded control over the Champavat, Shor, Sira, Johar and Darma areas of Kumaun.

The Chand chiefs of Champavat (953-1790) eliminated the multitude of the petty chiefs of Kumaun. Raja Gyan Chand (1374-1419), who gained control over many neighbouring *thakurais*, attained so much prestige that he was awarded a *jagir* (land grant) in the Tarai by Ferozshah Tughlaq, Sultan of Delhi. Raja Bharti Chand (1437-59) overthrew the yoke of Doti after a prolonged conflict of twelve years. His son, Raja Ratan Chand (1459-88) extended the Chand sway even over Jumla, Bujan and Thal which paid tribute to Kumaun up to mid-eighteenth century when the Gorkhas advanced in those parts. His son, Raja Kirti Chand (1488-1503), annexed several other *thakurais* and extended the limits of Champavat up to the left bank of the Suval river near Almora. His dominion included most of Kumaun except the western parts and the northern Bhotiya areas of Darma, Chaudans and Byans. Considerations of administration and strategy led Raja Kalyan Chand (1560-65), popularly known as Balo Kalyan Chand, to shift the Chand capital from Champavat to Almora, which he founded on the Khagmara hill in 1560. It was difficult to control from Champavat the far and wide areas of the Chand dominions especially those on the western flank. Kalyan Chand's reign is of great importance from the point of view of the consolidation and unification of Kumaun. He extended his territory up to the Bhotiya areas in the north and developed, for the first time, a policy of sorts towards Tibet on the pattern of the Katyuri chiefs, his western neighbours.

Raja Rudra Chand (1566-97) visited the court of Emperor Akbar. Raja Baj Bahadur Chand (1638-78) attempted an invasion of Western Tibet via Johar in 1670. The political situation in Western Tibet, then held by Ladakh, was very confused. Central Tibet, then under the dual authority of Dalai Lama V and the Mongol prince Gushri Khan, was expanding southwards and westwards and the stage had almost

been set for a clash between Ladakh and Tibet. The consequent harassing of the Indian pilgrims to the holy Kailash and Manasarovar and dislocation of the Bhotiya trade with Western Tibet provoked Baj Bahadur to march into Western Tibet. He defeated the Huniyas (Tibetans) and wrested the control of the passes on the Kumaun-Tibet border. He virtually destroyed the fort of Taklakhar/Taklakot. The natural boundary established by him between Kumaun and Tibet is even now the boundary between India and Tibet there. He returned to Almora in 1671 after defeating the Raja of Garhwal.

After Baj Bahadur, the Chand power began to decline so much so that it could afford no resistance to the invading Rohilla army of Ali Mohammed Khan from the south in 1743-44. The Rohillas retired after plundering the temples and villages and obtaining a ransom of Rs. 3,00,000 from Raja Deep Chand (1748-74). Dissensions and intrigues amongst the army and the Chand nobles became so acute that Harshadev Joshi, one of the ministers of Mohan Chand (1777-79, 1786-88), the last ruler of Kumaun, first installed Prince Jayakrit Shah of Garhwal on the throne of Kumaun and later, in 1790, invited the Gorkhas from Doti to occupy Kumaun.

In Garhwal, the Panwar chiefs of Chandpur unified all the ruling *garhis* (fortresses). Ajai Pal made the Badhan pargana, bordering Kumaun, and the Jamuna river as the eastern and western limits of his possessions. He transferred the capital from Chandpur to Srinagar in 1517.³⁵ The Panwars, like the Chands of Kumaun, also frequently came in conflict with their neighbours. Raja Man Shah (1571-1610), a contemporary of Akbar, was even successful in conquering Champavat. He also subdued the neighbouring chief of Daba in Western Tibet. In 1625, the Garhwalis under Rikhola Lodhi again marched on Daba, whose inhabitants had been raiding the upper areas of Garhwal, and took control of the passes and the territory up to the Tholing monastery on the upper Satluj river.³⁶ Jesuits of the Tsaparang Mission (1625-50), who made Srinagar the base of their operations when matters became complicated in Tsaparang, have left eloquent accounts of the affairs of Garhwal of this period.

Around 1757, the Panwars, like the Chands, faced an invasion from the Rohillas and temporarily lost the Doon area to them. Pradyumna Shah (1787-1804), the last ruler of Garhwal, for a time held sway over the entire territory of Kumaun-Garhwal bounded on the east by the Kali and on the west by the Jamuna river.

The attempt of the Gorkhas to wrest the Langur Garhi in Garhwal in 1791, subsequent to their annexation of Kumaun to Nepal in 1790, could not be successful because of their recall for the support of the Gorkha army in Tibet in 1792. Pradyumna Shah promised to pay a yearly tribute of Rs 25,000 to Nepal. However, the Gorkhas returned to conquer Garhwal in 1803. The fall of Dehradun in 1804 compelled Pradyumna Shah, who had taken refuge in Saharanpur, to seek British help. On their defeat in the war with the British in 1815, the Gorkhas evacuated both Kumaun and Garhwal. The 1815 treaty of Sugauli fixed the Kali river as the western limit of Nepal.

Prospects of trade with Tibet through the passes of Kumaun and Garhwal led the British to annex whole of Kumaun including those parts of the Bhabar and Tarai which had been parts of Kumaun historically and the eastern half of Garhwal (i.e. the part east of the Alkananda and Mandakini rivers) including the Doon of Dehradun to the British territory and restore remaining Garhwal to Raja Sudarshan Shah (1815-59), with Tehri as its capital. The native state of Tehri acceded to the Union of India immediately after Independence on 15 August 1947.

KINNAUR, LAHUL AND SPITI

The Western Himalaya abounds in historical remains reminiscent of the time when numerous petty chiefs, *ranas* and *thakurs*, exercised authority either as independent rulers or as vassals of a paramount power and when *ranhuns* and *thakurais*, domains of ranas and thakurs respectively, literally dotted the whole of it. The ancestors of the rajas of Bashahr who originally had their seat at Kamru (Mone in the Kinnauri dialect) in the Baspa Valley, the chiefs of Kinnaur, whose forts and legends are encountered at several places in Kinnaur, and the Sena chiefs of

Spiti called the Piti Thakurs in Kulu, all belong to that period. In the early tenth century, the upper parts of Kinnaur and Spiti were included in the kingdom of Kyi de nima gon (Skyi lde nyima mgon) of Ladakh. Senge Namgyal (Sangs gyas rnam rgyal r. 1590-1640) of Ladakh conquered upper Kinnaur and Spiti together with Guge and Purang in the early seventeenth century. The ruins of a castle called Sengekhar (Sangs gyas khar) at the Shipki La still point to this occupation. Ladakh lost most of its acquisitions as a result of a war with Tibet in 1681-83. However, Deleg Namgyal (bDe legs rnam rgyal r.c. 1675-1705) of Ladakh, who married a daughter of the Tibetan general, Galden Chhewang, got Spiti back in dowry.³⁷

A significant outcome of the confused situation in Western Tibet was the rise of Raja Kehri Singh of Kamru-Bashahr, who had established his supremacy over all the southern principalities of Delath, Kurangulu, Kaneti, Kumharsain, Sari and Kotgarh. His exploits in Mandi, Suket, Sirmur and Garhwal earned admiration from Aurangzeb, who conferred on him the title of *chhatrapati*. Thus firmly entrenched he allied with the Tibetans in their war against Ladakh. The important role he played in this war is evident from a contemporary document discovered at Namgya. The cession of territories by Ladakh to Tibet brought upper Kinnaur to Kehri Singh's share. From Tibet, Kehri Singh also obtained a commercial agreement, entitling the Bashahri traders rights of free trade and movement in Tibet.

Kehri Singh's successors could not keep his exploits in tact. The Gorkhas of Nepal, having failed to conquer Kangra in 1803-9, invaded Bashahr along with other inner hill principalities. They met with no resistance up to Wangtu on the upper Satluj, where they found the bridge over it destroyed by the Kinnauras in order to check the Gorkha advance. Raja Ugra Singh (1736-1811), who had sought shelter in Kinnaur, offered an annual tribute of Rs 12,000 to the Gorkhas in order to keep Kinnaur safe from them. In 1814, when approached by the British with an appeal to cooperate in their campaign against the Gorkhas, Ra a Mahendra Singh (1808-50) deployed, 3,000 Kinnauras

in the service of the British. After the conclusion of the Anglo-Gorkha war, the British granted Raja Mahendra Singh a sanad on 8 February 1816, restored him in his territories and put him under the supervision of the British political agent at Sabathu, 50 miles west of Simla and close to the great, natural fortress of Arki, the capital and stronghold of the Gorkhas for the hill principalities between the Jamuna and the Satluj rivers from 1808 to 1814. Simla was then a small hill village.

Raja Mahendra Singh also agreed to pay an annual tribute of Rs 15,000 to the British and furnish *begar* for the construction of roads in his territories. The amount of the annual tribute was reduced to Rs 3,945 as compensation for the abolition of transit duties in 1847. The British government acquired the forests of Bashahr on lease in 1864. Like the Hindustan-Tibet Road, these continued to be controlled by the Government of Punjab even after the formation of Himachal Pradesh on 15 April 1948.

Spiti was subjected to several encroachments and aggressions by Bashahr, Kulu and Ladakh and had very often to pay them tribute to escape plunder. Bashahr grabbed the Spiti territory up to Dankhar. In 1841, Spiti became a part of the Dogra possessions by virtue of General Zorawar Singh's conquest of Ladakh. A force of 4,000 Dogra-Sikh troops which entered Spiti through Kulu in 1841, plundered the monasteries there. Most of the people of Spiti, who could put up only a feeble resistance, sought refuge in Bashahr.

Spiti passed on to the British after the first Anglo-Sikh war in 1845. They retained Spiti and Lahul with a view to obtaining an opening to the wool producing districts of Western Tibet.

LADAKH

Archaeological and other evidence, coupled with historical data from Kashmir and Khotan, suggest close affinities between Ladakh on the one hand and Kashmir and Central Asia on the other in the early times. The Dards and Mons from Kashmir and Gilgit organized their colonies in the central valley of Ladakh. From amongst these early settlers came the first chiefs of Ladakh.

Besides the animistic beliefs of the original inhabitants, Buddhism from Kashmir also developed roots in Ladakh. The rulers of Kashmir from the Kushans in the third century A.D to the Huna Chief, Mihirakula, in the sixth century also considered Ladakh within their political sphere.

In the middle of the seventh century, Song tsan gampo of Central Tibet subjugated Ladakh while on his way to conquer Gilgit and Vakhan in the Pamir region. The route to Vakhan lay through Ladakh. Before this time Ladakh did not form a part of Tibet. Possession of Ladakh became imperative to Tibet on the resumption of a bitter struggle with China in 660 A.D over the question of the control of Kashgar, Khotan, Kucha and Karashahr from where the Chinese were compelled to withdraw in 670. Towards the beginning of the ninth century, the collapse of the Tibetan alliances with the Arabs in the west and the tribal chiefs of Taliphu on the Tibet-China frontier in the east coincided with the fratricidal quarrels in Tibet, during which an anti-Buddhist faction headed by Langdarma (gLang dar ma, r. 836-42) controlled power. The most important repercussion of all these events was the loosening of the authority of Tibet over the outlying possessions like Ladakh, Gilgit and Turkistan.

In the confusion following Langdarma's assassination by Lama Lho lun phel kyi dorji in 842, a nephew of the elder queen of Langdarma occupied the throne of Central Tibet, ignoring the claim of 'Od srungs, a legitimate child of Langdarma begotten by the second queen. The conflict between the rival claimants continued for long, ultimately resulting in the flight of Kyi de nyima gon (r. -930), a grandson of 'Od srungs, to Western Tibet with a few hundred followers in the beginning of the tenth century. The Gyalpo of Purang, dGeshes bKra shis btsan, married his only daughter 'Bro bza 'khor skyong to Kyi de nyima gon and also made him his successor. With this nucleus, Kyi de nyima gon gradually conquered Guge, Ladakh and the adjacent countries. After his death in 930, a division of the kingdom of Western Tibet amongst his three sons took place. The eldest son Pal gyi gon (dPal gyi mgon) got Ladakh, bound

on the east by Rabma between Rudok and the Spanggur lake, on the north by the upper valley of the Yarkand river and on the west by the Zoji La, and Rudok together with suzerainty over his brothers, Tashi gon (bKra shis mgon) and Detsu gon (lDe gtsug mgon), who got Guge and Purang and Zanskar, Spiti and Lahul respectively. After the death of Palgyi gon, the status of suzerain passed on to the chief of Guge and Purang, except for a brief period in 1080-1110 when Utpala, the then ruler of Ladakh, again brought Purang, Kulu and Purig (Baltistan) under Ladakh.

Spread of Islam in Kashmir during the period of the Muslim sultanate in northern India in the thirteenth-fifteenth centuries had an impact upon Ladakh. The Muslims started penetrating beyond the Zoji La in the mid fourteenth century. Baltistan was invaded by Shihab-ud-din (1359-1378) and Sultan Sikandar (1394-1416) of Kashmir. Ladakh being deeply rooted in Buddhism did not attract Muslim proselytes from Kashmir. In the reign of Lodo Chhuten (bLo gros mchhog ldan 1440-1470), Zain-ul-Abidin (1420-1470) of Kashmir invaded Ladakh and Guge for establishing the suzerainty of Kashmir over them and for plundering the riches of their monasteries. Continuous invasions from Kashmir forced a change in the dynasty rule in Ladakh. In 1470, Bhagan (c. 1470-1500), a cousin of Lodo Chhuten, deposed and imprisoned the king and founded the second Ladakhi dynasty, which continued until the annexation of Ladakh to Jammu by the Dogras in 1842.³⁸

The *Tarikh-i-Rashidi* of Mirza Haidar records a number of invasions against Ladakh and Tibet from Central Asia in the sixteenth century. An invasion in the 1510s was successfully repelled by the Ladakhis, who also took the opportunity to gain control over Guge and Purig. Abu Syed Mirza, Khan of Kashgar, who had been contemplating invasion of Ladakh and Kashmir, landed two columns of his army, one led by himself and the other by his son Iskandar and his minister Mirza Haidar, in the Nubra Valley south of the Karakoram Pass in 1532. Ladakh submitted and its ruler, Tashi Namgyal (bKra shis rnam rgyal), was executed for provoking a revolt in Nubra in the Shyok Valley in 1535.³⁹

Mirza Haidar, who stayed in Ladakh up to 1536, was responsible for the establishment of relations between Ladakh and the Mughal Emperors of India. Deserting Rashid Khan, the new Khan of Kashgar, he joined the service of Kamran, brother of Emperor Humayun (1530-40, 1555-56), and engineered the conquest of Kashmir for the Mughals in 1540. Having established himself in Kashmir, he sent two expeditions to Baltistan and Ladakh across the Zoji La in 1545 and appointed Muslim governors there. Whether they ever joined their posts is not known. In 1553 and 1562, Ladakh again suffered raids from Kashmir but they ended in disaster for the latter. One of the most important factors in repelling the invasions from Kashmir was the strong policy of consolidation and expansion resumed by Chhewang Namgyal (Tshe dbang rnam rgyal 1535-75), who also reduced both Guge and Baltistan to Ladakh's vassalage. After his death in 1575, a fratricidal war broke out in Ladakh and many vassal chiefs revolted. Ali Mir, the chief of Baltistan, was one of them. He invaded Ladakh and compelled its ruler Jamjang Namgyal ('Jam dbyangs rnam rgyal r.c. 1580-1590) to marry his daughter. The issue from this matrimony, Senge Namgyal (r. 1590-1640), occupies a great place in the history of Ladakh. His reign coincides with the chaotic conditions in Baltistan as well as Tibet. In the early years of his reign, he was engaged in consolidating his position at home. In 1639-40, he reduced both Baltistan and Western Tibet to the Ladakhi subordination. In his advance against Baltistan, he was confronted with the Mughal garrison at Shams Kharbu near Kargil, which compelled him to relinquish claim to Baltistan and pay an annual tribute to the Mughal governor of Kashmir. He did not keep his promise and, on the winter setting in, he again attacked the Shams Kharbu garrison and made it to evacuate.⁴⁰

On the eastern side, Senge Namgyal faced no difficulty in reaching Sakya, west of Shigatse, in 1640. Depa Tan Jong (sDe pa Karma bstan skyong r. 1620-1640), usually styled Depa Tsangpa, offered peace to Senge Namgyal by recognizing the latter's authority up to the Maryum La. With the Gelugpas

gaining strength in Tsang, conflicts arose between Ladakh and Central Tibet. The Ladakhi ruler and most of his subjects were followers of the Nyingmpa sect. The Tibetans complained of the inciting of trouble by the Ladakhis in Tsang and the persecution of the followers of the Gelugpa sect in Guge. On these pretexts Tibet declared war on Ladakh in 1681. According to the Ladakhi chronicles, which do not deny the religious cause of the war, the actual dispute was between Bhutan and Tibet and the Ladakhis had only taken up the quarrel with Tibet on behalf of the Shabdung Rinpoche of Bhutan, and their spiritual patron⁴¹.

Developments around Ladakh, therefore, necessitated acceptance of the Mughal sovereignty over Ladakh. Deldan Namgyal (bDe ldan rnam rgyal 1640-75) despatched an embassy to Srinagar with professions of loyalty and promise of tribute to the Mughal Emperor. In 1664, an envoy from Kashmir saw fulfilment of the promises and called upon Deldan Namgyal to embrace Islam. Deldan Namgyal embraced Islam and assumed the name of Aqabat Khan. A mosque was also built at Leh in 1665. Deldan Namgyal's successors reverted to Buddhism.

Alliance with the Mughals paid dividends at the time of the Mongol-Tibetan invasion of Ladakh in 1681. For two years Ladakh had found itself unable to challenge the invaders, who had laid siege even to Basgo in Western Ladakh. In 1683, a Mughal army intervened on behalf of Ladakh and compelled the Mongol-Tibetan army to raise the siege and retire beyond the ancient Ladakh-Tibet border at Tashigang. Ladakh and Tibet concluded peace at Timisgong (gTing sgang) in 1684, the terms of the treaty especially stipulating cession of all territory east of the Lhari stream at Demchok by Ladakh to Tibet in lieu of certain important trade concessions, including the monopoly of the shawl wool trade for Ladakh. The 1684 treaty also stipulated exchange of presents-bearing missions between Leh and Lhasa and retention by Ladakh of the Minser village between Gartok and Manasarovar.⁴²

For the assistance received from the Mughals, Deldan Namgyal committed himself to pay an annual tribute to the

Mughal governor of Kashmir. Deldan Namgyal was also authorized to issue coins of the Mughal type with legend in Arabic. Ladakh also granted to the Kashmiri merchants the monopoly of the Chang Thang wool trade. Continued allegiance to Kashmir throughout the eighteenth century enabled the Ladakhis to maintain their autonomous status and remain unaffected by the consequences of the Chinese expansion in Tibet and Central Asia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Subsequent to the conquest of Kashmir by the Sikhs in 1819, Tsepal mingyur dondub Namgyal (Tshe dpal mi gyur don grub rnam rgyal r.c. 1800-1834, 1840-1842) of Ladakh offered allegiance to the British through William Moorcroft, who along with George Trebeck, had gone up to Ladakh to explore the possibilities of extending British trade in that direction. However, Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler, did not contemplate conquest of Ladakh before 1834. One of the important factors in desisting him or other Sikh officers was the counsel of the Dogra brothers, Gulab Singh and Dhian Singh of Jammu, who wished to conquer Ladakh for Jammu.⁴³

Lha chhen (Mahadeva) was the common title of the kings of the first Ladakhi dynasty (c. 930-1470) and *Chogyal chenpo* (Chhos rgyal chhenpo, Maha Dharmaraj, Great Righteous King) was the official title of the kings of the second Ladakhi dynasty (c. 1470-1842).

In 1834, when both the British and the Sikhs were concerned with Sindh, Zorawar Singh, a general in Gulab Singh's army, attacked Ladakh through Kishtwar. However, it was not until 1840 that Ladakh's full subordination could be achieved. In 1841, when more favourable circumstances prevailed (the British involved in Afghanistan and Burma, the Sikhs absorbed in their internal dissensions and Tibet involved in a tussle for power between the Regent and the Ministers), Zorawar Singh invaded Western Tibet. The Dogra troops suffered a heavy defeat near Manasarovar; most of them were slain and Zorawar Singh was shot dead. News of the disaster travelled fast to Ladakh, where the ruler declared his independence at the instigation

of the Tibetans. The troops of Vazir Ratnu and Dewan Hari Chand of Jammu soon put down the revolt, and even pursued the Tibetan troops up to Dorkhung. At the Tibetans' instance peace was concluded with the signing of a treaty between the Dogras and the Tibetans on 15 August 1842, which stipulated non-interference in the affairs of the countries bordering Ladakh by both parties, recognition of the frontier between Ladakh and Tibet, continuance of old commercial ties and, above all, initiation of friendly relations between the two governments. This was followed by an eleven-article treaty between the Khalsa Darbar of Lahore and the Dalai Lama of Lhasa and the Emperor of China, ratifying the 1842 agreement and envisaging specifically that "... the boundaries of Ladakh and Lhasa shall be constituted as formerly, the contracting parties engaging to confine themselves within their respective boundaries...."⁴⁴

After the first Anglo-Sikh war in 1845, the British government confirmed Gulab Singh's title to Ladakh. By two agreements signed at Lahore and Amritsar in March 1846 after the conclusion of that war, all hill territories between the Ravi and Indus rivers, including Kashmir and Hazara were transferred to Gulab Singh against payment of Rs 75,00,000 (Nanak shahi, the Sikh silver rupees) and acceptance of the British sovereignty. British efforts to extend their commerce to Central Asia in the third quarter of the nineteenth century led to the conclusion of a ten-article commercial treaty between the Government of India and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir on 7 September 1870. This treaty enabled the British to secure a foothold in Ladakh as it specifically provided for the appointment of a British Joint Commissioner in Ladakh for supervising the Central Asian trade as well as for maintaining the caravan highway from India to Central Asia over the Karakoram Pass. It also provided for the survey of the trade route to Yarkand from Lahul through the Changchenmo Valley of Eastern Ladakh. Subsequently, the Joint British Commissioner was also granted judicial powers to decide disputes relating to Central Asian trade. The British interest in Ladakh did not diminish until the beginning of the twentieth century,

by which time they had realized the uneconomic nature of the Central Asian trade and had also secured this frontier more or less from danger from Russia.

Ladakh became a part of the Indian Union with the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India in 1947. In October 1950, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir announced agrarian reforms in the State. These reforms, which greatly affected the landed nobility and the monastic establishments in Ladakh, gave rise to a movement headed by some landholders and monastic officials who even threatened that if no economic development of Ladakh was started by the government they would seek Ladakh's union with Tibet. The commotion generated by the agrarian reforms, incidentally, coincided with the control of Sinkiang and Tibet by People's China in 1949-51, which posed a grave danger to the security of Ladakh. Control of Tibet by China particularly made the discontented elements have second thoughts and seek closer relations with India.

CONCLUSION

The pattern of history in the entire Himalaya that emerges from this study is that of the history of a borderland, a frontier zone, between two culturally and politically distinct areas and constantly under their pulls and pressures. Those pulls and pressures were not felt uniformly over the entire Himalaya because of the small geographical framework within which each of the units functioned in the past. A political unity in the entire Himalaya, whether under the aegis of a local or foreign power, was found unaccomplishable despite the expansion of a few of the units far beyond their own geographical limits or imposition of temporary unity by conquests by a southern or northern power. For the greater part of their history, most of them looked to the south for protection and closer relations. Even countries like Bhutan and Spiti, predominantly Tibetan in cultural and political complex, were no exception. British intervention in their affairs from the second half of the eighteenth century is the watershed in the history of the Himalaya border countries. Drawn more and more within

the fold of British India through a series of engagements and treaties in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they were completely alienated from the political influence from the north and their position as buffers was relegated to Tibet. Sovereign India did not perhaps fully realize the implications of an autonomous Tibet on her northern periphery and thereby allowed the Himalaya again to become a battleground between the two diametrically oriented powers of India and China. This again thrust on Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal the position of buffer with no guarantee of their security and integrity against China. It is not altogether difficult now to visualize the nature and pattern of the political developments in the Himalaya in the foreseeable future.


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INDIA - CHINA BORDER : WESTERN SECTOR



TRUE 'LINE' OF ACTUAL CONTROL BY CHINESE FORCES IN NOVEMBER 1959

LINE SEPARATING INDIAN AND CHINESE FORCES ON SEPTEMBER 7, 1962

LINE REACHED BY CHINESE FORCES AFTER THE MASSIVE INVASION OF OCTOBER 20, 1962

INDIA-CHINA BOUNDARY : WESTERN SECTOR

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India-China boundary in the western sector, as in any other sector, lies in the great Himalaya. The state of Jammu and Kashmir which is situated in this sector is completely within the fold of the Himalaya. It covers about 350,000 square kilometers of mountainous tract. From west to east the length of this tract is about 700 kilometers, and from north to south it is about 500 kilometers. There are great contrasts in relief features, forest covers, soils, climate and accessibility. Of all the Himalayan regions Kashmir has the largest share of snows and glaciers. No other part of the Himalaya is traversed by so many high ranges running diagonally and flanking trough-like, longitudinal basins. The Karakoram range and Naga Parbat (8,126 m.), K (2) (8,611 m.), Hidden Peak (8,068 m.), Broad Peak (8,047 m.), Gasherbrum II (8,035 m.), Rakaposhi (7,788m.), Haramosh (7,397 m.), all are situated in this area. Several glaciers, such as Siachen and Rimo, are situated in this area. These glaciers are in turn the feeders of vast rivers system. Besides the great Indus, the other rivers which flow in the area are, Shyok, Dras, Zaskar, Astor, Shigar and Yarkand. Apart from mountains, glaciers and rivers, there is the great Ladakh plateau. The average elevation of this plateau is about 5,300 meters, and it occupies the north-eastern portion of the Kashmir Himalaya, abutting against the Karakoram range on the west. It is the highest plateau of India, containing remnants of at least three peneplains at heights ranging between 5,300 and 5,800 meters. One of India's most inaccessible parts, it has all the landforms of a steppe country. The Chang Chenmo range divides Ladakh into two distinct parts. North of this range, the Chang Chenmo river flows westwards in an asymmetrical, flat-floored valley. There are a number of hot springs. On the higher slopes mountain lakes like Ororotse Tso add to

the natural beauty of the region. Further north is a typical interior drainage basin, carved out of limestones and shales of the Mesozonic age, containing a number of salt lakes with centripetal drainage. The plateau has been dissected into plains and mountains. From south to north, they are designated Lingzi Tang plains, Lozyhung mountains and Soda plains. The plains of this part are absolutely dry and bare—even nomads do not dare move about for want of pasture.

History—India

The history of this region is as rugged as the setting. The process of the decay of the Mughal Empire, which commenced several years before the death of Aurangzeb (1707), accelerated after his death. The war of succession which followed the death of Aurangzeb let loose the provincial Viceroys, who rebelled against the central authority. It also helped the rise of the Marathas, Rajputs, Rohillas, Sikhs and Jats. This disintegration was followed by the attack of Nadir Shah in 1739, who ransacked Punjab and inflicted untold miseries on the citizens of Delhi. Ahmad Shah Abdali followed Nadir Shah's policy towards India and attacked her in 1749, 1751-52 and captured Delhi in 1757. Under such situations, strife and anarchy spread over the length and breadth of India. Ranjit Singh, in these chaotic conditions, became the Governor of Lahore under Zaman Shah (1792-1800). He ultimately became master of Lahore on 6 July 1799¹. He conquered Kashmir from the Afghan Governor in 1819 and appointed Gulab Singh as his Governor there in 1822. On 27 June 1822 Gulab Singh was made the Raja of Jammu². Gulab Singh appointed Zorawar Singh as his commander. After subduing Reasi, Khistwar, Rajouri and Samarth, Zorawar Singh looked towards Ladakh.

Prior to the tenth century the history of Ladakh is shrouded in mystery. Nothing with any definiteness can be said about its status.³ Around 900 A.D. Ladakh emerged as an independent kingdom. This independent status of Ladakh continued till it became a tributary to the Mughal empire in 1639 A.D.⁴, and a part of the empire in 1664. Ladakh ceased to pay tribute to Kashmir soon after the death of Aurangzeb in 1707. During

the period of chaos which began with the attack of Nadir Shah and till the rise of Ranjit Singh, Ladakh was a tributary to the Abdali invader, who established his rule in Kashmir in 1752. After the expulsion of the Abdalis from Kashmir in 1819, Kashmir became a part of the Lahore Kingdom and with it came Ladakh, the ruler of which began to send tribute to Ranjit Singh.⁵ In March 1834, Zorawar Singh marched his armies into Ladakh and annexed it.⁶ Prior to this date, "Ladakh had no relations with China of a political nature, had no connection with Lhasa save that which arose from community of religion, language, manners and close proximity".⁷ Dr. Lamb is of the view that Ladakh was a dependency of Tibet⁸. How is it, that a dependency was involved in war with Tibet in 1683-84 and negotiated a treaty on an equal footing?⁹ Where was Tibet when Ladakh was attacked by the Dogras in 1834?

The British power in India began to expand from east to west. It met Ranjit Singh's possession at Sulej only in 1808, when it extended from Jammu to Sulej.¹⁰ After the death of Ranjit Singh in June 1839, the British Government began to prepare for the annexation of Punjab. The first Punjab war in February and March 1846 was followed by a treaty concluded on 8 March. This gave a death blow to the otherwise dying kingdom of Lahore.¹¹ It was finally annexed on 29 March 1849, after three bloody battles at Ramnagar, Chilianwalla and Gujrat. In the meantime in order to further weaken the Lahore kingdom, and for securing a reliable Rajput ally, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was carved out of the Sikh kingdom on 16 March 1846, by the Treaty of Amritsar¹². In fact Gulab Singh was the master of the area even otherwise. He was Raja of Jammu from 1820. All the states of his brothers, Dhyani Singh and Suchet Singh, fell to him, after their death by 1844. Finally, as the Prime Minister of the Lahore Durbar he was in actual control of the area.¹³ The recognition of this fact was accorded to Gulab Singh for seventyfive lakhs of rupees, which he paid to the British. The British Government took four decades to appoint a resident in Kashmir in 1885 after the death of Maharaja Ranbir Singh, and fortythree years to depose

the ruler of Kashmir. However, in the meantime an officer on special duty was appointed in 1851 for the summer season only. Cayley was posted at Leh in 1867. A Commercial Treaty was signed in 1870 and a Gilgit Agency (1877-81) was established and later withdrawn. Actually the British became masters of Kashmir only on the deposition of Partap Singh on 8 March 1889. In 1891 they attacked Hunza, and in 1895 Chitral.

Tibet

The energetic Manchus of China attacked Tibet in 1720. They established their hold for some time. Tibet was regarded as a Chinese Protectorate from 1720 to 1792, but even this Protectorate status began to decline with the conquest of Sinkiang in around 1758 by the Chinese. It was only during the Gorkha invasion of Tibet in 1792 that a Chinese army was despatched to protect Tibet, but never after that¹⁴. In the nineteenth century the Chinese authority in Tibet was non-existent. Not a single soldier fought against the Dogras in 1841-42¹⁵. Similarly, no Chinese protection was offered at the time of Nepalese attack in 1856, or at the time of the British expedition under Francis Younghusband in 1904. Not only did the Chinese fail to protect Tibet, but their commands were never respected in Tibet during the same period. In spite of having a valid passport from Peking authorities, the Russian explorer Prejevalski was refused permission to enter Tibet in 1878¹⁶. In pursuance of the provisions of the Chefoo Agreement of 13 September 1876, when a British Mission under Colman Macaulay was commissioned in 1886, the Tibetans looked upon it "as the first step in a British invasion of Tibet", and refused its entry into Tibet¹⁷. Apart from this factual position, the Chinese themselves had denied their power in Tibet on several occasions. In 1873 when the British Government desired the opening of communications with Tibet, the Chinese Government told the British Minister at Peking that they had no sufficient control in Lhasa to ensure the entry of European travellers into that country. At the time of the negotiation of an additional article to the Chefoo Convention in 1876, a similar denial of authority was made by the

Chinese and thus the phrase "with due regard to the circumstances" was added to the article. A similar denial of authority in Lhasa was made by the Chinese while issuing passports to Charles Ellias in 1883 and to A.D. Carey in 1884. As a matter of fact, the Chinese would have been happy if somehow the exclusiveness of the Lamas could have been abolished.

The appointment of Chinese Ambans (Residents at Lhasa) was part of a reciprocal arrangement under which Lhasa used to send certain Lamasto reside at Peking nominally to worship for the Imperial family. The Ambans had no control over the Government of Tibet and exerted no authority at Lhasa. Only in matters of official ceremonies and religious rites, concerning the reigning family at Peking, were the Ambans consulted by the Tibetan authorities. Still they used to reside at Lhasa as the representatives of the Emperor. From time to time they used to write memorials and despatches on the affairs of Tibet in such a style that it gave the reader the impression that they were the masters of the situation in Lhasa. The chief reason for the perpetuation of the fallacy of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet lay in the writings of the modern authors who derive their information exclusively from Chinese sources. The memoirs of Chien Lung (1735-1796), the Manchu Emperor, giving an impression of the exact degree of sovereignty which that ruler imagined or intended to have over Tibet, became the basic source material for the modern writers on Tibet¹⁸.

Sinkiang

Sinkiang was originally populated by an Aryan race, and came under the control of the Chinese in 94 A.D. during the Han Dynasty, for a short period. After about six hundred years the Tang Emperors sent expeditions in Central Asia. The sway of the Chinese rulers lasted only for a while till Islam appeared in 712 A.D. Muslim rule flourished in Sinkiang for nearly five hundred years. At one time in the eleventh century their rule extended from the Caspian sea to the Gobi Desert. It was only in the thirteenth century that Chingiz Khan made his appearance in Sinkiang. In 1220 A.D. Sinkiang became a

part of the Mongol Empire. Chingiz Khan, his son Chagatai Khan and his descendents continued to rule the country up to about 1678. Jungars, who took over from the Mongols, ruled the country for about 78 years, after which the Chinese became the masters of the area. In essence the history of Sinkiang from the fifteenth century to the eighteenth affords an unbroken record of civil wars between two religious groups. It was only on the death of Khan Haldan-Shirin that the struggle assumed menacing dimensions. The struggle in his family for pre-eminence ended in the mutual overthrow of the direct heirs.¹⁹ Amoorsana, a distant relation of Haldan's and a chief of one of the Kalmuck tribes, thought he would take the opportunity of these dissensions to possess himself of the Jungar throne. Accordingly, with the aid of the devotees to his cause, he made the attempt. Being unsuccessful, he and his tribe declared themselves to be subjects of China. The sons of the Celestial Empire did not let slip the favourable opportunity afforded to them of gaining possession of Jungaria. A Chinese army was immediately despatched, and by the year 1758 Sinkiang was conquered.²⁰

The Manchu masters of the alien population in Sinkiang failed to preserve peace for long. Well within a century Jehangir Khan rose in an open rebellion in 1825. His revolt was so successful that he was practically the master of Kashgaria for a while. The effect of this revolt was so profound that it created a sensation throughout Asia.²¹ It was soon followed by the revolt of Khoja Yasuf in 1830, and that of the seven Khojas headed by Katta-Turra. The descendents of the dispossessed rulers of the country made repeated attempts to recover their lost patrimony from the alien Chinese masters. The last of such efforts was that by Vali Khan Turra in 1857. Vali Khan Turra was able to hold Kashgar and rule it for some months till he was driven out by the Chinese. In July 1864, a band of Tungans came from Urumchi to foment risings against the Manchu rulers. This revolt of the natives was so widespread that it embarrassed the western provinces of China, Zuragaria and Yarkand. One after the other, Kuchu, Yarkand, Khotan, and Kashgar fell to the Khojas. The Chinese garrison was cut to pieces at every

place. Kuchu and Yarkand were held by Rashid-ud-deen, and Khotan elected Haji Habibulla as its ruler. In the meantime Bazurga Khan arrived from Khokand with a force of 500 men under the able command of Yakub Beg Khushbegi. After a number of successes against the Chinese, Yakub arrested his incapable master and then set about extending his own sway. His possessions extended as far as Manas and Urumchi in the north east and to Khotan in the south. By 1869 this obscure minor Kokandi official had made himself the absolute ruler of Sinkiang. It was a remarkable achievement. "Yakub Beg was virtually the last truly independent sovereign of Central Asia and perhaps the most outstanding ruler that Asia produced after Nadir Shah."²² The Chinese rule in Sinkiang was non-existent from 1863, and the major problem for Yakub Beg was the maintenance of his rule against Russian encroachment.²³ For a while China lost all hopes of a reconquest of Sinkiang. It was only in 1874 that the Chinese General Tso Tsung Tang attempted the reconquest. Kansu was subjugated and the Chinese forces moved slowly in the direction of Urumchi. The Chinese force was so ill equipped that great apprehensions were expressed about its success against Yakub Beg Khushbegi.²⁴ This army moved gradually towards Urumchi. On 16 August 1876 the town of Kumuti or Tsi-Hwai-cheng was captured and the next day Urumchi or Hung-Miao-Tso (Red Temple). The town of Manas was taken from Tunganis on 6 November 1876. This success of the Chinese gave them an opening to the north side of Thian-Shan.²⁵ At this stage of the campaign against Yakub, there was some difference of opinion in regard to continuance of the war. Prince Kung supported by King-Lien was in favour of the termination of campaign, but the militant group among the Council prevailed and the action was continued.²⁶ The Chinese forces met with a serious repulse at the hands of Yakub's troops in the month of September 1877.²⁷ But soon they captured the cities of Karashar and Kucha on 7 and 18 October 1877.²⁸ In the meantime Yakub Beg Khusbegi died. It was rumoured that his sons, Haq Kuli Beg, Azar Khan Tora and Niaz Hakim united together and poisoned him through

the medium of one of his most favourite female slaves. The death of Yakub was followed by a war of succession.²⁹ The Chinese immediately took advantage and captured the entire Sinkiang once again towards the end of 1877.³⁰ This Chinese re-occupation of Sinkiang, as earlier, failed to give positive stability. Constant Muslim rebellion was continued. One such rebellion was reported in the province of Kansu in 1894.³¹ This was, however, suppressed.³² Though "Sinkiang has lain within the political horizon of China for more than two thousand years, but only intermittently has it been under Chinese influence, control, or sovereignty."³³

India-China Boundary in Western Sector

The India-China boundary in the western sector is divided into two parts. One, which meets Tibet in the east ; and the other, which is adjoining to Sinkiang. Both these regions need separate treatment as the authority of China was not as uniform as it has come to be in our times.

Indo-Tibetan Boundary

During 870-900 A.D., Tibet was under a constant religious turmoil. During this period Skyid-Lde-ni-ma-mgon came out of Tibet and established the first Ladakhi dynasty. He had three sons. Before his death, he divided his kingdom among his sons. Lha-chen-Dpal-gyi-mgon received :

"Mar-yul of Mnah-ris, the inhabitants using black bows ; Ru-thogs of the east and the gold-mine of Hgog nearer this way Lde-mchog-dkar-po ; At the frontier Ra-ba-dmar-po ; Wam-le, to the top of the pass of the Yi-mig rock, to the west to the foot of the Kashmir pass, from the Caverous stone upward hither, to the north to the gold-mine of Hgog ; all the places belonging to Rgya."³⁴

Bkra-Sis-mgon, the second son, received Guge with Puhrams, Rtce etc. and the youngest son Lde-gtsug-mgon was the ruler over Zans-dkhan-sgo-gsum, with Spi, Spi-lcogs, etc.³⁵

This territorial division of Ladakh continued among the descendents of the three sons of Pal-gyi-gon. It was only at the time of De-den Namgyal that Purig was annexed to Ladakh

in 1673 and Shyok river valley in 1674. By 1675 the kingdom of Ladakh was having its extent over Nubra, Dras, Purig, the lower Shyok River Valley, Guge, Purang, Rudok, Spiti, Upper Kunawar, Upper and Lower Lahul and Zaskar.³⁶ This practically comprised the whole of western Tibet including Mansarowar and Kailash. During the reign of Deleg N̄mgyal (1675—1705) a dispute arose between Bhutan and Tibet. Ladakh on behalf of Bhutan took up arms against Tibet. In this war Ladakh had to take the assistance of the Kashmir Governor. On the intervention of Hbrug-pa-pham-dban-po, the great Omniscient, a peace treaty was concluded. This treaty provided :

“As in the beginning, King Skyid-Lde-ni-ma-mgon gave a separate kingdom to each of his sons, the same delimitation to hold good. The Ladakhis were not to allow an army from India to proceed to attack upon Tibet through Ladakh ; mNa-rio-Skor-gsum was 'set apart (from Ladakh) to meet the expenses of sacred lamps and prayers (offered at Lhasa) ; but at Mensar (near Mount Kailash) the King (of Ladakh) shall be his own master, so that the Kings of Ladakh may have wherewithal to pay for lamps and other sacrifices at the Gang Tso ; it shall be his private domain. With this exception, the boundary shall be fixed at the Lhari stream at Demchog.”³⁷

By this treaty, except a small village of Mensar, Ladakh lost her possession in western Tibet. Kailash Mansarowar which is so current in our tradition was ceded to Tibet in 1684. But the old boundaries of Ladakh were once again confirmed.

At the time of the Dogra conquest of Ladakh in 1834, “the people who dwelt between the Zoji pass, Landar, Shedula, and Polong Darndra”³⁸ were all subjects of Ladakh. The kingdom was bounded in the north by Shahidulla and in the east by Polong Darndra. After the Dogra war with Tibet a treaty was concluded in 1842. This treaty once again confirmed the old boundaries of Ladakh.³⁹ When the modern state of Jammu and Kashmir was created by a treaty at Amritsar in 1846, it was decided by the British Government to determine the boundaries. In fact Lord Hardinge wanted an easy flow of Tibetan wool. Consequently, he wrote to the Wazir of Lhasa for the deputation of a boundary commissioner.⁴⁰ The letter was carried by Anant Ram, a native of Bashahr, to Gartok.

Though the letter was accepted, it was never sent to Lhasa.⁴¹ At the same time Hardinge sent a copy of the letter to Sir John, the British Plenipotentiary at Hong Kong, for its transmission to Peking. He observed: "I am led to understand that Tibet is immediately under the authority of the Imperial Court at Peking, I have to request that your excellency... will take such measures as to you may appear best calculated for securing the cooperation of Chinese authorities and for facilitating the objects of the Commission so far as they are connected with the boundaries subject to the Empire of China."⁴² After a great deal of persuasion by Davis, the Chinese replied: "Respecting the frontiers I beg to remark that the borders of those territories have been sufficiently and distinctly fixed so that it will be best to adhere to this ancient arrangement and it will prove far more convenient to abstain from any additional measures for fixing them".⁴³ Thus the British had to abandon the plan. But the ancient boundaries in this sector had been confirmed, by the Chinese themselves. In 1858 an agreement was signed between Basti Ram and Mangual Islae, confirming old boundaries.⁴⁴ Again in 1900 when Captain R. L. Kennion went to Gartok, he took as basis the old customs and settled the dispute regarding trade and grazing taxes.⁴⁵ Tibetans were jealous guards of their boundaries. The entry of the British European subjects in Tibetan territory was a problem.⁴⁶ Tibetans were always vigilant and alert whenever any British European subject was reported travelling close to their boundary.⁴⁷ But per chance if any body happened to cross into Tibet, he was subjected to hard punishment. A. H. Landor entered Tibet from Kumaon in 1897. Near Mansarowar he was arrested by a Tibetan patrol party. "He was beaten, tied up, deprived of most of his possessions, made to travel in bonds for several days and finally released when he had reached a state of physical collapse."⁴⁸

While this had been the position of the boundary of Ladakh with Tibet, the area within the boundary was in constant use. It was used for salt and wood collection. In 1868 Maharaja Ranbir Singh opened the Chang Chenmo route. He reduced duty on goods passing through that road from 5 per cent to 4

per cent, and sanctioned Rs. 5,000 for the repair of the road and renovation of rest houses on the route. Next year he instituted a present of Rs. 30 to a kafila using the road and the duty on every two Damas of tea was remitted.⁴⁹ After the commercial treaty of 1870 this area of Ladakh was in much use till 1886. Carey, a British traveller who visited the area in 1886, wrote that Pangong Lake area was within Ladakh, and the entire Aksai Chin area was used for salt collection. He observed that the Tibet boundary began from Lankala Pass.⁵⁰ Captain Ramsay, the British Joint Commissioner at Leh, in his memorandum on Kashmir Boundaries stated that the entire Aksai Chin area belonged to Ladakh.⁵¹ But Dr. Lamb raised his doubts about this area on the basis of the extension of the red line beyond 80° longitude. This line was drawn on the Simla Convention map of 1914, only to denote the limit of Tibet and China. It had nothing to do with Aksai Chin.⁵² Therefore, the boundaries shown in our present maps are the ancient boundaries, established in history.

India-Sinkiang Boundary

This boundary was of the British making, when the Crimean war of 1854-56 was over in Europe. The expansion of Russia in Europe was stopped by the neutralization of the Black Sea. Consequently, Russia began to expand in Central Asia. By 1864 the whole Kazakh Steppe was encircled by a line of Russian stations, and in 1865 the city of Tashkent in the Khanate of Kokand was captured. The following year, Khudojar Khan of Kokand, finding further resistance impossible, came to terms with the Russians ; and in 1868 General Von Kaufman took Samarkand in the amirate of Bokhara. In 1873 Khiva, the last of the Central Asian Khanates, was brought to heel ; and in 1876 the troublesome client state of Kokand was annexed.

While the British Government was active in Kashmir, Pamir and Sinkiang, it was equally alive to the Russian threat to Kashmir and in turn to their possessions in India. Out of this fear of Russia, they tried to secure a strategically sound boundary line for Kashmir state. The state of Jammu and Kashmir,

including Ladakh and the dependency of Hunza, was having control over a wide range of territories. In the north-west corner of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the Mir of Hunza was having the boundaries of his possessions including Tagdumbash, Khunjerab and Raskam as follows :

“The northern watershed of the Tagdumbash Pamir from the Wakhijrui Pass through the Bayik peak to Tlijilga, about a mile above Dafdar, thence across the river to the Zankan nullah, thence through Mazar and over the range to Urok, a point on the Yarkand river between Sibjaida and Itakturuk. Thence it runs along the northern watershed of the Raskam Valley to the junction of the Bazar Dara river and the Yarkand river. From thence southwards over the mountains to the Mustagh river leaving Aghil Dewan and Aghil pass within Hunza limits.”⁵³

This boundary of Hunza was very carefully ascertained by McMahon, and he was of the opinion that, “It appears to be well known to all the Kanjuts, and Hunza Wazir and others tell me they could easily at once point it out on the ground”.⁵⁴ Ladakh under Tshedpal-mi-gyur-don-grub Namgyal (1790-1835) was exercising control over, “The people who dwelt between the Zoji Pass, Landar, Shedula and Polong Darndra.....”⁵⁵ After the Dogra conquest and the creation of Jammu and Kashmir state, the Maharaja of Kashmir used to have a guard house at Shadula.⁵⁶ The boundaries of Ladakh towards east were defined in the treaties of 1784 and 1842, the first between Ladakh and Tibet and the second between Gulab Singh and Tibet.⁵⁷ These treaties were further confirmed by an agreement signed in 1858 between Dewan Basti Ram on behalf of the Kashmir state and Mangyal Islae on behalf of Tibet.⁵⁸ It is evident from this agreement that neither the British Government in India was sovereign over Kashmir nor China was over Tibet. However, the British Government after the treaty of Amritsar in 1846 tried to ascertain the boundaries of Jammu and Kashmir in the direction of Tibet, after dragging China into the picture.⁵⁹

Forsyth Line (1874-75)

Prior to the commercial treaty of 1870 with the Maharaja of Kashmir, the British Government had neither ascertained the boundaries of Kashmir state, nor had they the means to do so. Therefore, the issue then was not that of Kashmir's boundaries, but the boundaries of Kashmir and the British territory. Petty encroachments of the Kashmir officials near Lingti river in Kangra district were the concern of the British Government.⁶⁰ Although the desire was great to settle the boundary near Lingti river, the Earl of Mayo was of the opinion that it "...must not be forced on Maharaja".⁶¹ The discussion in regard to Lingti border ended in 1872 when pillars were erected between the British and Kashmir borders.⁶²

While these activities were on, the power complex in Central Asia was fast changing. Russia had taken over most of the Khanates. Chinese rule in Central Asia was thrown off by the rise of Yakub Beg Khusbegi. Kashmir was forced to give some concessions to the British activity in the state. Under such circumstances the British Government was keen to give the world some maps showing the boundaries of their possessions in India. The Survey of India, on the basis of the limited work done by their surveyors, and relying on the limited knowledge of Johnson and T. D. Forsyth, produced certain maps of Turkistan without any authority either from the ruler or from the ruled of the area.⁶³ On certain discrepancies in the maps so produced, Baron Northbrook observed that the boundaries were "...not laid down authoritatively". He further warned the authorities that, "we should not do so without communicating to Maharaja of Kashmir".⁶⁴

The boundaries in this area were the concern of both Calcutta and London. The missions to Yakub Beg headed by T. D. Forsyth were instructed by Calcutta to increase the geographical knowledge of the area and to ascertain the boundaries of the possessions of Yakub Beg. The British Minister in Peking was also sounded by London. The Foreign Office was informed :

"So far our Indian frontier is concerned, it must be remembered that there will be between it and Eastern Turkistan, to speak generally

the Kuen Lien mountains and the Himalaya, to say nothing of the large wild country of the Mohamedan cities just now ruled over by Yakoo Beg, which we loosely style Kashgaria"⁶⁵.

After the return from the Yarkand Mission in 1874, T. E. Gordon reported about the politics of Sarikol, Pamir and Wakhan.⁶⁶ Forsyth, while giving an alarmist signal about the march of Russia in the direction of India, ascertained the possessions of Yakub Beg.

"...no claim is ascertained to any tract or country south of the Karakush River and on the Yarkand River they do not come higher up than Kufelong...."⁶⁷

Forsyth did not rest content with his observation on the possessions of Yakub Beg. He pointed out what should be the boundary of India.

".....for commerce sake I would put the boundary at Ak-Tagh, and in laying out supplies I practically made that point the limit. The line then would run from the Eastern Corner of the Kuen Luen longitude 81° down to Karakash river to Suget, across that pass to Ak-Tagh, Longitude 78.5 (aproximately), latitude 35.59', hence down to Yarkand river to Kanjut"⁶⁸

While the British mission was active in Yarkand, the Maharaja of Kashmir strengthened his post at Shahidulla. Mohammed Rasool, a sepoy, was despatched to assist in the transit of mails from and to Yarkand.⁶⁹

When the Second Anglo-Afghan conflict was on, the Chinese had taken possession of Sinkiang from Yakub Beg in 1878. The British were able to instal a Political Agency at Gilgit in July 1877. The Russians were able to annex Kokand in 1876. The thought of the British Government was diverted towards the northern boundaries of the Kashmir state. Lytton in a policy statement pointed out the desirability of some general demarcation of the political borders of the undefined area. "The line which we may at first adopt as defining the sphere of our political influence, and should coincide generally with the geographical outline of the position, which, if need be, we may be ready to maintain actively."⁷⁰ He suggested that such points of contacts should be selected beforehand, though the natural boundary of India is formed by the convergence of the great mountain ranges of the Himalayas and of the Hindukush.

After careful investigation from political and strategical angles he recommended that if :

“.....we extend and by degrees consolidate, our influence over this country, and if we resolve that no foreign interference can be permitted on this side of the mountains, or within the drainage system of the Indus, we shall have laid down a natural line of frontier which is distinct, intelligible, and likely to be respected”⁷¹.

Ney Elias Proposal (1878)

While Lytton was preparing for the war with Afghanistan and China was occupying Yarkand, the Maharaja of Kashmir was concerned about the defenceless position of Ladakh. He enquired about the position in view of the troubled state of affairs in Yarkand from the British Joint Commissioner in Ladakh. Ney Elias suggested the strengthening of Kashmir garrison at Leh and Skardu. At the same time he communicated his views on the boundaries of Kashmir. The line which he suggested was based on these considerations : that the line should follow on the whole the natural waterparting between the two countries; that it should place a natural barrier between the people of the State and the possible enemy; that it should be near the base of supplies ; and that it should be easy to demarcate. He suggested that if only the boundary marks were placed, it would serve the purpose.

“.....in the west the crest of the Mustagh or Baltoro pass might be demarcated as the first point, the summit of the glacier at the head of the Nubra valley as the second (it is possible that a mark between Nos. 1 and 2 might be required as it is said that a pass exists in that region, the summit of the Glacier at the head of Shyok Valley as the third, the crest of the Karakoram pass, where the main road to Yarkand crosses as the fourth, the crest of the two Chunglung passes at the crossing points of the alternative routes via Chang Chenmo as the fifth and sixth, and finally some point on the present Chinese-Tibetan boundary to be afterwards decided on.”⁷²

In suggesting this line Elias sacrificed the claims of the Maharaja on Shahidulla and the neighbouring territory. When after a few years the Wazir Wazarat of Ladakh tried to enforce the claims of Kashmir, he repeated his old line and suggested not to occupy Shahidulla.⁷³

Ramsay Line (1888)

After almost a decade, in 1887, Sir Mortimer Durand forcefully advocated the reestablishment of Gilgit Agency. In a policy statement he pointed out the unreliable nature of the cooperation of Turkey and Persia. He recommended that "... we ought to cultivate the friendship of China..." in order to check the Russian expansion in Central Asia.⁷⁴ In the interest of Imperial security he reluctantly remarked that the "Native States contribute very little towards the support of the Empire which has given them existence and order and wealth..."⁷⁵ Therefore, he advocated that whether there were Russian objects or not, we must "...occupy such points in advance of our border as are decided to be really necessary for the security of our military position"⁷⁶ He was supported in his view by Sir F. Roberts.⁷⁷ Thus ultimately the second Gilgit Agency was established in July 1889, after the deposition of Maharaja Partap Singh on 8 March 1889. But the Kashmir borders did not cease to interest the British Government. Captain H. L. Ramsay, the British Joint Commissioner in Ladakh, laid stress on the settlement of the boundary between Ladakh and Chinese Turkistan. He pointed out that "It is to our interest that Russia should be kept at as great a distance as possible to the North West of the Hindukush and Mustagh-Karakoram ranges"⁷⁸. He reminded the Government of India thrice for the settlement of the boundary, but his advocacy made no impact on the authorities⁷⁹. Earl of Dufferin, the then Viceroy, dismissed the case with an observation that :

"It seems to me that it would not be desirable to run the risk of a troublesome controversy with China in order to push a Kashmir post beyond Karakoram, with the object of forestalling Russia when she succeeds the Chinese in Yarkand."⁸⁰

Not content with the attitude of the Government of India, Ramsay presented a Memorandum on 10 December 1888. He pointed out that the Chinese frontiers were bounded by a line extending from Sarikol to Kugiar, Kilian and Sanju, and that the "Yarkand authority do not regard Karakoram pass as their frontier". He recommended that the entire inhospitable

lands west of Shahidulla should be included within Kashmir borders.⁸¹ To the east of Shahidulla Ramsay advocated that :

“For geographical and ethnological reasons, the Karakoram would appear to be the natural boundary, so far as that part of the border is concerned. This amounts to saying that the watershed of the Indus system forms the frontier, but the Shyok is part of the Indus system, and the watershed of the Shyok is on the west of Lingzi Thang and Soda plains, both of which are supposed to belong to Ladakh, unless therefore we are prepared to one day find ourselves involved in a dispute regarding this large, though pecuniarily worthless, tract of country, it is advisable that here too the frontier should be defined.”⁸²

While Ramsay was earnestly insisting upon the definition of the northern boundary of Kashmir state, Hunza tribals made a raid on the people between Suget and Shahidulla. They carried off seven women, sixteen men and a large number of goats and yaks.⁸³ On receipt of the news of the raid, Kashmir Darbar despatched twentythree soldiers to Shahidulla for providing an escort to the merchants.⁸⁴

Turdikul, the headman of the Shahidulla Kirgiz, after the Hunza attack, went to Yarkand. He requested for help and protection from the Chinese Amban there. The latter told him that the Chinese frontiers extended only to the Kilian and Sanju passes, and if they came and settled within these borders, they would get protection. But so long as they lived at Shahidulla, China could do nothing. He advised Turdikul to apply for protection to the Ladakh authorities.⁸⁵ After having a positive ‘no’ from the Chinese, Musa Kirgiz came to Ladakh and requested for British protection.⁸⁶ Shahidulla Kirgiz were considered by the British Government as Chinese subjects.⁸⁷ But the Chinese had declined. The fact was that the Kirgiz of Shahidulla used to pay tax to the Chinese only when they visited Yarkand.⁸⁸ Since they had to visit Yarkand for certain purchases and other requirements they had to pay the taxes. This was because of the fact that the distance between Shahidulla and Yarkand was less than that to Leh. Thus on the representation of Musa, Ramsay recommended for the help, pointing to the fact that the Kirgiz were not Chinese subjects.⁸⁹ But it was hard to convince a pro-Chinese Foreign Secretary, Sir Mortimer Durand, that Karakash and Shahidulla

belonged to Kashmir.⁹⁰ Ney Elias on whose advice Durand worked on this frontier was of the opinion that it was a "... mistake to meddle with the fort or 'defensible sarai' or in any way to raise a question regarding Shahidulla". Agreeing to the remarks of Elias, Durand observed : "If we bring the Chinese on at this point we shall be in an illogical position. The water-parting ought to be our political boundary from Assam to Hunza. However, the Chinese do not recognise it."⁹¹

The entire advocacy of Ramsay in regard to boundary was just ignored and no action was taken. Captain Younghusband was asked to enquire into the whole of the northern boundary of Kashmir afresh.

Younghusband on the Northern Frontiers of Kashmir (1889)

In view of the appeal of Kirgiz and the reported visit of a Chinese officer to Hunza,⁹² the services of Captain F. E. Younghusband of First Dragoon Guards was requisitioned by the Government of India.⁹³ Younghusband was instructed to proceed to Karakash valley in the company of Musa Kirgiz from Leh, for ascertaining their requirements and the degree of dependence on China. He was, in fact, asked to explore the entire territory between Hunza and Shahidulla. Apart from the investigation of Shahidulla fort from the point of view of defence, he was warned that "...should any intimation be made to you respecting the sovereignty the Kirgiz desire to live under, you will be careful to use only the most guarded language in reply".⁹⁴

Younghusband reached Shahidulla on 21 August 1889. He met privately Turdikul first and the next day, he called a meeting of all the Kirgiz headmen. In the presence of all, Younghusband ascertained that Turdikul was considered as the chief of them all. All the headmen promised to obey Turdikul. Younghusband thereupon gave Turdikul a sum of Rupees five hundred for the repair of the fort of Shahidulla.⁹⁵ In regard to the Chinese boundary Younghusband made very careful enquiry and found :

“In the former Chinese occupation the Kuen-Lun mountains (that is the branch of them over which the Kilian and Sanju passes run) were always recognised as the frontier and the country to the south belonged to no one in particular..... After the Chinese re-occupation of Yarkand (1878), no Chinese official or soldier has ever come across the Kilian or Sanju passes.....”⁹⁶

Younghusband was told that when Ney Elias went to Yarkand in 1885, he left a map in which some watersheds were shown. This map was in the possession of a native with whose assistance the Chinese were trying to know what lay beyond Kuen Luen.⁹⁷ In spite of this clear declaration about the Chinese boundary by Younghusband, Ney Elias prevailed upon the Viceroy. Lansdowne decided that

“The country between Karakoram and Kuen Luen ranges, is, I understand, of no value, very inaccessible, and not likely to be coveted by Russia. We might, I should think, encourage the Chinese to take it, if they showed any inclination to do so”⁹⁸

Not content with convincing the Viceroy, Ney Elias, advocated his Indus watershed line to Colonel J. C. Ardagh. Elias advocated that the land between Karakoram and Kuen Luen was uninhabited. So long Sarikul belonged to the Chinese and Wakhan to the Afghans, there was no chance of Russian occupation of the isolated lands between Kuen Luen and Karakoram. In case Turkistan falls to the Russians, then, “the Indus waterparting would form a more rational, a more simply defined and easily guarded frontier than an artificial line further north”. Finally if the British Government had decided to occupy the land, they would have to open “regular negotiations with China (the most impracticable nation), and have a formal Delimitation Commission to determine an artificial frontier line”. Therefore, in the opinion of Elias :

“The simplest solution of the matter, while China occupies Eastern Turkistan, would be to influence the Chinese to claim all the country draining into the Tarim system i.e. upto the heads of the Indus water. This would require no negotiation and no Delimitation Commission”⁹⁹

Younghusband moved towards Hunza from Shahidulla and explored the entire region hitherto unexplored. He submitted his final report advocating a safe strategical boundary of the British India.¹⁰⁰ In the meantime it was reported that

the Chinese had occupied Shahidulla.¹⁰¹ But ultimately the report was proved to be a rumour. Younghusband's report was carefully discussed by the Government.¹⁰² The deliberations and the policy to be followed in regard to the northern borders of Kashmir state were communicated to the Home Government in London. Lansdowne, though he partly admitted the claims of Kashmir state on Shahidulla, could not reconcile himself to the responsibilities of holding it. The land between Karakoram pass and Shahidulla, to his mind, was uninhabited and was not likely to be inhabited. Therefore he observed that :

“We should gain little by extending our responsibilities to the further side of great natural barrier like the Karakoram mountains, it is on the other hand evidently to our advantage that the tract of the country intervening between the Karakoram and Kuen Luen mountains should be definitely held by a friendly power like China.¹⁰³

He therefore wished from the Secretary of State that

“...the Chinese Government to be informed that we desire to see the frontier of Chinese Turkistan coterminous to those of Afghanistan and Kashmir and its dependencies, and Chinese authority definitely asserted upto the Karakoram mountains and to the limits of Afghan territory on the Pamirs.”¹⁰⁴

This same policy statement was sent to Sir John Walsham, the British Minister in Peking.¹⁰⁵ The British Resident in Kashmir was informed accordingly that he

“...should regard the limit of the Indus watershed as the boundary of His Highness's territories towards the north, i.e. that the line of natural water parting from a point near the Irsad pass on the west to the recognised Tibet frontier on the east should be also the limit of our political jurisdiction.”¹⁰⁶

This decision of the Government of India in regard to the Indus watershed as the northern boundary was not pleasing to Captain Ramsay. His several protests and pointed references to the non-existence of Chinese authority beyond Kilian and Sanju passes was deliberately ignored by the Government.¹⁰⁷ The Secretary of State for India, Viscount Cross, observed that this “...will need confidential and delicate handling, and will likely to be decided here in London with the Chinese minister”.¹⁰⁸ He enquired about the definite line of boundary to be proposed to China. Lansdowne could not propose one, as he himself was not aware of it.¹⁰⁹ In Peking Walsham visited Tsungli

Yamen on 12 September 1890 and pressed for the appointment of the British Agent at Kashgar. Yamen refused the request, saying that there was very little exchange of people and goods in that region, and pointed that

“...the New Dominions and India could scarcely be considered coterminous countries. A large belt of country inhabited by Mohamadan tribes was wedged in between the boundaries of the two Empires.”¹¹⁰

Walsham again pressed Tsungli Yamen on 30 September 1891 for the same, but without any results.¹¹¹

Younghusband to Chinese Turkistan (1890)

While the British Government was busy inducing China to capture the lands between Karakoram pass and Shahidulla, at Peking and London, Captain Younghusband was deputed to Kashgar. He was instructed to proceed via Leh and Shahidulla to Yarkand, and then to the Pamir region. In consultation with Chinese officials Younghusband was asked to ascertain the degree of Chinese claims and to

“...impress upon the Chinese officials the necessity of strengthening and asserting their occupation, so that, if possible, there may be no grounds for alleging that any unclaimed strip intervenes between Afghan and Chinese territory.”¹¹²

On the Kashmir frontier between Karakoram and Shahidulla his instructions were to “take opportunity of explaining to them our common interests in those regions and the friendly intention of the Government of India.”¹¹³

Captain Younghusband with these instructions reached Leh on 1 August, and went to Shahidulla via Suget on 20 August 1890.¹¹⁴ From Shahidulla he went to Yarkand. He met P’an Ta-jein, the Amban of Yarkand, on 5 September 1890. With the help of the maps he explained the total geography of the region south of Kuen Luen and north of Karakoram ranges. He pointed out to the Amban that :

“...the Viceroy of India had ever been of opinion that the best boundary between Kashmir and Yarkand was that formed by the watershed of the Karakoram range”¹¹⁵

But on the contrary the Chinese regarded Kilian pass as their boundary. If it was so, Younghusband said, the Viceroy of India

was prepared to occupy the intervening lands. P'an Ta-jein in reply stated that the Chinese had ever considered the watershed, "...as a natural or, literally in Chinese, a Heaven made boundary, to be the frontier between Kashmir and Yarkand..." He assured Younghusband that the Chinese were prepared to protect the trade route as far as that range.¹¹⁶ Thus the British game was fairly complete.

Chinese Activities on Kashmir Frontier

The Chinese in Sinkiang were apprehensive and alarmed by the British activities after the deposition of Maharaja Partap Singh. These apprehensions became more confirmed when the British forces entered Hunza and Nagar in December 1891.¹¹⁷ Russia, on the other hand, was equally alarmed at the extension of the British territories near to hers. M. Petrovsky, Russian Consul-General in Kashgar, began to instigate the Chinese against the British.¹¹⁸ The Chinese, thus encouraged by the British and instigated by the Russians, became active on the frontiers of Kashmir.

The Chinese, prior to the meeting of Younghusband and the Amban in Yarkand, never regarded the territories beyond Kuen Luen as a part of their Empire. The map prepared by Hung Ta-chen, the Chinese minister at the court of St. Petersburg, represented the real Chinese boundary. In this map no portion of the Yarkand river valley, Karakash river valley or Shahidulla was claimed as Chinese territory.¹¹⁹ But after the meeting of Younghusband, and with due preparations, the Chinese came down to Kuen Luen. In 1892 they came to Shahidulla and later erected boundary marks at Karakoram Pass.¹²⁰ Next year they came down to Aktagh, between Karakoram and Kuen Luen.¹²¹ Two Chinese officials, Hai-ta-Lao-yieh and Li were deputed to survey the total area and to report.¹²² Li surveyed the area between Karakoram and Kuen Luen and Hai went to the Pamir region of the Chinese territory.¹²³ Both these officers surveyed the area thoroughly and presented the maps to Yamen.¹²⁴ When the survey operations were on, all the traders were stopped to use the roads leading to Ladakh.¹²⁵

Hai-ta-Lao-yieh, the Chinese border expert, made searching queries from Macartney about the borders of the British Government, during the same time.¹²⁶ Not content with this, the Chinese Governor of New Dominions proposed to send a man into Ladakh on the pretext of making copies of Chinese inscriptions said to exist there.¹²⁷

While the Chinese were active, the Kashmir State Council was not complacent about the boundaries of the state. The matter of Shahidulla occupation by the Chinese was discussed on 4 April 1892.¹²⁸ A memorandum was presented to the Resident and his views were sought. ¹²⁹ Colonel W. F. Prideaux, following the line of the Government of India, stated that, "I do not think I can recommend that the question of the occupation of Shahidulla Khoja by the Kashmir Darbar should be opened".¹³⁰ When the Chinese erected boundary pillars at Karakoram, Raja Amar Singh again appealed to the Government of India.¹³¹ After careful consideration Amar Singh was told that "it does not seem desirable that the responsibilities of the Kashmir state, already heavy, should be increased by the assumption of control over the country beyond the Karakoram" ¹³²

The British Government was not apprehensive of the Chinese activities. In fact, all Chinese activities were on their invitation. Mortimer Durand characteristically remarked: "The Kashmir State is now well in hand, and I should be inclined to explain to them that any attempt on their part to go beyond the watershed is a mistake."¹³³ But the attitude of Lansdowne was different. He, while agreeing with Durand, was of the opinion that no boundary pillars should be allowed to be erected on the slope of the pass. Lansdowne expressed his opinion that "no boundary marks will be regarded as having any international value, unless they have been erected with the concurrence of both powers".¹³⁴

The information of the Chinese activities was reported to the Secretary of State. He was asked to inform the Chinese Government, that their activities were closely watched and

that they would not be allowed to hold the land without "common consent". Lansdowne significantly observed :

"It would in our opinion be matter for congratulations, if the Chinese were to assert effectively their claims to Shahidulla and the tract between Kuen Lun and Karakoram ranges. We encouraged them to do so at the time of Captain Younghusband's mission in 1890."¹³⁵

N. R. O'Connor, the British Minister in Peking, was asked to represent the encroachments of China to Yamen.¹³⁶ He accordingly visited Tsungli Yamen on 12 June 1893. Yamen at first pleaded ignorance of the incidents, but promised to inquire.¹³⁷ After necessary enquiries from the Amban at Kashgar, Yamen asserted that, "The locality is without doubt within the territory of China and has no connection with India".¹³⁸ Thus the Chinese activities were within their empire. Lord Elgin, the successor of Lansdowne, kept quiet on the outcome of O'Connor's representation to Yamen. He thought it "undesirable to make any objection to the attitude taken by the Chinese Government".¹³⁹ O'Connor was accordingly informed not to raise the issue any more.¹⁴⁰

Macartney's Neutral Zone Scheme

In the meantime Macartney argued that in the event of Russian occupation of Sinkiang, the British position would be very difficult.

"Kanjut, it may be remembered, used before our occupation of it to levy taxes as far as Dafden (? Dehd) on the Taghdumbash Pamir. A portion of Sarikul known as Pakpah and Shaksah was apparently once tributary to it. A stronghold at a place called Darwaza, situated near on the northern side of the Shimshal pass, seems still to be in the possession of the Kanjutis. This jurisdiction of the Maharaja of Kashmir used to extend to Shahidulla."¹⁴¹

Macartney suggested that these facts should be made known to the Chinese. The Chinese may not admit territorial claims. But it would be sufficient to place them on record in a treaty, pointing out that the claims were waived, so long as these territories remained in the possession of China. In the event of their occupation by Russia, he suggested that the British could take up the issue and establish a 'neutral state', under the guarantee of both the powers. Such a state would occupy all the mountain.

regions between the crest of the Karakoram and the Mustagh ranges on the one side, and on the other be limited by a line drawn from about Tachkurghan to Kugiar and thence by the skirts of the mountains until Polu on the Kuen Lun range. "Such places as the Taghdumbash Pamir, the Raskum district and Shahidulla would thus be comprised in a neutral zone".¹⁴²

The 'neutral state' proposal of Macartney was thoroughly discussed and the claims of Hunza and Kashmir were enquired into. The claims of Kashmir and Hunza were genuine.¹⁴³ They were admitted by the Chinese governors of Sinkiang.¹⁴⁴ Still the Foreign Secretary referred the matter to the Military Department with the characteristic observation that, "The less we know about the jagir, the less I think we will be compromised."¹⁴⁵ The Quartermaster General saw many objections without any advantage in the proposal. He declared it strategically unsound.¹⁴⁶

While the Neutral Zone proposal of Macartney was rejected, it was decided to take steps towards the settlement of the boundary between Kashmir and Sinkiang. Elgin pointed out to Lord George F. Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, that :

"It might be stipulated that Taghdumbash should revert to Hunza, if China abandons it. The recent Franco-Chinese treaty may offer a favourable opportunity for demanding from China the settlement of her boundary with Afghanistan, Hunza and Kashmir, in such a manner as to definitely limit extensions by Russia towards Karakoram Mustagh if she succeeds China in Raskam and Sarikol."¹⁴⁷

The recommendation of Elgin was forwarded to Salisbury by Hamilton.¹⁴⁸ But in the opinion of Salisbury the condition of China then was not satisfactory for raising any boundary question.¹⁴⁹ Hence the matter was held over for future settlement.

The Ardagh Line

In the meantime the Pamir demarcation was complete.¹⁵⁰ The Chinese were defeated by Japan and the Muslim population in Kansu province was in revolt against Chinese rule.¹⁵¹ It was thought that the Chinese rule in Sinkiang was about to collapse and likely to be replaced by the Russian. Sir John

Ardagh, Director, Military Intelligence, pointed out in a memorandum that the boundary line determined by the Government of India, in the great mountain ranges north of Chitral, Hunza and Ladakh, was defective. In a general sense that formed an acceptable defensible line. Because it was easy to define, difficult to pass and fairly dividing the population. But the physical conditions of these mountains, their great extent, high altitude, general inaccessibility and sparse population were the great impediments in watching the actual watershed. Therefore from the military point of view, a frontier following the highest watershed was defective. The object of closing the passes of Kilik, Mintaka, Khunjerab, Shimshul, Mustagh and Karakoram against an enemy will not be achieved, as the enemy will get a safe halting ground in the valleys of Yarkand and Karakash rivers. He therefore suggested that the boundary of British India should include the

“...basins of the Danga Bash river and its affluents above Dehda, at the junction of the Ili Su and Karatchukarof the Yarkand river above the point where it breaks through the range of mountains marked by the Sargon and Ibis Birkar passes at about latitude 37° north and longitude 74°50' east.....and of the Karakash river above a point between Shahidulla and Sanju or Grim pass.”¹⁵²

Ardagh argued his case by pointing out the inclusion of the fertile river basins, and the claims laid by Kashmir state and Hunza to the area. He was of the opinion that it was not likely that, “China in her present state would offer much objection, or indeed, that her influence extends to the south of the Kuen Lun.”¹⁵³ In the meantime Salisbury emphasized the desirability of acquiring an efficient control within the frontiers which were considered as “essential to British interests”.¹⁵⁴

Ardagh's memorandum was sent from London on 12 February 1897, and reached India on 1 March 1897.¹⁵⁵ Unfortunately, his memorandum was discussed by the authors of the MacDonal Line. W. J. Cunningham, the Secretary of Foreign Political Department, J. A. Douglas of Military Department and Francis Younghusband unanimously rejected it.¹⁵⁶ Elgin had to put his seal and he pointed out that “No invader has ever approached

India from this direction where nature has placed such formidable barriers".¹⁵⁷

In the meantime, on the instigation of M. Petrovsky, the Chinese pointed out an error on the map in regard to Aksai Chin boundary to Macartney.¹⁵⁸ They also stopped Hunza cultivation of Raskam valley.¹⁵⁹ But in both these cases the British Government kept mum. Hunza was asked to obtain best possible terms from the Chinese without the supposed knowledge of the British Government.¹⁶⁰ In Aksai Chin, for the first time Captain Deasy was not allowed to travel through Polu on the pretext of road repairs. In fact M. Petrovsky told the Tatri that the English had some secret intentions on the Aksai Chin country, and warned Huang Ta-jen that "the Russian Government would interfere".¹⁶¹ However, on representation to Tsungli Yamen by Ironside, Deasy was allowed to travel in Aksai Chin.¹⁶²

MacDonald Line (1899)

In 1898 Salisbury enquired about the boundary line to be secured from China in the direction of Afghanistan, Hunza and Kashmir.¹⁶³ The matter came again under discussion among the members of Elgin's Government in India.¹⁶⁴ The consensus was to press the claims of Hunza on Taghdumbash and Raskam, only for having a bargain with China. But Elgin was "prepared to renounce them in exchange for renunciation by the Chinese of all claims over Hunza".¹⁶⁵ The line which was proposed by the Indian Government to be secured from the Chinese as boundary began at Pamir region, where the Pamir boundary commission of 1895 had completed the work. By and large, it followed the crest of the main range of the mountain and ran as follows :

"...beginning at the North end at the Peak Povalo-Schveikoski, the line takes a south easterly direction, crossing the Karachikar stream at Mintaka Aghazi, thence proceeding in the same direction till it joins, at the Karchanai Pass, the crest of the main ridge of the Mustagh range which it then follows passing by the Kunjerab pass and continuing southwards to the peak just north of the Shimshul pass. At this point the boundary leaves the crest and follows a spur running east approximately parallel to the road from the Shimshul to Hunza post at Darwaza. The line turning south through

the Darwaza post, crosses the road from the Shimshul pass at that point and then ascends the nearest high spur and regains the main crests, which the boundary will again follow, passing the Mustagh, Gusherbrum and the Salto passes to the Karakoram. From the Karakoram pass the crests of the range run nearly east for about half a degree and then turn south to a little below the 35th parallel of North latitude. Rounding then what in our maps is shown as the source of the Karakash, the line of hills to be followed runs north-east to a point east of Kiziljilya and from there, in a south easterly direction, follows the Lak Tsung range until that meets the spur running south from the Kuen Lun range which has hitherto been shown on our maps as the eastern boundary of Ladakh. This is a little east of 80° east longitude.”¹⁶⁶

Sir C. MacDonald was asked to present this line to Tsungli Yamen.¹⁶⁷ He in a note presented this line to Tsungli Yamen on 14 March 1899.¹⁶⁸ Yamen promised to enquire and to reply to MacDonald.¹⁶⁹ In spite of several queries by Box Ironside from Yamen, China failed to respond to the proposal.¹⁷⁰ In the meantime Salisbury sounded the Russian Foreign Office about the instigation of M. Petrovasky.¹⁷¹ Count Mouravieff denied any knowledge of the activities of Petrovasky and said that the “matter is between India government and China, in which Russia had nothing to say”.¹⁷² This Russian denial was communicated to Yamen.¹⁷³ But Tsungli Yamen refused the cultivation in Raskam due to the fear of Russians.¹⁷⁴ Salisbury in the meantime informed Sir C. Scott that, “In view of the present state of affairs in China, I approve your proposal to defer carrying out these instructions until a favourable opportunity presents itself.”¹⁷⁵

In India Elgin was replaced by Curzon on 6 January 1899. China due to internal disorder stopped interfering with people in the south of Kuen Lun mountains. After the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, the Russian fear was removed, and Young-husband in 1904 removed the exclusiveness of the Tibetans. Hunza began to cultivate Raskam lands as usual from 1914.¹⁷⁶

The British experiment on boundary making of India, out of fear of Russia, cost India much. The legitimate claims of Kashmir had been ignored. A line based on military strategy was proposed. Though nothing came out of MacDonald proposals of 14 March 1899, yet the British Government gave a positive weapon

in the hands of China to play with, in an opportune time which they have used after 1948. MacDonald proposals gained a strategic boundary for the British empire, but India lost its legitimate claims to an area of approximately 4,800 sq miles between Karakoram and Kuen Lun ranges. China, prior to the instigation of Younghusband in 1890, never claimed any territory below Kuen Lun mountains in Sinkiang, nor did they ever raise any issue in regard to Aksai Chin area.

The first fifty years of the present century were of internal struggles both in India and in China. Except for a brief period in 1910-11 Tibet also enjoyed her independence. Chao Erh-Feng came to Tibet from the east. His campaign led to the making of the McMahon Line in 1914. But the western sector remained as it was in 1900. With the advent of the Chinese communists in Tibet, our Government came to realise that our northern frontier required closer attention. Hurriedly treaties with Sikkim and Bhutan were revised in 1949-50. China in her expansionist move got the seventeen point agreement of 23 May 1951 signed with Tibet.¹⁷⁷ This agreement sealed the fate of Tibetan independence. India quickly accorded the recognition of Chinese authority over Tibet in the Sino-Indian Agreement of 29 April 1954.¹⁷⁸ It was prompted by the spirit of Bandung and the 'Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai' slogans. Very soon, however, China began to raise claims on Barahoti.¹⁷⁹ In September 1957, the road through Aksai Chin was completed.¹⁸⁰ The Government of India protested to the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi. Thus claims and counter claims began. Cartographical warfare led to actual intrusions. Indian patrol parties were intercepted by the Chinese. At times they were arrested and subjected to harsh treatment. In the meantime diplomatic notes continued. The officials of the two Governments met thrice at Peking, Delhi and Rangoon. Entire historical materials were scrutinized. Both the governments came out with their own versions of boundaries. Chou En-lai and Jawaharlal Nehru could not settle the issue, in spite of their visits to each other's country. Relations deteriorated to the extent that China made a frontal attack on our territories on 20 October 1962.

Prime Minister Nehru wrote to Chou En-lai that, "Nothing in my long political career has hurt and grieved me more than the fact. . . ." ¹⁸¹

We are aware that when Governments are changed, the borders and communications are alerted, but in our case, we either remained engaged with other pressing problems like partition or Kashmir, or we had been complacent. The price of complacency we have paid in terms of land and lives, and have allowed an issue to be created the solution of which is not in sight as yet.

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¹⁷⁶Aitchison, p. 15.

¹⁷⁷Richardson, n. 14, Appendix pp. 275-78.

¹⁷⁸Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreement signed between the Government of India and China 1954-1959, White Paper I.

¹⁷⁹17 July 1954. Ibid I.

¹⁸⁰Ibid., pp. 26-27.

¹⁸¹White Paper No. 8, p. 4.

INDIA-CHINA BOUNDARY : CENTRAL SECTOR

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India-China Boundary in the Central Sector is located in high Himalaya. Generally the portion between the rivers Kali and Sutlej is known as the Central Sector. This portion of the Himalaya is most frequented by people. This mountain tract covers about 38,000 sq. km. and contains the type-areas of all the three Himalayan sections, the Siwalik, Himachal (lesser Himalaya), and Himadri (great Himalaya). The Siwalik range proper, with its forest-covered slopes and flat summits rising to 900 to 1,000 meters extends uninterruptedly for about 74 km. between the Ganga and the Jamuna. From Hardwar to Rishikesh the Siwalik range appears to present a succession of deep slopes and escarpments. The Himachal (the lesser Himalaya) section comprises mainly two linear ranges, the Mussoorie and the Nag Tibba. The former extends from Mussoorie town to Lansdowne, a distance of about 180 km. and has a number of hill stations of moderate heights (2,000 to 2,600 m.) on its summits. Near Nainital town there are several lakes of considerable beauty, of which Nainital and Bhim Tal are the most notable. The Himadri (great Himalaya) contains about 6,600 sq. km. of Himals, snow fields. The Gangotri Himal feeds the Gangotri and Kedarnath glaciers, and the Nandadevi Himal feeds the Milan and Pindari glaciers. A grand view of the peaks of Himadri can be obtained from Badrinath. Nilkantha stands directly above Badrinath, rising in a single awe-inspiring sweep to a beautiful snow-capped cone-summit. Nandadevi (7,817 m.), the highest peak in Kumaun Himalaya, stands within a vast amphitheatre-like valley, 112 km. in circumference, the average height being 7,000 m. Dunagiri (7,066 m.) stands on the western summits of Nandadevi. To be precise, it stands on the western end of the northern

arm and Trisul (7,120 m.) on the southern arm. The Nandadevi group of peaks are drained by the Dhauliganga. Further west lies the Kamet Himal with towering Kamet peak (7,756 m.) on the Zaskar range, a northern branch of great Himalaya. Above the Gangotri Himal there are Satopanth (7,084 m.), Badrinath (7,138 m.), Kedarnath (6,940 m.), Gangotri (6,614 m.) and Srikanta (6,728 m.). In Kulu valley the two peaks worth mentioning are Indrasan (6,220 m.) and Deo Tibba (6,001 m.). Most of the rivers such as the Ganga, Jamuna, Sutlej and their tributaries have their origin in this region.¹

History

From times immemorial the region was known by the name of Kedara-Khanda. This had been the most holy and esteemed land for Hindus all over India. Ancient Sanskrit classics such as the Vishnu Purana and the Mahabharata etc. tell us that a number of tribes were dwelling on the borders of Bharat. Amongst them the Sakas, the Nagas, the Khasas, the Hunas and the Kiratas were the most important. The area was divided into fifty two small principalities. All the rulers of the later period had claimed their descent from the famous Salivahana.² As a matter of fact the neighbouring regions of Bharat were ruled by the people who went out from this country. Khotan was ruled by some descendants of the Mauryas.³ The first king of Tibet was also an Indian.⁴ Therefore, there was one big family which was ruling the country within and beyond Himalaya. The places of worship in this region were sacred to the people beyond Himalaya also. Perhaps that was the reason of complete homogeneity among the rulers and the ruled. The fall of the powerful kingdom of Harsha in 640 A.D. was followed by the rise of a powerful Tibetan Empire.

Kedarā-Khanda was known as the kingdom of Brahmapura, when Hiuen Tsang, a Chinese traveller, visited India in 629 A.D. In times there arose the four principalities of Spiti, Bashahr, Garhwal and Kumaun.

Spiti in early times was ruled by the Sena Kings. One of the earliest known rulers was Samudra Sen, who presented to the

temple of Paras Ram at Nirmand a copper plate grant and founded that institution. During the reign of Rajendra Sen, Kulu was a tributary to Spiti. The fortunes of Spiti declined during the reign of Chet Sen and in the beginning of the seventh century it was annexed by Ladakh. A small jagir with three villages was given to the son of Chet Sen who settled there peacefully. Later in the tenth century Spiti was given to one of the three sons of the ruler of Ladakh. Spiti remained a part of Ladakh and was taken by Gulab Singh, the ruler of Kashmir, in 1834, when Ladakh was attacked by Zorawar Singh.⁵ The boundaries of Spiti with Tibet were settled in several treaties with Tibet, such as the treaties of 1684 and 1842.⁶

Bashahr State in early times was ruled by a Rajput family. One of the earliest rulers was Pradyumna. He was succeeded by several kings. During the Mughal rule in India, one Raja Kehri Singh was summoned to Delhi. The Mughal Emperor was pleased with the hill Chief and honoured him with the title of Chhatrapati. The successors of Kehri Singh were ruling the state when the British power extended to the area. After the Gurkha War Mahendra Singh was restored to power on 8 February 1816.⁷

Garhwal in ancient times was ruled by a Katyuri dynasty. The last of the Katyuris was Birdeo. He was the most tyrannical king. After his death the principality was divided among small feudal lords. Amongst them one Som Pal succeeded in establishing the Kingdom of Garhwal. His sway was extended all over Garhwal and the pilgrim route to Gangotri came under his control. In the fourteenth century the seat of Government was Dewalgarh. In around 1483 A.D. Bahadur Khan Lodi, the Sultan of Delhi, granted the title of Shah to Balbhadra Shah of Garhwal. This title is still used by the descendants of ex-rulers of Garhwal. Balbhadra Shah was followed by Man Shah, Dularam Shah, Mahipati Shah, Medini Shah and Fateh Shah. Fateh Shah ruled Garhwal from 1684 to 1716. He was the most powerful ruler, and had once attacked Tibet without success. Garhwal was always having hostility with Kumaun and a regular war was fought under all the rulers.⁸ So long

as the central power was not affected none of the Mughals ever interfered in the hill states.

Kumaun, like Garhwal, was also ruled by the Katyuris for several centuries. After the fall of the Katyuris the kingdom was divided into several small principalities. A Rajput adventurer who came from Jhansi was destined to be the first Chand ruler of Kumaun. Atma Chand (975-1055) and his successors had ruled the country till the Gurkha occupation. It was only when a strong central power was established that Rudra Chand went to Delhi and accepted the Mughal overlordship in the reign of Akbar. Among the successors of Rudra Chand, Baz Bahadur was the most powerful. He extended his territories by adding Bhotia Mahals in Kumaun. He once attacked Tibet but was unsuccessful in his attempt.⁹

All the four principalities were ruled by different Rajput dynasties. In the absence of a strong central authority they were left to themselves. But when the strong central authority of the Mughals was established in Delhi, these principalities became subordinate to it. So long as the authority of the Mughals was intact, no external power ever succeeded in any of their designs in the Himalayan region.

While these developments were taking place in India, Tibet was also subjected to several changes. After the fall of the Tibetan power in the seventh century, Mansarowar and Kailash region which was known as Guge, Purang and Nari Khurosan was annexed to the Ladakhi kingdom. In 930 A.D. when the Raja of Ladakh divided his kingdom, Spiti, Guge and Purang were given to two younger sons. Ever since then it seems the areas of Kailash and Mansarowar remained part of Ladakh. At times they became free, but whenever a powerful king came to power at Leh the areas went to Ladakh. In about 1671 Guge-Purang was annexed¹⁰ by Ladakh but soon it was ceded to Tibet in 1684. The decline of Tibet led to the occupation of Lhasa by the Chinese in the early eighteenth century.

The Decline of the Mughals and the rise of the British

The decline of the Mughal power in the eighteenth century

was followed by an era of power struggle for supremacy in India. Two decisive battles were fought in the east and the north—at Plassey and Panipat. In both of them foreign invaders were the victors. The Afghan victors of Panipat were expelled out of the country by the lion of the Punjab, Ranjit Singh, in the beginning of the nineteenth century. The British East India Company, the victor of Plassey, was destined to rule the country for about two centuries. After establishing themselves in Bengal, the Company moved westward fairly fast. A treaty of friendship and alliance was concluded with Nawab Shuja-ud-Daula of Oudh in 1765. The British troops were stationed in the forts of Chunar and Allahabad in 1772. The possessions of Raja Chait Singh of Banaras were ceded to the Company by Nawab Asaf-ud-Daula in 1775. The succeeding Nawab Saadat Ali Khan brought the British to the banks of the Jamuna by ceding the lands in the Ganga-Jamuna Doab and the whole of Rohilkhand in 1801.¹¹ Thus, by the dawn of the nineteenth century, the British East India Company came to an area where the Sikhs, the Jats, the Rohillas and the Gurkhas were active in making territorial gains at the cost of the twin states of Kumaun and Garhwal, between the rivers Jamuna and Sutlej.

Kumaun

The decline of the fortunes of Kumaun began from the accession of King Devi Chand in 1720. He was a weak and irresolute prince. Under the influence of his advisers, he embarked upon wild schemes which were ultimately responsible for the fall of the Chands. In order to establish a 'Golden Era' in Kumaun he tried to pay off the debts of all his subjects. This undertaking was a costly affair. About a crore of rupees were spent without gaining the object of the king. The condition of his unthrifty subjects remained as it was. He fought wars with Garhwal and Doti and tried to take part in the power struggle of the plains. On the advice of Manik and his son Puran Mall Bisht, Devi Chand took Afghan Daud Khan into his service as a military general. Devi Chand had supported

the cause of one Sabir Shah in opposition to the Mughal Emperor of Delhi. In the meantime Azmatullah Khan was sent from Delhi to take possession of Rudrapur and Kashipur. Devi Chand with his army marched from Almora to meet him in battle near Nagina. Before the actual battle was started, Daud Khan was bribed by Azmatullah Khan, and he deserted Devi Chand with all his forces. Devi Chand was defeated in the battle and took shelter in a Thakurdwara. Soon after his defeat Devi Chand retired to the village of Debipur in Kota, where he had built himself a pleasure house. He remained there for the last three years of his reign. In the year 1726 A.D. he was murdered by Ranjit Patoliya at the instigation of treacherous ministers, Manik Bisht and Puran Mall Bisht. Devi Chand died without heirs and hence the power of administration passed into the hands of the Bishts. The Bishts searched out one Ajit Singh, son of Narpal Singh, Raja of Kalehir, from a daughter of Gyan Chand of Kumaun. Ajit Singh was called to Almora and installed as king under the name of Ajit Chand. The Bishts along with one Birbhadra Joshi as Kamdar began to plunder the people of Kumaun. Unfortunate Ajit Singh was not destined to rule for a long time. Like Devi Chand, he was also murdered in 1729 by the Bishts. The Bishts once again had to search for a puppet. Failing in their efforts they placed the son of a female slave on the throne as a son of Ajit Chand with the name of Balo Kalyan Chand. But this time their triumph was short-lived. The Maras and the Phartiyals, the two peoples of Kumaun, united and sent messengers to the Mal Rajas of Doti to search for any of the members of Narayan Chand's family who had settled there. One Kalyan was found out at Doti. He was brought to Almora and was installed as Raja under the name of Kalyan Chand in 1730.¹²

Kalyan Chand became king in 1730 and set himself to punish the Bishts first. Both Manik and Puran were killed with all their families. The poor little Raja Balo Kalyan was given as a slave to a Mussalman javelin-man who was attached to the court. Thus ended the Bisht interregnum. Kalyan Chand was confronted with a stupendous task in restoring internal

order in Kumaun and resisting the external aggression of Oudh and the Rohillas. He somehow managed the affairs of the state for seventeen years till his death. He died early in 1748 A.D. after leaving his son and family in the hands of Shiva Deo Joshi, the Prime Minister of the state. Deep Chand, who succeeded his father Kalyan Chand in 1748, was a man of mild and weak temperament. He was generous and kind with all. He was entirely in the hands of the priests. Despite the weakness of the king, Shiva Deo Joshi, the Prime Minister, managed the affairs of the state fairly well so long as he was alive and fulfilled the trust and authority bestowed upon him by Kalyan Chand. Shiva Deo Joshi was killed in a revolt of the soldiery in 1764 A.D. (11 Paus 1821 Sambat).¹³ The death of Shiva Deo Joshi was followed by a period of chaos and confusion, which paved the way for the Guikha occupation of the state.

Shiva Deo Joshi was succeeded by his eldest son Jai Krishna as Prime Minister and Viceroy of Kumaun. Within two and a half years of his succession to the office, a son was born to Raja Deep Chand. Upon the birth of the child queen Shringari Manjari thought that she had a claim on the regency. Soon she began to intrigue with Hafiz Rahmat Khan of Rampur through Jodh Singh, a relation of hers and a favourite of the Rohilla Chief. She was desirous that Jai Krishna should obey her while in office or else he should go. Rahmat Khan conveyed the desire of the Rani to Jai Krishna. Jai Krishna out of disgust and disappointment resigned all his situations and retired from the Government. Thereupon Shringari Manjari appointed her favourites to the various posts of the state. Krishna Singh was appointed Prime Minister, and the post of Commander-in-Chief was given to Mohan Singh. Parmanand, the paramour of the queen, was appointed to the Viceroyalty. Jodh Singh was appointed as the manager of Kashipur. This team could not pull on well together, and within a year Mohan Singh was relieved, and replaced by Parmanand. Mohan Singh fled to the Rohillas, and through the assistance of Doondee Khan of Bisauli gathered a body of troops. With these troops and along with the Rohillas, Mohan Singh attacked the capital Almora and

defeated the Rani's troops. Mohan Singh captured Raja Deep Chand and put to death the Rani and her paramour, Parmanand. But Hafiz Rahmat Khan had a soft corner in his heart for Raja Deep Chand. He sent for Harsha Deo and Jai Krishna, sons of Shiva Deo Joshi, and helped them in ousting Mohan Singh who fled to Oudh. This time Deep Chand appointed Harsha Deo as his Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief and Nand Ram as the Governor of Kashipur. Thus peace was restored in the kingdom of Kumaun for the time being, but soon intrigues were set on foot. This time Jai Krishna opened correspondence with Mohan Singh and paved the way for his return on condition that he apologized for his past misconduct. Jai Krishna was keen on removing Nand Ram from Kashipur. But while on his way to Almora, Mohan Singh won over Nand Ram and warned him of the impending danger. Mohan Singh even encouraged Nand Ram to resist the plan of Jai Krishna. Soon, Jai Krishna was defeated and put to death by Mohan Singh. In 1777 Deep Chand and his two sons were killed by Mohan Singh. After getting over all his adversaries, Mohan Singh proclaimed himself Raja, assuming the title of Mohan Chand. He assigned the Tarai to Nand Ram, who surrendered it to the Nawab of Oudh. Mohan Chand let loose a reign of terror. Relations and friends of Shiva Deo Joshi, stricken with fear, migrated from Kumaun. The atrocities of Mohan Chand attracted the attention of the rulers of Doti and Garhwal. They opened communications with Harsha Deo who was in prison. At an opportune moment they made an attack on Kumaun, and compelled Mohan Chand to seek safety in a flight to the plains. The victorious prince of Garhwal, Lalit Shah, placed Kumaun in charge of his son, Pradyumna Shah, under the title of Pradyumna Chand.¹⁴

Pradyumna Chand restored the Joshis to power, and Harsha Deo Joshi was appointed Prime Minister. It was only after the death of Lalit Shah, that the relations between Jayakirti Shah, his successor in Garhwal, and Pradyumna Chand, his son in Kumaun, became strained. This gave a chance to Mohan Singh once again to enter into Kumaun politics. He soon came to an understanding with Jayakirti Shah in the hope of recovering

the kingdom of Kumaun. When this was known to Harsha Deo, he on behalf of his master went to Srinagar for demanding an explanation from Jayakirti Shah. Jayakirti Shah refused to be cowed down. The struggle which followed was a great blow to the Garhwalis. Jayakirti Shah suffered a crushing defeat and died shortly afterwards. Pradyumna occupied the throne and joined Garhwal and Kumaun into one kingdom ; but his preference for Garhwal alienated the Kumaunese people. By 1786, the people of Kumaun threw off the dominance of Garhwal, and Mohan Singh once more came to power in Kumaun. Harsha Deo Joshi fled from Kumaun and collected a large army for an attack on Mohan Singh. Following defeat Mohan Singh and his brother Lal Singh were made prisoners by Harsha Deo Joshi. Lal Singh was pardoned but Mohan Singh was put to death. Harsha Deo invited Pradyumna Shah to come to Kumaun, but when the latter declined, he placed on the throne Shiva Singh, a descendant of Udyat Chand. But this arrangement was opposed by Lal Singh, who compelled the King and the Minister to flee. Lal Singh ascended the throne of Kumaun and Mahendar Singh, the son of Mohan Singh, became his Prime Minister.¹⁵ When Kumaun was passing through such a state of confusion, it attracted the attention of the Nawab of Oudh, of the Rohillas and of the Gurkhas of Nepal.

Garhwal

While Kumaun was engaged in the intrigues of the Bishts and Mohan Singh, Garhwal enjoyed a comparative stability. Fateh Shah (1684-1716), credited with an attack on Tibet, was succeeded by his son Dalip Shah in 1717. He could only reign for a few months when he was succeeded by his brother Upendra Shah. Upendra Shah was ruler of Garhwal just for a period of nine months. Pratap Shah, son of Dalip Shah, succeeded Upendra Shah and ruled Garhwal for half a century. During his reign Garhwal, including Dehra Dun, enjoyed an exceptional prosperity. This prosperity soon attracted the attention of Najib Khan, the Rohilla Chief of Saharanpur. In 1757, the Rohilla led his first expedition into Dehra Dun and after a very feeble

resistance on the part of Garhwal Raja established his authority there. Till 1770 Dehra Dun had been in the hands of the Rohillas. Pratap Shah died in 1772 and was succeeded by his son Lalit Shah (1772-1780). Lalit Shah took no notice of Dehra Dun which became a safe hunting-ground for Gujars, Sikhs and Mussalmans. Lalit Shah was a weak ruler, and he appeased the offending jagirdars of Dehra Dun with a grant of villages. Gulab Singh, the Pundir Rana, obtained twelve villages with the hand of Lalit Shah's daughter in marriage. In the anarchy of Kumaun Lalit Shah was forced to intervene in 1779. He defeated Mohan Singh, the usurper in Kumaun, at Bagwali Potchar and permitted his son Pradyumna to become Raja of Kumaun. Lalit Shah had four sons : Jayakrit, Pradyumna, Parakram and Pritham. Lalit Shah was succeeded by Jayakrit Shah in 1780. The two brothers of Kumaun and Garhwal began to quarrel for domination. This quarrel led to the overthrow of Jayakrit Shah, who died in 1804.¹⁶

Muslim inroads into Kumaun and Garhwal

Weak rule in Kumaun and Garhwal and internal strife first attracted the attention of the neighbouring Muslim rulers. Kalyan Chand, the Raja of Kumaun, provided the cause for the first Rohilla attack on Kumaun. A fugitive of Kumaun, Himmat Gosain, had taken shelter in the Rohilla camp in 1743-44. Kalyan Chand despatched assassins into the Rohilla camp who murdered Himmat Gosain and his family. Ali Mohammad Khan was enraged at the murder, and sent a force of ten thousand men under the command of Hafiz Rahmat Khan, Pinda Khan and Bakshi Sardar Khan to invade Kumaun. This force immediately smashed the feeble resistance of Shiva Deo Joshi at Rudrapur and proceeded to Almora. Kalyan Chand fled from Almora and requested Pradip Shah of Garhwal for help. Almora was soon occupied by the Rohillas. The combined forces of Kumaun and Garhwal met the Rohillas at Dunagiri, but were utterly defeated. The triumphant forces of the Rohillas threatened the capital of Garhwal, Srinagar.

Thereupon the Rajas of Kumaun and Garhwal came to terms and agreed to pay three lakhs of rupees to the Rohillas, who in turn abandoned the country.¹⁷ Soon after the Rohillas, Nawab Mansur Ali Khan of Oudh occupied the pargana of Sarbana in Kumaun. Shiva Deo Joshi who had to fight with Teju Gaur, the Oudh Chakladar, was wounded and taken prisoner. It was only after the intervention of the Mughal Emperor that the pargana of Sarbana was restored to Kumaun.¹⁸ Najib Khan of Saharanpur captured the Garhwal territory of Dehra Dun in 1757, and was in occupation till his death in 1770. From 1770 to 1785 Dehra Dun was under the control of local jagirdars. In the year 1786, Ghulam Kadir, the grandson of Najib Khan, attacked Dehra Dun and inflicted untold miseries on the population of the valley.¹⁹

Gurkha attack and Occupation of Kumaun and Garhwal

When Kumaun and Garhwal were under the attack of Oudh and the Rohillas, slowly a strong power was emerging in Kathmandu valley. Prithvinarayan Shah came to power in 1742 over a small principality of Gurkha. Immediately after his accession to power he commenced his career of conquest by the annexation of Nawakot and the hill country in the west. By 1768 he annexed Kirtipur, Banepa and Bhatgaon and was in possession of Kathmandu. He died in 1775 and was succeeded by his son Singh Pratap Shah. Singh Pratap ruled for a short while and was succeeded by his son Ran Bahadur Shah in 1778. Kumaun then was a cockpit of intrigues and anarchy. Ran Bahadur despatched an army to Kumaun under the command of Chautaria Bahadur Shah, Kazi Jagjit Pande, Amar Singh Thapa and Surbir Thapa in 1790. Both Lal Singh and Mahendra Singh met the enemy at the battle field, but were badly defeated. They were compelled to leave the country at the mercy of the invaders. Next year the Gurkhas launched an attack on Garhwal from Almora. The Garhwal forces met the Gurkhas at the Fort Langurgarhi and a battle was fought. While the protracted siege of Langurgarhi was going on, the report of Chinese incursion into Nepal was received. The Gurkha show of force

was enough to frighten the Raja of Garhwal, who concluded a treaty of peace agreeing to pay an annual tribute of rupees twenty thousand and to keep an agent at Kathmandu. The Raja of Garhwal remained loyal to the terms of the treaty for twelve years. Gurkha forces were withdrawn from Garhwal in 1791. Harsha Deo Joshi was appointed to the charge of Almora by the Nepalese. Joga Mall was left to administer Kumaun. After being free from the Chinese trouble, the Gurkhas once again turned their attention towards Garhwal. In 1803, a well equipped army under the leadership of Amar Singh Thapa, Hastidal Chautariya and Bam Shah Chautariya invaded Garhwal. The Raja and his family being closely followed by the Gurkhas escaped to Dehra Dun. Amar Singh Thapa and his son Ranjor Thapa assumed charge of the administration of Kumaun and Garhwal.²⁰ The triumphant Gurkhas expelled the Raja of Beshahr from his capital Rampur and occupied the Sutlej Kali tract.

The British in Kumaun and Garhwal

The Company's Government, which extended to the Doab and Rohilkhand, was eagerly watching the developments on the frontiers. After expelling Jaswant Rao Holkar from Punjab, the Company's Government had secured a treaty of friendship and alliance with Ranjit Singh in 1809. In 1809 the extent of Ranjit Singh's territories was limited by the river Sutlej. Thus secured against all probable enemies, the Company's Government was looking forward to annex the frontier principalities between the rivers Kali and Sutlej.

After the occupation of Kumaun and Garhwal, the Gurkha power, unmindful of the power of the Company's Government, embarked upon a series of aggressions on the British territories. In Saran frontier about thirty villages were occupied by the Gurkhas. In Tirhoot about two hundred villages were seized. The Nawab of Oudh was badly harassed and places like Butwal, Tilpur and Bankepur were captured by the Gurkhas. Five parganas of Rohilkhand were occupied. Kashipur in Moradabad district was occupied and Raja Sansar Chand of Kangra was

threatened.²¹ Under such circumstances it was decided to strike at the Gurkha power. Lord Hastings declared war on 1 November 1814. It was decided to attack Nepal simultaneously from as many points as possible. Major-General Morley with 8,000 men was sent to Bihar. In Gorakhpur a force of 4,000 men was entrusted to Major General Wood. General Gillespie with 3,500 men was instructed to enter Garhwal for the ejection of the Gurkhas from Srinagar. At the extreme west of the position General Ochterlony was given the task of holding the Gurkhas in check. In Kumaun Lieutenant Colonel W. L. Gardner was to proceed up the Kosi river and direct the attack against Almora. Captain H. Y. Hearsay with 1,500 men was to enter the area near Kali river by the Timla pass.²² It was decided prior to war that

The acquisition of the low countries along the whole course of the frontier and of the province of Kumaun may, it is hoped, in a great measure contribute an indemnification for the expenses of the war while the occupation of these posts in the Hills which government may determine to retain will materially strengthen our frontier in that quarter, and enable us to maintain that control over the restored chiefs necessary for the preservation of harmony and tranquillity among them.²³

In the face of the elaborate military mobilization by the British, the power of the Gurkhas was shattered. General Ochterlony who was in the extreme west entered into an agreement with Kajee Amar Singh Thapa, the Gurkha Governor of Garhwal, on 15 May 1815 by which the entire Garhwal passed into the hands of the Company's Government.²⁴ On 14 May 1815 the Gurkha forces in Kumaun were expelled beyond the river Kali.²⁵ Thus the frontier territory between the rivers Kali and Sutlej went into the hands of the Company's Government.

The Company's Government soon after the annexation of Kumaun and Garhwal began to ascertain the boundaries of the area with Tibet. W. L. Gardner who was chasing the Gurkhas reached the border and set himself to the task. He reported that Nangulee, Millum and Neetee Ghat were the border villages. The territories of Kumaun and Tibet (Condeysee) in the area were separated by high passes of Beeanse (Lepu Lekh) Darmah,

Joowar, Neetee and Perwa. Through these passes the communication and trade with Tibet was regulated. These passes were "open across the Hymachal into Condeysee from the 26 of June till about the end of November".²⁶ Gardner left Kumaun under the able control of his assistant George William Traill, who was later appointed Commissioner in 1815. He stayed there for two decades and extended the administration up to the high passes of Mana, Niti, Jawar, Darma and Byans.²⁷

Beyond the territories of Garhwal, Raja Mahendra was restored to power in the state of Bashahr on 8 February 1816.²⁸ The boudaries of the state were ascertained. The territories of Bashahr and Tibet were divided by the Shipkee pass which was situated at a height of about 13,500 feet above the sea level.²⁹

The administration of the Kali-Sutlej tract was entrusted to the Superintendent of Sikh and Hill States and the Commissioner of Kumaun and Garhwal. The boundary ascertained during the first two decades of the nineteenth century ran along the high passes of Shipkee, Mana, Niti, Jowar, Darma and Byans, which has remained so ever since then.

Tibetan Encroachments in Garhwal and Kumaun

By 1858, practically the whole of India was taken by the British. The rule of the East India Company was replaced by that of the Crown. The British administrators in India thought for a revision of their policy towards Tibet. The Duke of Argyll while agreeing to the proposal, informed Mayo, the Viceroy, that

I entirely concur with Your Excellency's Government that benefit may reasonably be expected from the proposed measure of abandoning our recent policy of isolation towards Tibet and resuming the former friendly communications with its ruler, which was originally opened by Mr. Warren Hastings, which have unfortunately been too long in abeyance.³⁰

This change of policy was soon followed by the appointment of a Resident in Kashmir in 1885 and the deposition of Maharaja Partap Singh in 1889. The opening of Sikkim was vigorously pursued and a political officer was appointed there in 1889.³¹ At this time there occurred a change in Tibet also. Dalai

Lama XII died in 1876, and the Regency which came to power was more hostile to the British Government in India.³² British activities in the frontier region created suspicion in the minds of the Tibetans. Every attempt towards opening of Tibet was frustrated, and a series of encroachments were made by the Tibetans on the frontier land.

Garhwal, Barahoti

In about 1888 one Mr. Campbell was travelling along the frontier near Niti pass. The Tibetans in order to prevent the entry of British officials came down to Barahoti, a place nearby, and established a post with ten or twelve men. This encroachment was reported to the Government. In the opinion of the Chief Secretary the small guard house was of no harm to the people in the area.³³ But he was told that "...Their action in establishing a custom house within the British frontier constitutes an encroachment which cannot be tolerated".³⁴ It was decided to communicate with the Tibetan authorities in the area. When these efforts failed the matter was brought to the Viceroy. Lord Lansdowne reluctantly remarked that, "I should be sorry to resort to a little expedition, but it would not do to overlook a deliberate encroachment".³⁵

Lord Roberts, the Commander-in-Chief, was asked for needful action in getting the territory vacated by the Tibetans. The first and third Gurkha Battalions under Major C. Pulley went to the area immediately. But before this force reached Barahoti the Tibetans ran away. Soon after the expedition, Pandit Dharmanand Joshi, Deputy Collector of Kumaun, was deputed to explain to the Tibetan official Sarji, with the help of maps, the exact boundary line in that region.³⁶ Subsequent to this incident the Tibetans used to come to announce the trading season to the people of the area. The Government on its part decided not to notice these minor border encroachments.³⁷ In 1914 the Government of India again gave a description of the Barahoti boundary to the Tibetan official Lonchen Shatra. No objection was ever raised in regard to the boundary in the area by the Tibetan authorities.³⁸ Therefore the issue was taken as settled.

Kumaun

During the same time as the Barahoti incident, the Tibetans made encroachments in Kumaun. The Tibetan officer (Jongpen) was in the habit of stopping travellers and sending down his men to the British territory. The people from Taklakot (Tibet) were regularly using roads in the British territory whereas British European subjects were subjected to harsh treatment. Wood and fuel were freely taken out of the British territory. Rest houses and Dharamsalas were destroyed by the Tibetans. There was no British Agent at Garbyang to listen to the disputes or to supervise the area. Major General G. L. Channer, Commander, Rohilkhand Division, who had been to Mansarowar Lake in 1894, brought the matter to the notice of the Government. He suggested the appointment of a native Mukhtiyar (Agent) at Garbyang for forwarding complaints regarding disputes and destruction of property. Channer asked the Government that the Tibetan officer (Jongpen) should be informed that as Tibetans freely used the roads in the British territory, Englishmen should also be allowed access for sports all about the lakes and Kailash. He demanded the deputation of a party of Gurkha Rifles under a British officer to Dharchula.³⁹

T. U. Stuart, Deputy Commissioner, Almora, visited the area and met Jongpen with great difficulty. He impressed upon Jongpen the mistakes of the people of the area. Jongpen after some persuasion accepted the view of Stuart.⁴⁰ At the same time Lieutenant E. E. Bliss was asked to move to Dharchula with a detachment of first and third Gurkha Rifles. The administration of the area was reorganized. Khadg Bahadur Pal and Parmanand were appointed as Mukhtiyar and Peskar with certain powers at Garbyang and Pithoragarh (SOR). A Tehsildar was appointed at Champavat. Bageshwar road connecting Almora and Askote was repaired, and arrangement was made for the assessment of the taxes at Bageshwar fair.⁴¹ In 1897 the Tibetans levied certain taxes on the people of Dharma Pargana near Darma Pass. The area was separated from the rest of the district of Almora (now Pithoragarh) by a lofty range

of mountains which rendered them inaccessible except during the summer months. The Government of India took exception to this and suggested to the local authorities that "...if need be a military force should be sent. No land tax of any kind can be levied by Tibetans on Indian territory". However, the issue was decided amicably by the officials of both the Governments.⁴² There had been several other small encroachments on this border by the Tibetans, such as at Nilang, Jadhang and Barahoti etc, during the first four decades of the present century. All of them were mutually settled by the local officers of the British and Tibetan Governments amicably.⁴³ There was no further dispute about the boundary in this area.

The boundary between the rivers Kali and Sutlej had been marked by nature in the form of watersheds, mountain passes and river valleys. There had been no disputes regarding the boundary. The rulers of the area, both Katyuris and their successors, Shahs and Chands were always aware of the limits of their possessions. These limits were later confirmed by the Company's Government which came to power in the area in 1815. The people of the border area on both sides are similar, with almost the same religious beliefs. Therefore, they were always having some kind of affinity. They were using the passes for their trade and social get together. Authority and politics never came in their way of life. No authority either in India or in Tibet ever entertained mutual hostility or fear from each other. If at all there had been some sporadic attacks, they were of a very short duration. It was only after the British Government came to power in India that the Tibetans became more alert. Having in view the fate of the Rajas and Nawabs of India, the Tibetans were naturally apprehensive. The Tibetan hostility grew gradually with the strengthening of the British power, and their approach to Tibet. All British efforts towards the opening of Tibet were met with resistance on the borders. The protests which were sent to Peking by the British Government⁴⁴ were of no avail as the Chinese power in Tibet was practically non-existent in the nineteenth century. Occasional Tibetan encroachments beyond the passes were, however, settled amicably by the border officers.

The Beginning of Hostilities

The attainment of freedom by India was soon followed by a revolution in China. Mao's triumph over Chiang-Kai Shek turned the wheels of history in an altogether different direction. Tibet, an adjoining country, which was recognized as a sovereign state from 1912 onwards, was confronted with the Communist liberation army. Dalai Lama, the head of the Tibetan Government, was compelled to sign away the liberty of his country in a seventeen point agreement on 23 May 1951. Among other things the agreement provided that, "Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the Motherland, The People's Republic of China."⁴⁵ This position of China vis-a-vis Tibet was soon recognised in an agreement signed between the Governments of India and China on the basis of Panchsheel principles, namely (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit and (5) peaceful co-existence. (29 April 1954).⁴⁶ Oppression and suppression became the rule in Tibet after 1951, and finally Tibet disappeared from the political map of the world. Dalai Lama with a large number of refugees came down to India in 1959.

The Trade and Intercourse Agreement of 29 April 1954 once again recognised the boundary in the area which ran through Lepu Lekh, Darma, Kungri Bingri, Niti, Mana and Shipki passes. Hardly had the ink of the pious agreement dried, when China as the master of Tibet laid claims on Barahoti on 17 July 1954.⁴⁷ An Indian patrol party was stopped by the Chinese at Damzan near Niti pass on 15 September 1955⁴⁸ On 28 April 1956 a party of twelve Chinese soldiers was detected at Nilang.⁴⁹ A party of ten Chinese Army personnel entered Shipki pass on 1 September 1956.⁵⁰ After these reconaissance visits the Chinese started cartographical aggression and air intrusion on the Indian territory. Protest notes were sent and received without any positive results. The Prime Ministers of both the countries met at New Delhi from 19 to 25 April 1960,

and decided to have a scrutiny of the historical materials on the boundary. Accordingly officials of India and China met at Peking, Delhi and Rangoon between June and November 1960 and scrutinized the relevant materials without reaching any agreement.⁵¹ The situation began to deteriorate rapidly on the India-China border. Indian Trade Agencies in Tibet were withdrawn and compensation for the loss to traders was demanded from China, in September 1962. The Trade Agreement of 1954 lapsed.⁵² Finally an armed conflict started on 20 October 1962.

In the middle sector of the boundary China unjustly laid claims to Lapthal, Sangchamalla, Barahoti, and Nilang, south of the main watershed in this area, and traditionally within Indian boundary. The claim is clearly motivated as these places are important to China as military bases, for a future intrusion into Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh.

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INDIA-CHINA BOUNDARY: EASTERN SECTOR

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The question of the Sino-Indian boundary, so far as the eastern sector is concerned, precisely refers to the controversy whether the McMahon line is acceptable or not. Both the claimants, India and China, sharply differ on this point. It became more difficult with the widening of the ideological difference between the two Governments. Innumerable publications have come out on the subject, but they only make the issue more confusing. These publications may be broadly classified in the following categories :

(i) *Colonial literature*

The works by British Officials like Younghusband¹, Charles Bell, Richardson and Bailey, who were directly connected with Tibet, contain valuable records and factual data ; whereas those of other Western authors like Patterson and David Macdonald are more or less popular writings.

(ii) *Pro-Chinese literature*

The publications from the Foreign Language Press in Peking, the NCNA Bulletins, the Peking Press Review (Special Number), as also the works of Anna Louise tell the story in favour of the Chinese claim. Some modern writers like Li Tieh Tseng strike a neutral pose, which, however, wears off in their selection of facts aimed at supporting the Chinese view. The same is true about Alastair Lamb and Neville Maxwell.

(iii) *India Government Publications*

The White Papers in the Indian Parliament, the Reports of Officials and other publications of the Government of India are definitely more detailed and informative, but being Government publications they are not likely to be accepted at their face value.

(iv) *Feature writings in journals*

A large number of articles and features have been published in journals and newspapers in India and abroad since 1959, and many political personalities like J. P. Narayan, J. B. Kripalani and others are among the contributors. The works of Canakya

Sen, Ram Gopal, Raghuveera and others contribute valuable information regarding Tibet and her relations with neighbouring countries. A few western authors like Ford narrated the story meant for the common readers according to their own pattern.

(v) *Armymen's Experiences*

Since the Indian army debacle in 1962 some army officers like Kaul, Dalvi and Mankekar ventured to depict their experiences with reference to the attitude of the Indian political leaders of the time. As against the general run of criticism is the work of B. N. Mullick which is appreciative of the policy of the Government of India and of Nehru.

(vi) *Observations of Jurists*

The International Commission of Jurists in Geneva had probed the Tibetan cause and published their Report on the 8th August, 1960. Subsequent to that, some legal practitioners and scholars of International Law attempted to examine the legal aspect of the issue. The works of Bain, Mitter and others may be referred to here. Their observations go in favour of the humble sufferers. The UNO Proposals and the works of the Dalai Lama and his brother tell the tale of the tortured, which has drawn general sympathy.

When so many varieties of writings on the same topic are available, the scope of the present study may be questioned. But no historical survey on the boundary question has yet been done. The present one is, therefore, not redundant.

Sino-Indian Border conflicts not accidental

Regarding the India-Tibet boundary, notes had been exchanged between McMahon, the British Plenipotentiary and his Tibetan counterpart Lonchen Satra in March, 1914.² On the basis of consent given by both the officials a map in duplicate had been signed and sealed. Accordingly, that map had been tabled in the Simla Conference in July, 1914. When a map on mutual agreement had demarcated the boundary between India and Tibet, there was no room for dispute. But China, after her occupation of Tibet, entered into an armed struggle with India in 1962 to settle the matter according to the Chinese

view. The border conflicts between India and China are not accidental, but lie in the whole history of their relations. It is worthwhile, therefore, to make a thorough survey of the whole issue, with special reference to the political changes occurring in India, Tibet and China.

The India-Tibet Boundary

Since the olden days the India-Tibet boundary was not delimited by any treaty. But the conventional boundary had been accepted by the inhabitants of India and Tibet for centuries. As regards the eastern sector, the customary boundary was accepted by the British Government and the McMahon line was drawn in concurrence with the then Tibetan Government before the Tripartite Conference was held at Simla. The description of the boundary is as follows.

'The boundary starts with the watershed between the Tista river system in the east of Nepal and the Yaru Chu and the sources of the Amo Chu in Tibet and crosses the Nathula and Jalepla. Thereafter it crosses the Amo Chu and the Paro Chu and joins the great Himalayan range at Chomo Lhari (approximately Long $89^{\circ} 30' E$: Lat $27^{\circ} 45' N$) and runs along the crest of that range upto the Mela Pass ($91^{\circ}.40' E$: $27^{\circ} 57' N$) through Kula Kangri. Teygala is located at point $91^{\circ} 40' E$: $27^{\circ} 48' N$. The boundary follows Teygala on the Mela ridge and runs along the crest of the Thagla (Tang La). It enters the Zanglung ridge of the Great Himalayas to the east of the Namjang Chu after crossing the Thagla Pass at approximately $91^{\circ} 44' E$: $27^{\circ} 46' N$. It further runs up to Bumla after crossing the Namjang Chu to the east of Khinzemane (approximately $91^{\circ} 46' E$: $26^{\circ} 46' N$) and through Nakchutpa ridge. From Bumla the line runs along Nakchutpa to Tsona Chu in a west-north-west to east-south-east direction. It further proceeds eastward after crossing the Tsona Chu (at approximately $92^{\circ} 0' E$: $27^{\circ} 44' N$) and follows the crest of the Great Himalayan range which is also the watershed between the Chayul Chu in Tibet and the Kameng, Kamala and Khru rivers in India. The northward protrusions of the

boundary between $92^{\circ} 0' E$: and $92^{\circ} 30' E$ are based on the Peaks and their co-ordinates are shown below :—

Ft. 18982	($92^{\circ} 16' E$: $27^{\circ} 49' N$)
" 18525	($92^{\circ} 16' E$: $27^{\circ} 52' N$)
" 19359	($92^{\circ} 20' E$: $27^{\circ} 47' N$)
" 21271	($92^{\circ} 23' E$: $27^{\circ} 51' N$)
" 21450	($92^{\circ} 24' E$: $27^{\circ} 48' N$)
" 7420	($92^{\circ} 26' E$: $27^{\circ} 52' N$)
" 20769	($92^{\circ} 27' E$: $27^{\circ} 49' N$)

The boundary crosses the Subansiri river at approximately $93^{\circ} 13' E$: $28^{\circ} 22' N$ and it runs northward along the ridge west of the Pindigo river (flowing into the Subansiri). Then at about a point approximately $93^{\circ} 18' E$: $28^{\circ} 37' N$ the alignment turns north-eastward along the ridge lying to the north-west of the Hariak river (flowing into the Tsari Chu) upto Peak 18056 ft. ($93^{\circ} 32' E$: $28^{\circ} 41' N$), whereafter it turns south-east and east to cross the Tsari Chu south of Migyitun. The Kariak and the Pindigo rivers also flow for their whole courses in Indian territory and join the Tsari Chu at $93^{\circ} 31' E$: $28^{\circ} 37' N$ and the Subansiri at $93^{\circ} 16' E$: $28^{\circ} 22' N$ respectively. The heights of the ridges west of the Pindigo river and north-west of the Hariak river are about 16,000 ft. It further crosses the Tsari river at approximately $93^{\circ} 33' E$: $28^{\circ} 39' N$ to the south of Migyitun in Tibet. The boundary which is about four miles to the south of Tso Karpo and four miles to the east of Tsari Sarpa separates the basins of the Oto Chu and Lilung Chu at the average height of about 16,000 ft. The alignment runs along the watershed and at the point where the Tsari river breaks through. The line runs between Migyitun and Longju. Longju and Migyitun are in the Tsari valley. The height of the intervening ridge is about 10,000 feet. The height of Longju is slightly over 9,000 feet. Thereafter the boundary turns in a northward direction till it crosses Tunga Pass (approximately $94^{\circ} 10' E$: $28^{\circ} 59' N$). Between $93.30' E$ Longitude and the Tunga Pass the alignment goes along the ridges lying to the south of Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa and separating the basins of the Oto Chu and Lilung Chu in Tibet from the tributaries

of the Subansiri in the south. From Peak 16,454 ft. ($93^{\circ}59'5''\text{E} : 28^{\circ}48'\text{N}$) the alignment lies through Peak 16,894 ft. ($94^{\circ}2'\text{E} : 28^{\circ}051'\text{N}$) along the crest of the Great Himalayan range upto Tunga Pass. It then runs east towards the western bank of the Dihang (Tsangpo) at approximately $95^{\circ}02'\text{E} : 29^{\circ}08'\text{N}$ to the west of Korbo in India ; and then, moving up along the midstream crosses over to the other side at approximately $94^{\circ}59'\text{E} : 29^{\circ}10'\text{N}$ (west of Mongku in Tibet). It ascends the watershed between Chimdru Chu and Rongta Chu in Tibet and the Dihang and its tributaries in India. The boundary crosses the Yonggyap Pass ($95^{\circ}36'\text{E} : 29^{\circ}13'\text{N}$) and the Kangri Karpo Pass ($96^{\circ}5'\text{E} : 29^{\circ}28'\text{N}$) in this section. Between the Dihang and the Lohit river the following peaks are located at or near the main turning points of the boundary line alignment.

Ft. 13720 ($95^{\circ}27'\text{E} : 29^{\circ}02'\text{N}$)

" 18484 ($96^{\circ}05'\text{E} : 29^{\circ}28'\text{N}$)

" 9700 ($96^{\circ}24'\text{E} : 29^{\circ}15'\text{N}$)

" 15899 ($96^{\circ}07'\text{E} : 29^{\circ}05'\text{N}$)

" 19430 ($96^{\circ}32'\text{E} : 29^{\circ}04'\text{N}$)

" 14917 ($96^{\circ}18'\text{E} : 28^{\circ}23'\text{N}$)

" 16061 ($96^{\circ}48'\text{E} : 28^{\circ}20'\text{N}$)

The main passes in this area are :—

Zikyon Pass ($95^{\circ}30'\text{E} : 29^{\circ}06'\text{N}$)

Andra Pass ($95^{\circ}33'\text{E} : 29^{\circ}09'\text{N}$)

Yonggyap Pass ($95^{\circ}36'\text{E} : 29^{\circ}13'\text{N}$)

Kangri Karpo Pass ($96^{\circ}05'\text{E} : 29^{\circ}28'\text{N}$)

Aguia Pass ($96^{\circ}23'\text{E} : 29^{\circ}13'\text{N}$)

The alignment crosses the Krawnaon river at approximately $97^{\circ}01'\text{E} : 28^{\circ}19'\text{N}$, runs on the opposite bank along the ridge separating the waters of the Latte and Dichu basins, and proceeds along the crest of the ridge to the mountain range at Peak 15283 ft. which is the tri-junction of the boundaries of India, Burma and China. The co-ordinates are approximately $97^{\circ}23'\text{E} : 28^{\circ}13'\text{N}$. It then crosses the Lohit river a few miles south on Rima, and joins the tri-junction of the India, Burma and China boundaries near the Diphu Pass.'

The Sino-Indian Boundary Line

As against the customary boundary, the People's Republic of China claimed the line to run according to the details given below—

'The greatest part of the traditional customary line in the eastern sector, from the tri-junction of China, India and Bhutan (approximately $91^{\circ}30'E : 26^{\circ}53'N$) eastwards up to approximately $93^{\circ}47'E : 27^{\circ}01'N$ and then north-eastwards to the vicinity of Nizamghat which is just north of the traditional customary boundary line, roughly following throughout the line where the southern foot of the Himalayas touches the plains on the northern bank of the Brahmaputra river.

From the starting point of the eastern section to Nizamghat, the boundary line crosses the Chungli river at approximately $92^{\circ}07'E : 26^{\circ}52'N$; crosses the Bhoroli river at approximately $92^{\circ}51'E : 26^{\circ}55'N$; crosses the Ranga river at approximately $93^{\circ}58'E : 27^{\circ}20'N$; crosses the Subansiri river at approximately $94^{\circ}15'E : 27^{\circ}34'N$; crosses the Tsangpo river at approximately $95^{\circ}19'E : 28^{\circ}05'N$; north east of Pasighat; and crosses the Dibang river at approximately $95^{\circ}40'E : 28^{\circ}15'N$.

From Nizamghat the boundary line turns south-eastwards into mountainous terrain and runs along the mountain ridge up to where it meets the lower stretch of the Tsayul river, passing through Peak 10,695 ft. (approximately $96^{\circ}06'E : 28^{\circ}13'N$), Painlon Pass, and Peak 11,675 ft. (approximately $96^{\circ}17'E : 28^{\circ}08'N$).

The boundary line meets the lower stretch of the Tsayul river at approximately $96^{\circ}31'E : 28^{\circ}04'N$, then runs along this river until it leaves it at approximately $96^{\circ}54'E : 27^{\circ}53'N$ and runs in a south-eastern direction up to the tri-junction of China, India and Burma.'

The Land of the North Eastern Frontier

The long boundary line between India and China starts in the eastern sector from the point to the south of the Mela Pass (approximately $91^{\circ}40'E : 27^{\circ}48'N$) and proceeds upto

the east of the Diphu Pass, at the tri-junction of the boundaries of India, Burma and China (approximately $97^{\circ}23'E : 28^{\circ}37'N$). It extends about 800 miles long and 40 to 100 miles wide in the mountainous region.

The land south of this boundary line is Indian territory and is in the lower belt of the Himalayas which slopes down to Assam through Bhutan and Kameng in the NEFA. Whether the Assam hills of the northeast India are parts of the greater Himalayas is a geological question. Separate names are applied to the different parts of this hill-belt with reference to the names of the local hill peoples. For instance, the Aka Hills, the Daffla Hills, and so on. The narrow belt of the Patkai Hills which slopes down from the Lohit district, broadens out in the south and runs along with the Lushai and the Kachar hills.

The elevation of this hill-tract normally varies from 5,000 ft. to 16,000 ft. and above. As regards vegetation in this sub-Himalayan belt, evergreen forests, coniferous forests and Alpine trees in high altitude (12,000 ft. and above) are available. Snow moss and other herbs which can persist in snow throughout the year are also found in the snow belt.

The NEFA (North Eastern Frontier Agency) hill area is divided into the following five administrative districts, named after the five rivers which flow down with their tributaries in this area :

(i) Kameng District, which is the westernmost part adjacent to Bhutan, refers to the area through which the Kameng river and its affluents, the Towang Chu and the Namjang Chu, flow.

(ii) Subansiri District is located in the Subansiri river basin.

(iii) Siang District refers to the Dihang or Dibang river basin. The tributaries like the Yamne, the Yang Sang Chu and the Siyon also flow through this district.

(iv) Lohit District covers the area of the Lohit river basin with its tributaries.

(v) Tirup District is located in the Tirup river basin.

The Sino-Indian boundary dispute, in the eastern sector, concerns mainly Kameng, Subansiri and Siang Districts and

a portion of Lohit District. So the details of the Tirup District are excluded here.

The serpentine courses of the rivers through the spurs of the hills, with dense forests on both sides, make the land difficult to cross, more dangerous and exceedingly violent. Wild animals are numerous and landslides frequent. Despite these the NEFA holds a virgin charm which attracts the traveller.

The inhabitants of the North East Frontier

The inaccessible hill tracts in the north and northeast of Assam are inhabited by peoples coming from different ethnic stocks. The primitive race-complex and native features are still traceable among them. Occasional references to these peoples in ancient Indian literature tend to hold that they had been in India since very old times.³ These peoples who are ethnically distinct from the Indo-Aryans and the Dravidians, may be divided into the following groups :—

(1) The Adi (Abor) group includes the Galongs, the Pashis, the Minyongs, the Padams and the Tegins (Tamding). The area of their settlement is between the Subansiri and the Dibang river valleys. The Pashis are observed in the foothills near Pashighat, the Minyongs are on the slopes of the Abor Hills in between Along, the district head-quarters, and Pashighat. The Miris, who live on agriculture, have come down to the foot hills near North Lakhimpur. The Adis (Abors) are considered to be the most advanced among the lot. They are economically in a better position.

(2) The Bhotia (Indo-Tibetan) group refers to the Dukpas (Bhutanese/Bhotantika), the Monpas living in the north-eastern part of Kameng, the Mempas (Memba), the Khambas on the Indo-Tibet borders to the extreme north of Siang district, and the Serdukpens belonging to the Bhotia group of the Indo-Mongoloid stock. In this regard the report of Gait⁴ mentions the three categories of the Bhotias in NEFA as follows :—

“First, there are the inhabitants of Bhutan, who entered the province at Kherkeria and the different passes west of that point. Secondly, there are the inhabitants of

the Towang province subject to Lhasa, a narrow strip of which runs southward on the eastern boundary of Bhutan and abuts on British territory north of Udalgui in the Mangaldai subdivision. Lastly, there are the Thebengia Bhutias who are practically independent of Lhasa, and occupy a small triangular tract of country, bounded on the north-west by the country of the Akas and on the south by the Darrang district”.

The third category, which Mackenzie⁵ calls the most easterly of Bhutias is, as we have seen, no other than the Membas; and the second possibly includes the Sherdukpens and Monpas. Since they had once migrated from Tibet which is known as Bhota in ancient Indian literature, these peoples are known as the Bhotias or Bhutias. The Monpas are further divided into five subgroups; such as, the Dhirang Monpas, the Pangchok Monpas, the Magopas, the Namhsu-thanwangs, and the Khalak thang-Monpas living at the foot hills near Tezpur. The Monpas hold close affinity with the Dukpas (Bhutanese); whereas, the Serdukpens of Rupa, Jigaon, and Shergaon villages in Kameng district claim themselves distinct. As regards the Membas and the Khambas who migrated from Kham, Eastern Tibet, Dr. Elwin⁶ remarks that ‘the Khambas are much poorer, both economically and culturally, than the Monpas, though the essential spirit of their Buddhism is equally strong. The Khambas of the romantic and sacred Yang Sang Chu Valley have maintained their remarkable dances, as have the Membas of Geling and they are now beginning to rebuild their shrines and temples which had fallen into a deplorable state of dilapidation’. The languages spoken by this group are offshoots of Bhotia, which comes out of the Tibeto-Burmese speech-family. They have a distinct culture and tradition on the basis of the Mahayana Buddhist faith in India.

(3) The Mishmi group including the Indu-Mishmis (Midhi or Chulikata), the Digaru-Mishmis (Taron) and the Mijus or the Mizumishmis with the Bebijiya occupy the area in the upper courses of the Dihang (Brahmaputra) beyond Na Dihang in the Mishmi Hills. As they have settled on the high hills,

trade and cattle-rearing are common, while cultivation is not extensive. A man rich in cattle and slaves may be allowed to keep as many wives as he can afford. Sorcery is a general practice to control diseases and other social evils. They are so handicapped that they prefer to remain secluded in such a remote locality.

(4) The Daffa group which includes the Apatomis, the Galongs and the Bagnis, live in the Subansiri and the lower Kameng affluents. They are probably the most robust and daring among the peoples in the NEFA. They have no written script but they use various dialects in respect to each sub-group. Their idea of religion is strange. Normally they do not believe in any church or temple but they have deep faith in a Creator who exists to punish the evil and to save the good.

(5) The Aka group, (Aska/Anka) including the Kapachors and the Hazarikhaos, is a distinct one. They prefer to restrict their settlement in the foothills of Kameng. They usually reside in hills of moderate elevation, not exceeding 6,000 ft. Traditionally, the Akas are said to have been driven out to the hills by the Ahoms. They have no scripture but they are not devoid of religion. They fear the threat from the nature, like roaring torrents etc. They have no script and their spoken tongue has some peculiar traits which deserve a special study. They live on agriculture and hunting. By nature, the Akas are meek and sober. They hesitate to establish matrimonial relations with the neighbouring peoples other than the Majis and the Angka Miris of the adjoining villages.

(6) The T'ai group includes the Khamptis and the Singfus (Sing-pho) in the lower Lohit and Tirup districts in the NEFA. The Khamptis are comparatively advanced and hold a sense of feudal superiority. Both the peoples inherit the legacy of the Hinayana Buddhism of India and Buddhist temples and monasteries are frequently observed in this locality. Their language also bears some affinity to the Pali language which is taught among the monks ; their spoken tongue, however, belongs to the Shan language. Regarding the migration of these people, Dr. Neog⁷ mentions :—“The last waves of the Shāns spread

into Assam when the Shān empire of Pong, which touched Tipperah, Yuan and Siam, was finally broken up by Alomphrā, king of Burma, about the middle of the 18th century. The group of Shāns, numbering about 5,000, known as Khamṭi, emigrated to this part of India from Bar-Khāmṭi and Mung-Khāmṭi-long or Mānchi, situated high on the Irawaddy, which, according to them they occupied for many centuries. They made their first settlements in Assam on the Tengāpāni river, south of Sadiyā, with the permission of the then ruling Ahoms. But during the reign of Gaurināthasimha (1780-90) they succeeded in ousting the Ahom Warden of the Sadiyā outpost and arrogating to their chief the title of Sadiyā-Khowā Gohain in 1794 A.D. The Ahoms and later the British, who took the country, had to recognise that office as such. In 1835 there was an immigration of 230 Moonglary Khamṭis. In 1839 the Khamṭis stormed the British garrison at Sadiyā and killed Colonel White. Eventually the rebels were defeated and scattered. Some Khāmṭis returned to Baṭi-Khāmṭi in 1840. Those who stayed were divided into four parties and settled in different parts of the Lakhimpur district—Chunporā, Saikhowāghat, Dāmādāji and Nārāyanpur. There are no Khamtis at the first place now”. The Singphos numbering about 2,500 belong to the Kākus or Kākhyens (the Cacobee of the ancient maps) living on the eastern branches of the Irawaddy in Burma. The Kakhyens invaded Assam and Bhutan after the fall of the northern Shan empire. They made their first appearance in the valley of the Brahmaputra during the ‘intestinal commotion’ in Assam when the Māyā-mariyā sect of Vaisnavas rose in revolt against the Ahom king, Gaurinathasimha, about 1793 A.D. They first settled on the Tengāpani river east of Sadiya and in the Namrup tract on the Buri-Dihing.

As regards their respective relations with the British administration in India, it may be mentioned that Assam was annexed to British India in 1838. The Ahoms had then lost control over the numerous inhabitants of the hill areas. The policy of the British Government was to maintain political control over these

areas with a view to giving protection, but with the minimum interference. The occasional raids made by these hill peoples were checked. Gradually the British administration pushed up in the first decade of this century when the 'forward policy' was adopted. Since then many government officials and missionaries had been in those remote areas for exercising administrative control and welfare activities among the NEFA peoples. The frontier between Assam and Tibet was eventually ascertained, conforming to the traditional line accepted by both the Indians and the Tibetans. Afterwards, the McMahon line confirmed the conventional boundary in 1914.

According to the records of the British Indian administration the leaders of the Akas bound themselves in 1842 and 1844, in return for stipends, to keep the peace. Over forty years later, in 1883, they raided a forest office, and a military expedition was despatched against them. They, however, surrendered in 1888, and signed an agreement under which their stipends were to be restored after a probation of two years. Thereafter, they kept the peace. But less amenable from the start were the Daflas. Though they agreed informally in 1835, 1837 and 1852 to curb their raiding activities, they violated the agreement several times. In 1874-75, the British sent a military force into the hills. There were no disturbances after that, but no cordiality was established with the British. With the Miris and the Abors, two tribes in close relation with each other, the British were at first on friendly terms. But there was a conflict in 1848 and a serious raid ten years later. A British military expedition into the hills was turned back. A second expedition was sent the next year and the Abors were overawed into submission. Three treaties were signed between November, 1862 and January, 1863; and a fourth in 1866, with various branches of the hill peoples. The Abors were never really subdued, and in March, 1911, an Assistant Political Officer who ventured into the area was murdered. Once more an expedition was sent to punish the Abors and exact reparation, and advantage was taken of the occasion to ascertain the frontier with Tibet. The British concluded no written engagements

with the Mishmis, and despite numerous raids for long it took no stricter measures than occasional blockades. In 1899, what Lord Curzon termed a 'miniature army' was sent, but with little result. In 1910, it was learnt that the Chinese had occupied Rima in Tibet, entered the Delei Valley in Mishmi country and planted their flag at Menilkrai, also in Mishmi territory. The Assam Government, therefore, recommended that the Mishmis should be brought definitely under British control. A friendly Mission was sent in 1911, road-building was commenced and British administration carried into this area'. The Monbas of Towang had been included in India for centuries and they concluded an agreement with the British Government in 1862, an extract from which is shown in appendix⁸.

During the pre-independence period in India these people had been hostile to each other and a member of a different group was considered an enemy. A victim was not always killed but was spared his life on acceptance of lifelong slavery. Slavery had been a common practice. Man-hunting and selling of women from one group to another were also not uncommon. Polygamy was in vogue for obtaining more members to cope with the hostile nature. To preserve the racial purity and virginity, tattooing was prevalent. The structure of these societies is different from that of the Assamese. They hold their primitive and indigenous concept of democracy and leadership which is interesting for a sociological study.

However, in 1947, when the Indian National Government had taken over charge of administration these peoples breathed a new air. Priority was given to the economic development of these peoples residing in the extreme northeast corner. The basic conditions of their livelihood have been changed and, now-a-days, they have been developing at a par with the other peoples in India. They have been enjoying equal rights regarding regional administration, Government service, agricultural development, education facilities, small scale and cottage industries, and communication. It will be a mistake to describe them now as backward. The high yielding crop cultivation and the use of modern agricultural appliances are no longer

unknown to them. Slave-hunting and tattooing have now been forgotten. Their sense of security and gradual prosperity have encouraged them to embrace the modern way of life enthusiastically. A spirit of awakening is observed everywhere in the NEFA.

India's early contacts with China and Tibet

India and China had their contact since the first century B.C. when Buddhism was introduced in China ; and it became stronger during the epoch of the Three Kingdoms—Wei, Wu, and Han dynasties (c.220-580 A.D.)—when many Indian teachers including Bodhidharma visited China for the spread of Buddha's doctrine. Chinese monks like Hiuen Tsang came to India, the land of Buddha, as devout pilgrims and learners of the Doctrine. Commercial relations between the two countries also existed since the olden days when Chinese silk had been exchanged for Indian ivory. During the ancient period, the Chinese emperors of the T'ang dynasty found a dignified pleasure in despatching emissaries to the Indian Court. Such contacts had a setback in the medieval period when both the countries came to be occupied with internal problems. The commercial exchange, however, continued. After the opening of the Opium trade (c. 1800 A.D.) by the Britishers from India a new era in Sino-Indian contact began and that came to an end in 1947 when India achieved freedom from British rule.

Historically, Tibet had come in contact with India since the 7th century A.D. when, Songtsangampo, the first historical ruler of Tibet, was on the throne. Many Tibetan scholars crossed the snowy Himalayas on foot in quest of learning the Indian Shastras, in particular the Doctrine of Buddha. Indian teachers like Padmasambhava and Dipankara had also visited Tibet for propagating Buddhism. Innumerable Buddhist texts had been translated and are preserved in the Kanjur and Tanjur collections. In short, the Tibetans had embraced Indianism with devotion and regarded India as the land of Buddha. Even after the spread of Maoism in Tibet, as far as we know, the Tibetans have not changed their feelings in respect to India.

During the medieval period, Tibet and India could not continue their cultural relations. Some Muslim rulers like Baktiar Khilji and Aurangzeb made attempts to conquer the trans-Himalayan country, Tibet, but with no success. In the early period of the East India Company, the Britishers had not much interest in Tibet. On March 29, 1774 Warren Hastings, Governor of Bengal, had an occasion to receive a note from the Panchen Lama II Lossang Yeshe and that invited the attention of the Britishers to Tibet. It encouraged the Company to send Bogle's Mission with a design to opening trade and communication between Tibet and Bengal through Bhutan. Since then a new chapter in Indo-Tibetan relations started which continued upto 1947.

Indo-Tibetan Relations

The Indo-Tibetan relations during the British period may be broadly divided into three phases :

- (a) The early phase, missions and negotiations.
- (b) The second phase, Tibetan threats and British reprisals.
- (c) The last phase, diplomatic bargains between the British and the Nationalist Government in China.

(a) In the early phase after the futile attempts in the time of Warren Hastings, the British Government in India did not show much interest in Tibet till the last quarter of the 19th century. Then repeated attacks on Sikkim border forced the British to take action, not only to demarcate the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim but also to open trade relations. China had little effective control over Tibet and did not object to the British trying to contact the Tibetan authorities directly. The obstinate attitude of the Tibetan authorities, however, forced the British to settle the issue by concluding a treaty with the Chinese in 1890, demarcating the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet⁹.

(b) The Convention of 1890 was not respected by the Tibetans who refused to accept the authority of China to conclude a treaty on their behalf. On the occasion of signing the Trade Convention of 1893 between China and the British Government

a Tibetan minister was present at Darjeeling but was not allowed to take any active part. It caused great resentment among the Tibetans who resisted installation of the border pillars on the Tibeto-Sikkim frontier. The intransigent attitude of Tibet who refused either to negotiate with the British directly or to accept a treaty signed by China created an impossible situation and necessitated more effective measures. The conflict was aggravated at the opening of the 20th century by alarming reports of Russian political interest and secret missions of Dorjjeff. Finally, the imperious Viceroy, Curzon, succeeded in hustling the British Government to send a military expedition into Tibet. The expedition under Col. Younghusband marched up to Lhasa and imposed a drastic treaty in 1904. The second phase of the Indo-Tibetan relations ends here.

Sino-Tibetan political complexity

Before we discuss the last phase of the Indo-Tibetan relations an examination of the Sino-Tibetan political complexity through the ages is necessary. Since the 7th century A.D. Tibet and China challenged each other, resulting in varied relations from time to time. H. H. Dalai Lama XIV remarks in this connection¹⁰ :—"It is true that there were times when China was strong and Tibet was weak and China invaded Tibet. Similarly, looking further back into history, there were times when Tibet invaded China".

He further adds : "There is no basis in history for Chinese claim that Tibet was a part of China. From 1912, until the fateful year 1950, Tibet enjoyed complete de-facto independence of any other nation ; and our legal status is now exactly the same as it was in 1912".

Tibet was an independent kingdom during her First Monarchy period (c. 618-1200 A.D) when the T'ang Dynasty (618-907 A.D), the Wu (Five) Dynasties (907-960 A.D.) and the Sung Dynasty (960-1278 A.D.) had been ruling over China. Later on, Tibet lost her independence at the hands of Godan, the Central Asian Mongolian Chief of the Kansu region, who, however, handed over the controlling powers of Tibet

to Sakya Pandita of Sa-skya monastery as the Viceregent (De-si) of Tibet by the middle of the 13th century A.D. Soon after the death of Godan and Sakya Pandita in 1251, Kublai Khan, who established the Yuan Dynasty (1260 A.D.) in China offered Phagpa of Sa-skya monastery the authority of ruling over the whole of Tibet upto the Kokonor in the far west. The Sa-skya hierarchs, thus became the theocratic overlord of Tibet under the suzerainty of Yuan rulers of China until the Ming Dynasty came to power (1368 A.D.).

After the downfall of Sa-skya hierarchy, the Second Monarchy of the Medieval Tibet (c. 1350-1642 A.D.) started when Chanchub gyaltsan of Pha-mo-du family became the favourite regent of Central Tibet and enjoyed the legacy of ruling over Tibet under the suzerainty of the Ming Emperors of China. During this period Mongolian chiefs like Essen of Oirat (c. 1435-1485 A.D.), Dayan, (1470-1543), a descendant of Chinghis Khan, and his successor Altai Khan (1543-1583) attempted to lay hands on Tibet diplomatically when the Tibetan Buddhist monks of the Gelupa sect and those of other sects were opposing each other. Gradually, the theocratic bureaucracy took its complete shape when Dalai Lama V Ngawang Gyantsho (1617-1682) assumed the temporal powers in 1642 with his ecclesiastical lieutenant Panchen Lama Chokyi gyaltsan (c. 1569-1662) and Lossang Yeshe (died 1737 A.D.). When the Manchu Dynasty was established in China (1644-1850), the Chinese Emperors Shun Chi (1644-1660 A.D.) and Kang Hsi (1661-1772 A.D.) enhanced the prestige of Tibet by recognising the Dalai Lama as the head of the Buddhist world. Thereafter, several successful military expeditions in 1728, 1735 and 1750 A.D. enabled the Chinese emperors to strengthen their hold in Tibet. In 1788 A.D. when the Gurkhas attacked Tibet, they were resisted by the Chinese forces. Emperor Chien Lung (1735-1796 A.D) then enforced effective control over Tibet by appointing two Ambans, one for Lhasa and the other for Shigatse, and by introducing a new currency and certain administrative reforms regarding foreign relations and financial control.

According to the Chinese sources¹¹, the imperial authority and prestige continued even when the Manchu power had been declining after the death of Chien-Lung (1796 A.D). But after the First Anglo-Chinese War, the Ching Emperors Hsien Feng (1850-1861) and T'ung Chih (1862-1875) realised that their hold on Tibet had been weakening rapidly. During the Second Gurkha invasion of Tibet (1855-56), the Dalai Lama XII Trinle Gyantsho (d. 1875) sought military assistance from the Emperor Hsien Feng who, however, could not respond because of the Tai Ping rebellion and conflict with Western Powers. Later on, China's defeat at the hands of Japan in 1894, scramble for concessions among the Western Powers, and internal troubles further weakened the Chinese control over Tibet.

The final blow came from the Younghusband expedition and the treaties of 1904 and 1906 which reduced Chinese suzerainty to an empty and meaningless claim. In 1911, when the Kuo-mintang (KMT) Party came to power the Chinese army in Tibet seized the opportunity of plundering the Tibetan Treasury at Lhasa and of looting the wealth stored in the Sera monastery. There was no law and order in Central Tibet and the situation went completely out of control. In the meantime, the exiled Dalai Lama XIII Thupten Gyantsho took over the reins of administration and declared armistice on the condition that all the Chinese forces would leave Tibet except only sixty bodyguards of the Amban. The new Government of the Republic of China appointed Com. Chung Yin of Lhasa as the High Commissioner in place of Li-En-yin. The Tibetans had no confidence in Chung-Yin and made a desperate attack. Finally, he was forced to leave Tibet with the remaining Chinese troops on January 6, 1913.

From this time the position of Tibet vis-a-vis China changed completely. As Mr. Purushottam Trikamdas,¹² Indian member of the International Commission of Jurists, states, "From 1912 to 1950 there was no Chinese law, no Chinese judge, no Chinese policemen on the street corner ; there was no Chinese newspaper, no Chinese soldier and even

no representative of China. Tibet thus became *defacto* independent with no written convention and the Dalai Lama XIII changed the heading of state administration by noting : “By the order of Lord Buddha—”in place of “By order of the Emperor of China, the Dalai Lama the Pontiff of Buddhism. . . .”

From the above discussion it is evident that,

(i) The status of Tibet during the Manchu dynasty was under the control of the Chinese Emperor in an undefined sense ; it was one of ‘patronage relationship’ and not suzerainty as we understand now.

(ii) Secondly, the Chinese control over Tibet, which had been weakened since the last quarter of the 19th century, was completely thrown out by the Tibetans immediately after the fall of the imperial power. The Chinese troops were disarmed and shipped back to China through India in January, 1913.

Simla Conference

The *defacto* independence of Tibet was given a tacit international recognition at the Simla Conference in 1913-14 which was attended by the Tibetan representative on an equal footing with the Chinese.

In October, 1913, a tripartite conference was held in Simla to define the status of Tibet and to demarcate Tibet’s boundary with China on the one hand and India on the other. The British had taken the initiative with a view to settling the dispute between Tibet and China, to secure Tibet against Chinese pressure and to consolidate British influence in Tibet.

The motives of the British Government were well understood by the Chinese who submitted the following proposals:—

1. Tibet should be regarded as an integral part of China.
2. China would not, however, convert Tibet into a province.
3. The British Government should undertake not to annex Tibet or any portion of its territory.
4. A Chinese Resident should be stationed at Lhasa with 2000 soldiers, of whom 1600 were to be posted in such localities as the Resident should deem fit.

5. The foreign and military affairs of Tibet should be conducted under the Chinese direction.

6. Tibet should not enter into negotiations or agreements with any foreign country except through the Chinese Government. The provision for the British Trade Agents as per Article V of the Lhasa Convention of 1904 was permitted.

7. The Tibetan boundary (with China) should be fixed at Giamdo, as it was suggested by Fusung-Mu after Chao Erh-feng's conquest (1908).¹³

The reaction of the British plenipotentiary, Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, was expressed in the following proposals :—

1. Tibet was to be divided into two parts, Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. Inner Tibet was to be under China, but Outer Tibet was to be fully autonomous. The administration of Outer Tibet was to be in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa. The selection and installation of the Dalai Lama should also be under the authority of the Tibetan Government.

2. China should withdraw all troops from Outer Tibet. The number of escorts for any Chinese official was not to exceed 300 men.

3. The boundary between Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet was to be as shown in a map tabled at the Conference. The map also showed the boundary line between India and Tibet, and was approved by the Tibetan and British officials prior to the session. This boundary line was subsequently known as the McMahon Line.

After exchange of a series of notes on the proposals and counterproposals, the Chinese representatives accepted the following terms :—

1. Tibet was to be under the suzerainty of China but the autonomy of Outer Tibet was to be recognised.

2. The territorial integrity of the country was to be respected by both the British and the Chinese.

3. The Tibetan Government of Lhasa was to have complete authority to run the administration in Outer Tibet including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama ; whereas, in Inner Tibet China could exercise her administration except

in ecclesiastical matters, which were under the Dalai Lama's power.

4. No Chinese troops or officials other than a Chinese Resident at Lhasa with 300 escorts would remain in Outer Tibet.

In spite of the initial agreement the Chinese plenipotentiary withdrew from the Conference at the last moment. It was only over the boundary line between Inner and Outer Tibet. The Chinese representative had initialled the draft agreement at the Conference but withheld signature on the final sheet. By the Simla Convention the British authorities recognised the autonomous status of Tibet in relation to China. The withdrawal of the Chinese representative did not affect the validity of the Convention so far as Tibet and India were concerned. The signature given by the Tibetan plenipotentiary in an international convention on an equal footing with the British plenipotentiary had categorically established Tibet's juridical position. In fact, by her withdrawal China had lost her claim even on those points which had been proposed to be conceded to her.

In this regard the observation of Richardson¹⁴ is most appropriate. "Whereas the Simla convention itself after being initialled by the Chinese Plenipotentiary was not signed or ratified by the Chinese Government, it was accepted as binding by the two other parties as between themselves. On the withdrawal of the Chinese, a Declaration was signed by the Plenipotentiaries of Britain and Tibet declaring that the Convention was to be binding on the Governments of Britain and Tibet and agreeing that so long as the Chinese Government withheld its signature it would be debarred from the enjoyment of privileges accruing thereunder."¹⁴

It is interesting to note here that the Chinese Plenipotentiary did not raise any objection to the alignment of the Indo-Tibetan boundary. It was pertinently pointed out in a letter of Nehru to Chou En-lai, dated March 8, 1959. It was even more clearly pointed out in his letter dated Sept. 26, 1959.

"...On the contrary, it is the McMahan Line which correctly

represents the customary boundary in this area. The water-parting formed by the crest of the Himalayas is the natural frontier which was accepted for centuries as the boundary by the peoples on both sides. The tribes inhabiting the area south of the McMahon Line—the Monbas, Akas, Daflas, Miris, Abors, and Mishmis—are of the same ethnic stock as the other hill tribes of Assam and have no kinship with the Tibetans. The Tibetans themselves regard these tribes with contempt and group them all together as “Lhopas”. It is true that the boundary of two adjacent countries is not determined by the ethnic affiliations of the people living in these countries. Some sort of cultural intercourse between the peoples living on both sides of the frontier is also not uncommon. All the same it is significant that the tribes mentioned above have not been affected in the slightest degree by any Tibetan influence, cultural, political or other, and this can only be due to the fact that the Tibetan authorities have not exercised jurisdiction at any time in this area. On the other hand, Indian administration gradually moved up to these areas. Agreements were signed with the Akas in 1844 and 1888, with the Abors in 1862-63, and with the Monbas in 1844 and 1853, extending the authority of the Government of India over them. It was the British Government’s policy generally to leave the tribes more or less to look after themselves and not to seek to establish any detailed administration of these areas such as was to be found in the rest of British Indian territory. All the same British Political Officers visited these areas for settling disputes and such like purposes. Finally, the Sadiya Frontier Tract, approximately, 10,000 square miles in area, was formed in 1912, and the Balipara Frontier Tract, also comprising about 10,000 square miles, was formed in 1913, i.e., before the Simla Conference met. The Atlas of the Chinese Empire, published in London by the Chinese Inland Mission in 1906, shows as the frontier in this area an alignment which is almost identical with what was settled at Simla in 1914. The area was extensively surveyed in 1911-13. The Lohit area was surveyed by the Mishmi Mission in 1911-12, the Dibhang Valley was surveyed in 1912-13, and the Abor area in 1913.

Captain Bailey carried out extensive surveys of the southern limits of Tibetan jurisdiction in the whole area in 1913-14. It was on the basis of all this detailed information that the boundary was settled between India and Tibet in 1914. It is clear, therefore, that the McMahon Line was not an arbitrary imposition on a weak Tibet by the Government of India. It formalized the natural, traditional, ethnic and administrative boundary in the area.”

The above statement represents a historical review of the facts which led Sir Henry McMahon to draw the alignment of the Indo-Tibetan boundary in the map tabled at the Simla Conference.

Sino-Tibetan Relations (1912-1949)

A new chapter in Sino-Tibetan relations began since June, 1912, when the Dalai Lama XIII went back to Tibet from his exile in India. By the beginning of 1913 all Chinese troops had been forced to leave, and with that were removed the last vestiges of Chinese political influence. The *de-facto* independence was confirmed at the Simla Conference which was attended by Tibet on a footing of equality with China. It was further confirmed by the conclusion of a new Trade Agreement for Outer Tibet on July 3, 1914 with no Chinese representation. It was assumed that China had debarred itself by its withdrawal from the enjoyment of the privileges offered in the Simla Convention. Tibet, however, neglected to take formal steps to secure recognition of its independent status from other nations. It proved to be an unfortunate omission which allowed China to revive its claim after nearly five decades.

Till the late twenties China was too occupied with its own problems to turn its attention to Tibet. It was after the consolidation of the Kuomintang power in China, that attempts could again be made to woo Tibet back into acceptance of the Chinese suzerainty. The following attempts are particularly worth noticing :—

- (i) In 1929 Miss Liu Man-Ch'ing, who was conversant

in both Tibetan and Chinese, interviewed Dalai Lama XIII and explained the Kuomintang Government's approach to the Tibetan issue. The Dalai Lama tactfully evaded the major question and showed his grace and courtesy to the young lady by a 'warm reception'.

(ii) Miss Liu's Mission was followed by a political mission led by Kung Chueh Chung-ni who had a stay at Lhasa for more than six months (Jan. to Aug. 1930). The Dalai Lama XIII, who had entertained the party with warmth and cordiality, enunciated a general outline of his approach to the Chinese proposals. Kung had requested written answers to the proposals made by the Chinese Government. On an analysis of the answers made by the Dalai Lama the following points emerge :—

(a) Tibet and China would restore their previous relations if the treatment of 'patronage relationship' by the Central Government of China continued.

(b) The autonomy of Tibet should be retained on the basis of the 'patronage relationship' of the Central Government, so that the Tibetans would feel safe and secure.

(c) As regards exercising administrative control over Tibet, the Dalai Lama demanded a written guarantee for securing a fundamental stabilisation in both political and economic matters.

(d) For the protection of Tibet against aggression, the Tibetans would expect the supply of arms and other kinds of help from the Central Government of China.

(iii) Immediately after the death of the Dalai Lama XIII (Dec. 17, 1933) General Huang, Special Commissioner to Tibet, led a mission to Lhasa to pay a posthumous tribute to the late Dalai Lama on April 25, 1934. He took the opportunity to place before the Tibetan Government certain proposals on behalf of the Chinese Government which offered autonomy in internal administration only. The newly installed Regent Re-ding Rimpoche and his Government submitted a counter proposal consisting of ten items. The Tibetan authorities hesitated to place their trust in the Chinese Government of the day. Huang's mission thus did not bring any gain to the Chinese

Government. However, the recommendation made by Huang was accepted by the Central Government about the return of the Panchen Lama to Shigatse with a number of Chinese escorts, and setting up a Preparatory Commission for Tibetan affairs.

(iv) On the occasion of the Dalai Lama XIV's installation (Feb. 22, 1940) Wu Chung-tsin visited Lhasa on behalf of the Kuomintang Government of China. He raised some political questions after the ceremony was over. In reply to these questions the Tibetan authorities expressed thanks for the friendliness shown by the Central Government, but proposed that priority be given to the settlement of the boundary dispute in Dege, Nyarong and Huo-Ko in the eastern border. Wu's mission made little progress in regard to the Sino-Tibetan relations except for the establishment of an office at Lhasa on behalf of the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs.

(v) In 1941, the National Assembly in China drafted a constitution for the National Government and delegates from Tibet were invited to participate. But it had no effect on the Tibetans.

(vi) Later on, the Kuomintang Government attempted to change the Tibetan indifference by offering a higher degree of autonomy to the Tibetans. In a statement on August 25, 1945 Chiang Kai-shek, agreed to grant independence to Tibet on a par with Outer Mongolia as and when the Tibetans would advance economically and politically for the support of their independence. Following this Tibetan delegates participated in the National Assembly and continued to hold their seats till the National Government evacuated from Nanking in 1948.

It is evident from the above details that the Chinese claim of suzerainty was hollow during the Kuomintang regime. The Kuomintang Government made repeated efforts to persuade the Dalai Lama to accept the suzerainty of China, and tried to woo the Dalai Lama who bargained from time to time. The Chinese failed to enforce their so-called suzerainty over Tibet till 1950.

Indo-Tibetan Relations (1914—47)

Indo-Tibetan relations steadily improved after the Simla Conference, thanks to the work of a few able British diplomats who succeeded in winning the confidence of the Dalai Lama. Sir Charles Bell's Mission in 1920 achieved a miracle in earning Tibetan good-will. Bell had been known to the Tibetan authorities since 1904 and the Dalai Lama XIII had great confidence in him. Bell was able to convince the Tibetan authorities about the good intentions of the British Government and their desire to help Tibet in economic development and defence. The British had recognised the autonomous status of Tibet and agreed to provide all material assistance needed by Tibet. By agreement with Tibet the following forms of assistance were offered and accepted:—

- (i) Supply of arms and ammunitions.
- (ii) Training of the Tibetan personnel at Gyantse.
- (iii) Construction of a telegraph line from Gyantse to Lhasa.
- (iv) Conducting a geological survey in Central Tibet led by Hayden.
- (v) Installation of an hydro-electric plant.
- (vi) Organisation of a police force on the Indian pattern.

After Bell, Bailey, the Political Officer in Sikkim, had been to Lhasa for a short visit when he was able to obtain the same regard and confidence from the Dalai Lama XIII as Bell. Tibetan confidence in British friendship was strengthened by British intervention during the Nepalese threat of invasion in 1922.

On the flight of the Panchen Lama VI, Chos Kyi Nyima, from Tashilhun po to China in 1923, the political situation looked grave. There was an apprehension of a threat from China where the Panchen Lama was received as a rival force to the Dalai Lama and his British ally. The British had shown indifference to the Panchen Lama, who had repeatedly appealed to them for intervention in his discord with the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama who had so long favoured modernisation of Tibet with British assistance now surrendered before the conservative elements which had discouraged such changes by designating

them as British-inspired. The Young Tibet Group, which endeavoured to remove Tibet's isolation and discard conservatism, received a challenge when a section of pro-Chinese officials and supporters of the exiled Panchen Lama became prominent. There had been no organisation like a party in Tibet, as we understand it, but a considerable amount of importance was given to the opinions held by high officials of Lhasa and the high monk dignitaries of the three principal monasteries of the Gelupa or Yellow sect namely, the Sera, the Depung and the Gaden.

Since 1925, the Republican Government of China started a policy of wooing Tibet and winning over the Dalai Lama. When the Chinese missions had been visiting Tibet since 1929, the British Officers in Tibet did not keep quiet. Col. Weir, the Political Officer in Sikkim, visited Lhasa in Sept, 1932 and got an opportunity to discuss important issues with the Dalai Lama. Williamson, the successor of Col. Weir, paid visits to Lhasa once in 1933 and again in 1935. After the death of Dalai Lama XIII when Lhasa experienced a new kind of rivalry over the installation of the Regent, the Government of India kept a vigilant eye on the political developments in Tibet. The presence of Basil Gould in Tibet for five months in 1936 had checked the Chinese Kuomintang Government in taking up a strong attitude for Tibetan rejection of Chinese overtures. The Chinese realised that no co-ercion was possible or would have any effect as long as the British counterforce was there. China, however, found an opportunity on the occasion of the return of the Panchen Lama to Tibet in August, 1937. The Panchen Lama was given a large Chinese escort. A group of Tibetans resolutely resisted the entry of the Chinese army personnel into Tibet. The British Mission maintained its position in Lhasa even after the departure of Gould in February, 1937. Gould left behind his assistant officer, Richardson, and an wireless operator. The Chinese raised objections to the British presence but it was rejected by the Tibetan authorities. The latter contended that if China could be permitted to set up an wireless office for regular communication between Lhasa and Nanking although she had not signed the 1914 Convention,

the British had even better claims to the same privilege as a signatory of the Convention. The withdrawal of the British could only be insisted upon when the Chinese also would withdraw. There ensued an almost open competition between the British and Chinese officers in spreading their influence among the Tibetans. Public opinion at Lhasa was divided into two factions, the pro-British Young Tibet Group and the pro-Chinese Group who supported the forcible entry of the Panchen Lama with a Chinese escort. The British were firm in their stand that as long as the Chinese would stay at Lhasa, the British officer must continue, specially when the Tibetan authorities were friendly. The Lhasa mission continued till 1947 when the British handed over the rights, responsibilities and facilities enjoyed by them to the Indian Government in August, 1947.

In short, the British could develop a closer tie with the Tibetans by diplomatic skill and stole a march over the Chinese who repeatedly endeavoured to establish a foothold in Tibet.

Tibet's Political Status Till 1951

The political status of Tibet down to the Chinese aggression of 1951 is one of the most debatable points in the field of international law. According to the modern conception of a sovereign state, Tibet fulfilled all the requisite conditions such as :— (i) people more or less numerous ; (ii) possessing a definite portion of territory ; (iii) independent of external control ; and (iv) a Government to which most of the inhabitants rendered habitual obedience. Despite the fulfilment of all such conditions, Tibet was not formally recognized as a sovereign state owing, first, to her own ignorance of international law and practice or neglect to seek recognition of her status by other Powers, and second, the deliberate policy of the British who accorded recognition of her *de facto* status, but avoided, in the interest of future eventualities, recognition of the *de jure* status.

The Dalai Lama XIV, however, claimed that Tibet had a sovereign status during the period 1912 to 1950, i.e., prior to the 17-Point Sino-Tibetan Agreement signed in Peking in

1951. To substantiate the claim, he put forward the following points in a Cablegram to the U. N. Secretary-General in September, 1959.

(i) That the Government of Tibet concluded as many as five international agreements before or during these years. The treaties of 1684 and 1842 which were concluded by Tibet with Ladakh and Kashmir are effective till now ; and the Tibeto-Nepal Treaty of 1856 concluded by the Government of Tibet was in operation for a full century until it was nullified by the Sino-Nepalese Treaty of 1956. The Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 could not be made effective owing to resistance by the Tibetans until the Government of Tibet entered into negotiations directly in 1904 and concluded the Lhasa Convention. Also, the Tibetan-Outer Mongolian Treaty of 1913 specifically acknowledges the sovereign status of Tibet as well as that of Outer-Mongolia.

(ii) That Tibet participated in the tripartite Simla Conference of 1914 on a footing of equality with Britain and China.

(iii) Despite the combined British, American and Chinese pressure during World War II Tibet, as a sovereign state, maintained her neutrality and allowed only the transport of non-military goods from India to China through Tibet. It definitely proves that Tibet had full control over both internal and external affairs.

(iv) The sovereign status of Tibet was further acknowledged by other powers like India, France, Italy, United Kingdom and United States when a Tibetan Trade Delegation had visited those countries in 1948 with passports issued by the Government of Tibet.

All these points decisively show that Tibet had a sovereign status upto the time she entered into the Sino-Tibetan 17-Point Agreement in 1951 ; but because of ulterior motives, Britain persistently neglected to accord *de jure* recognition and kept the question open and ambiguous. Thus Britain sought the ratification of the Lhasa Convention of 1904 by the Chinese authorities in 1906. Secondly, the British Government in India invited China as a party to the Simla Conference with a view to mediating

in the dispute between China and Tibet which had developed since 1910. But it virtually negotiated with Tibet as a vassal State and admitted that Tibet was under the suzerainty of China by recognising the autonomy of Outer Tibet. Although China deprived herself, by withdrawing herself from the Conference, of any claim to a recognition of her suzerainty, the British offer was destined to enable China to rake up the claim whenever it suited her convenience. Thus British policy throughout was aimed at using Tibet as a pawn in the political game between China, Russia and Britain.

Sino-Tibetan Relations (1949—1959)

After the Communists came to power in China in 1949 and established a strong and united government, there was a new vigour in Chinese policy towards Tibet. It was not merely Tibet which was sought to be brought back into the People's Republic but also all the neighbouring hill territories, down to the southern foothills of the Himalayas. In Mao's simile, Tibet was a 'palm consisting of five fingers' namely, Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Assam, the whole of which was to be liberated. As a pretext to reassert claims to all the outlying areas which had been at one time or other under China's suzerainty, a special expression was coined for the peoples of these areas, 'national minorities'. According to Mao, "Less than 5 per cent of the people in China occupy more than half of our country. They are 'national minorities', tribesmen, and they were once regarded as not part of the Chinese race. We must convert them and convince them that they are Chinese". It was to achieve this objective that the Chinese army went into action in Tibet under the name of the 'People's Liberation Army'.

The foreign policy of Communist China in the first phase, as formulated by the Central Committee, aimed at the inclusion of Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet in People's China, although declaring them as separate autonomous regions, such as the IMAR (Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region), the SUAR (Sinkiang Uigur Autonomous Region) and the TAR

(Tibet Autonomous Region). The People's Political Consultative Conference in September, 1949, specially mentioned that all the national minorities, the Mongolians, the Tibetans, the Miaoyaos, the Karens and others should have equal rights and duties, and equal status.

After the 17-Point Agreement of 1951 the Chinese sought to introduce changes in the social and economic structure in Tibet, but the resistance of the Tibetans and the hold which Dalai Lama's Government still had on the people forced the Chinese to go slow. In order to get Tibetan co-operation a Preparatory Committee for Tibet was set up in 1956. Mao stated cautiously at the time: "As a result of the efforts of the people of all nationalities over the last few years, democratic reforms and socialist transformation have in the main been completed in most of the minority nationality areas. Democratic reforms have not yet been carried out in Tibet because conditions are not ripe for them. According to the 17-Point Agreement reached between the Central People's Government and the local government of Tibet, the reform of the social system must be carried out, but the timing can only be decided by the great majority of the people of Tibet and their leading public figures when they consider them practicable, and one should not be impatient. It has now been decided not to proceed with democratic reforms in Tibet during the period of the Second Five Year Plan. Whether they will be proceeded with during the period of the Third Five Year Plan can only be decided in the light of the situation at that time".¹⁵

The pace of 'democratic reforms' and 'socialist transformation' was slow but steady in the early stage. The Chinese did not want to antagonise the backward peoples of Tibet by any overnight radical change. For instance, the Language Reform Campaign was not enforced in Tibet. Similar was the case of the Cultural Revolution, which was not much appreciated by the local people of Tibet. On the other hand, the Chinese hoped that the preservation of the Tibetan script of the 7th century A.D. would facilitate the spread of Mao's ideology and thoughts among the Tibetans and the Tibetan-speaking

peoples in the Indian Himalayas, including those of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Ladakh. But after the first few years the Chinese realised that they could not achieve any radical transformation in Tibet except by drastic coercive methods. The first impediment was the militant resistance of the Khampas in Eastern Tibet, and the second was the opposition of the pro-Dalai Lama group in Central Tibet. Fierce armed clashes took place and the Chinese took more drastic measures by tearing the facade of Tibetan autonomy and ignoring the Chairmanship of the Dalai Lama in the Preparatory Committee. The Dalai Lama described the bloody clashes as national revolt against the Chinese, while the Chinese considered them as anti-revolutionary activities engineered by reactionary elements. In short, the situation reached such a point by 1959 that no face-saving compromise was possible between the Dalai Lama's government and the Chinese army of occupation. The Chinese hatched a conspiracy to kidnap the Dalai Lama and then to crush Tibetan resistance. The conspiracy was foiled by the escape of the Dalai Lama in March, 1959. After a most hazardous journey the Dalai Lama reached India in March 1959 where he was promptly granted political asylum. Baulked of its prey, China was furious with the attitude of the Government of India and denounced India as following the British imperialist and colonialist policy in relation to Tibet.

Sino-Indian Relations (1947—1959)

For the first few years after independence, the Government of India showed great friendliness towards China. It was mainly inspired by Nehru's obsession about British imperialism and the wrongs done to China in her days of weakness. Without much historical knowledge, Nehru entertained a curious notion that it was the destiny of India and China to march together in friendship and co-operation and that no sacrifice of India's material interests was too high a price for facilitating the fulfilment of that destiny. His emotional sympathy for Communism also largely influenced his China policy. In October, 1949, when the Communists came to power in China, India was one

of the first to accord recognition to the new Government immediately and congratulated the Communists on their achievement. The People's Government of China, however, hardly reciprocated Nehru's blind faith in Sino-Indian destiny and suspected Indian motives from the beginning. Thus in 1947, when Richardson, the British Trade Agent in Tibet, was re-appointed by the Government of India, or when Sathi was appointed as India's Consul at Khasgar in Sinkiang, the Chinese considered it as ominous.

A few other incidents, minor in themselves, enlarged the gulf of misunderstanding between India and China. They were :—

(1) Invitation of a Tibetan delegation along with a Chinese delegation to the Asian Conference in New Delhi in March-April, 1947.

(2) The display of a map of Asia in the Asian Conference in which Tibet was shown outside the boundary of China.

(3) A similar thing in a film show regarding 'Kashmir' given to the members of the Diplomatic Corps in New Delhi in 1948. Professor Li Chin Lun, the Chinese Ambassador, lodged a written protest to the India Government.

(4) The reception of a Tibetan Trade Mission led by Sakyabpa by the Indian Government and India's sympathetic attitude for the Mission's further trip to Europe and America caused annoyance to the Chinese Government.

The early phase of Sino-Indian estrangement reached its climax in the events of 1950-51, when China imposed the 17-Point Agreement on a helpless Tibet in a bid to end the five decades of Tibetan independence and to bring Tibet under the firm grip of the Communist Government of China. It also meant depriving India of the special rights and interests she enjoyed in Tibet by virtue of the Lhasa Convention of 1904 and later agreements. China must have calculated the risk and possibly concluded that India under Nehru would draw back from an open confrontation. Her judgement was right. Public opinion in India was greatly agitated over the 'Chinese aggression on Tibet'. But the Government of India did not

pay any heed to the Dalai Lama's request for assistance. It was severely criticised by the opposition in the Indian Parliament which forced the Government of India to enter into a sharp exchange of diplomatic notes with the Chinese Government. But the Chinese had correctly sized up Nehru and felt that with all his sympathy for Tibet and concern for Indian interests in that country, he could be persuaded to shelve his conscience over Tibet in return for an assurance of Chinese friendship on the basis of those vague, sweet generalities which appealed to Nehru most.

The issue was finally settled, according to the Chinese plan, by the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 on the basis of the 'Panchasheela' so dreamily propounded by Nehru :

- (1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
- (2) Mutual non-aggression.
- (3) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
- (4) Equality and mutual benefit.
- (5) Peaceful co-existence.

By this Agreement India surrendered the extra-territorial rights which she had inherited from the British under the Treaty of 1904. The Tibetans were quietly abandoned to their fate and Nehru salved his conscience by declaring that India's extra-territorial rights in Tibet were of colonial and imperial designs. The notes which were appended to the Agreement mentioned that the Government of India would withdraw within six months from the date of ratification and exchange military escorts stationed at Yatung and Gyanste in Tibet and would hand over to the Government of China, the postal, telegraph and public telephone services together with their equipment at a reasonable price. It was further agreed that the Government of India would hand over to the Government of China the twelve rest houses of the Indian Government at a reasonable price and all lands used or occupied by the Indian Government other than the lands within the Trade Agency compound walls at Yatung. Both Governments agreed to Trade agencies and amenities for communication. The move-

ment of pilgrims between India and Tibet region of China was to be allowed in accordance with custom.

The conclusion of the Agreement was widely condemned in India as not only a betrayal of Tibet but also a cowardly sacrifice of vital Indian interests. Subsequent events were to prove how correct the opposition was in its judgement of the situation and Nehru was soon to realise the blunder he had committed.

Sino-Indian differences arose soon after the conclusion of the Agreement of 1954. China was determined to exclude Indian presence altogether from Tibet. Once, having achieved that, she questioned the validity of the McMahon Line and claimed large areas south of the Line as Tibetan and, therefore, Chinese. Shortly after the signature of the Agreement the Indian Trade Agency building in Gyantse had been washed away by a heavy flood. The Indian Government (Note from the Indian Ambassador dated 25 July, 1959) faced many difficulties and obstructions at the time of the reconstruction of the building. Technical points were raised about the right of the property in question. Similar troubles were also experienced in connection with the reconstruction of the Trade Agency building at Yatung and the Chinese authorities made conditions very difficult for Tibetan labourers to work there. The net effect of the Chinese policy was that the exchange of natural trade between India and Tibet was discouraged and later totally discontinued. Added to these came reports of repeated border clashes since June, 1954. The meeting between Nehru and Chou En-lai in New Delhi in 1956 on the occasion of the Buddha Jayanti did not improve matters. China was suspicious over the Dalai Lama's presence in India and the motives of the Indian Government, while India became increasingly worried on account of border clashes and Chinese 'Cartographical' aggression.

The McMahon Line Controversy

The Sino-Indian border in the eastern sector concern mainly the McMahon Line. In the cartographical warfare and territorial claims the justification of the respective stands

of India and China depended on the validity or otherwise of the McMahon Line. It is necessary, therefore, to analyse the viewpoints of the two parties on this question.

The Chinese contention was :—

(i) The Simla Conference was called to serve British imperial interests. Taking advantage of the instability in China's political situation after 1911, the British intended to separate Tibet from China and to bring Tibet under British control in the name of Tibetan autonomy. Chinese participation in the Conference was secured by threat and pressure.

(ii) The question of the Sino-Indian boundary was not discussed at all at the Simla Conference, but only the boundary line between Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet.

(iii) As regards the exchange of notes with maps between Tibetan representative Lossang Satra and Sir Henry McMahon on March 24-25, 1914, the Chinese disowned its validity, as no Chinese representative had been associated with it. They further opined that the so-called McMahon Line which was a red pencil line on a map appended to the notes had been drawn and settled between the British and Tibetan representatives behind the back of the Chinese representative, outside the Simla Conference, and the Chinese representative did not sign.

(iv) The Simla Convention of 1914 was not binding on the Chinese Government. The Chinese representative Ivan Chen had handed over two telegrams from Liu Yik Lin, the Chinese Minister to Britain, in which the Chinese Government had declined to recognise any treaty that might be signed between Britain and Tibet. Further the Chinese representative refused to sign because of the British pressure to accept terms detrimental to Chinese interests. The British had made repeated attempts till 1947 to persuade China to agree to the terms of the Convention, but no Chinese Central Government ever agreed. The Republican Government of China opposed the Convention throughout.

(v) According to the Chinese, Tibetan control had extended over a large area to the south of the McMahon Line, divided

into three regions, namely (i) Monyul, (ii) Layul and (iii) Tsayul areas.

(a) The Towang monastery and its adjacent area constituted Monyul (land of the Monpas), which was given to Mirak Lama in 1680, for collecting offerings from the devoted Monpas who had faith in the Gelukpa doctrine. A tradition of *drat'al* monk-service system developed for the maintenance of the temples and monasteries situated in that area.

(b) Similar was the case of Layul which had been under the Tsela monastery granted by the Dalai Lama's mandate in 1680. The local administration collected annuity for the maintenance of temples and monasteries. The direct control of the local Dzonpon officer continued upto 1947.

(c) Concerning the Tsayul area under Sanganga-chu Dzong, there was a similar mandate issued by the Dalai Lama V. It extended up to Walong.

The Chinese position regarding the McMahon Line was unambiguously stated by Chou En-lai in a letter to Nehru dated September 8, 1959, which was reiterated by the NCNA broadcast in 1962.

“The so called McMahon line which the Indian side unilaterally claims as the Sino-Tibetan boundary on the eastern sector was illegally drawn up by the British imperialism in 1914 as a result of conspiracy. No China Government has ever recognised it. The wide areas south of the so called McMahon Line right up to the foot of the Himalayas mountain have always been Chinese territory. For a considerably long period even after 1914, the Tibetan local Government had exercised effective control in those areas. In 1951, taking advantage of the opportunity of China's peaceful liberation of Tibet the Indian side pushed forward towards the so called McMahon Line on a large scale and drove away the administrative officials of the local Tibetan Government of China by force. After the Chinese Government put down the rebellion in Tibet in 1959, the Indian side went a step further to cross the so called McMahon Line and occupied Khinzemane ; at one time it intruded into Tamaden and Longju, and started the first armed

conflicts between China and India in the Migyuten area. The Chinese Government has consistently advocated settlement of the illegal McMahon Line, it has always restrained its military and administrative personnel from crossing it. The Chinese Government to ease up the border situation unilaterally stopped sending out patrols to the areas within 20 kilometers of the Chinese side of the entire Sino-Indian borders" (Sept. 25, 1962).

India's counter-arguments were :—

(i) The tripartite conference at Simla had been arranged with the full knowledge and consent of the Chinese Government. The invitation had been sent on August 7, 1913 and was accepted by China. It was also accepted by the Chinese authorities that the Tibetan representative would be one of the parties on an equal footing with the British and the Chinese plenipotentiaries.

(ii) It was clear from the proceedings of the Simla Conference that both the questions of the boundary between India and Tibet and that between Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet were discussed among the three Plenipotentiaries. The Chinese could not, therefore, claim ignorance of the McMahon Line.

(iii) The 1914 Convention which came out from the discussions among the three Plenipotentiaries was accepted by the Chinese and the Chinese plenipotentiary signed on the draft. He refused to sign on the final document, as China did not agree to the boundary between Inner and Outer Tibet and also to keep the door open for manoeuvring in future.

(iv) The argument about British pressure, taking advantage of Chinese weakness and political instability, was not to be taken seriously. China also did the same to a weak and helpless Tibet in 1950-51.

(v) The Chinese claim of suzerainty over Tibet was not to be understood in the modern sense of the term. The Sino-Tibetan relations since the 16th century could be better described as a 'patronage relationship'. It was the Communist Government of China which forcibly disowned the previous status

of Tibet. The legality of the Simla Convention could not, therefore, be challenged, when the Tibetan plenipotentiary who had equal status with the Chinese plenipotentiary had signed the document. Tibet had concluded earlier two international treaties, with Nepal (1856) and British India (1904), which were accepted internationally.

(vi) India's stand on the customary boundary along the watershed on the crest of the Himalayas had been taken for granted for centuries by the peoples of both sides. Sir Henry McMahon drafted the boundary line on this basis which was acceptable to both the Indian and the Tibetan peoples. The peoples inhabiting the area south of the McMahon Line had been in direct touch with the Assam administration under political officers of Balipara, Sadiya and Tirup Frontier Tracts since the 19th century.

(vii) The Chinese claim on the area south of the McMahon Line comprising Monyul, Layul and Tsayul was only vague and could not be substantiated with any documentary proof; whereas the Indian administrative records satisfactorily proved the Indian control since at least the middle of the 19th century. As regards the tradition of *drat'al* monk-service, tolls for maintaining the temples and monasteries, and that of *ula*, free transport service for monks, the Chinese failed to show that Tibetan control was anything more than ecclesiastical, emanating from the Religious Council of the Lhasa Government. In this Tibetan-speaking area, the inhabitants had a tradition of paying respect to the Dalai Lama and Tibetan Buddhist monasteries, who had direct control on the Buddhist Tibetans whether they lived in Tibet or outside. The Dalai Lama being the chief among the Tibetan monks, his ecclesiastical authority was highly respected by the peoples who had faith in Lamaistic Buddhism. Even in the case of the Tibetan Buddhists of Szechuan, Chinghai, Sinkiang and Hsikang the Dalai Lama's influence as the religious head remained predominant. The British authorities, however, had been responsible for maintaining law and order, took punitive measures from time to time and concluded repeated agreements. That established India's legal claim over the

area south of the McMahon line. The earliest reference to an agreement between the British authorities of Assam and the Tibetans dated back to 1862. (see, Aitchison-Collection of Treaties etc.; Vol. 1, p. 145-46). Several other agreements also conclusively prove that the British Government in India had effective control over the areas, which were inhabited by the tribesmen of Assam since the British extended their jurisdiction in the North East Frontier of India.

It may be noted, in conclusion, that the later Chinese stand on the McMahon line was inspired by other motives than a scientific or legal ascertainment of the boundary between India and Tibet. In the earlier period of cordiality between India and China, Chou En-lai had accepted and agreed to retain the McMahon Line as the boundary between India and Tibet. It was clearly brought out in Nehru's letter to Chou-En-lai dated December 14, 1958 :—

“In course of our talks I briefly mentioned to you that I had seen some maps recently published in China, which gave a wrong border line between the two countries. I presume that this was by some error and told you at the time that so far as India was concerned we were not much worried about the matter because our boundaries were quite clear and were not a matter of argument. . . .

“Towards the end of 1956, you did us the honour of paying visit to India. . . . In the course of these talks you referred to the Sino-Burmese border. You told me about the talks you had. . . . at Peking and your desire to settle this problem with the Burmese Government. It was in this connection you mentioned to me the Sino-Indian border, and more especially the so called McMahon Line. The McMahon Line covered a part of the Sino-Burmese border and a large part of the Chinese border with India. I remember you telling me that you did not approve of this border being called the McMahon Line and I replied that I did not like that name either. But for facility of reference we referred to it as such. You told me then that you had accepted this McMahon Line border with Burma and, whatever might have happened long ago, in view

of the friendly relations which existed between China and India, you proposed to recognise this border with India also.... You added that you would like to consult the authorities of the Tibetan region of China and you proposed to do so".¹⁶

Conclusion

Events moved fast after 1959 and reached a climax in October, 1962 with the Chinese invasion of India. These developments were not concerned only with the boundary question but were motivated by many other factors—ideological difference, Chinese militancy, Chinese suspicions of Western designs, and India's asylum to the Dalai Lama and sympathy for the Tibetans. A discussion of these other factors would lie outside the scope of the present study. So far as the boundary question is concerned, an attempt has already been made to give a historical review. More details for the recent period, from 1950 to 1962, will be available in the White Papers of the Government of India, which are quite exhaustive from the historical point of view. In conclusion, it may be said that the final confrontation between India and China was not inevitable but was due largely to Nehru's lack of foresight and failure to accept realities in his dealings with China. Ironically, Nehru himself admitted it after the 1962 debacle. We may, therefore, end this study with extracts from Nehru's speeches¹⁷ relating to China from 1946 to 1962.

About a year before achieving India's freedom, on Sept., 7, 1946, Nehru broadcast the following :

"China, that mighty country with a mighty past, our neighbour, has been our friend through the ages and that friendship will endure and grow. We earnestly hope that her present troubles will end soon (it refers to the struggle of the Communists to secure power in China) and a united and democratic China will emerge, playing a great part in the furtherance of world peace and progress".

After the victory of the Communists in China, Nehru welcomed it in a Parliament debate on Foreign Affairs on December 7, 1950.

“...No one can deny China has achieved the status of a great power to-day. China is in a position to shape her own destiny and that is a great thing. It is true that she is controlled by Communists as Russia is. It would be interesting to know whether or not her type of Communism is the same as Russia's, how she will develop and how close the association between China and Russia will be. The point at issue is that China is a great nation which cannot be ignored, no matter what resolution you may pass”.

In course of a broadcast from London on January 12, 1951, Nehru said :

“China has taken a new shape and a new form. But whether we like that shape and form or not, we have to recognise that a great nation has been reborn and is conscious of her new strength. China, in her new-found strength, has acted sometimes in a manner which I deeply regret. But we have to remember the background of China—as of other Asian countries, the long period of struggle and frustration, the insolent treatment that they received from the imperialist powers and the latter's refusal to deal with them on terms of equality. It is neither fair nor practical to ignore the feeling of hundreds of millions of people. It is no longer safe to do so. We in India have had two thousand years of friendship with China. We have differences of opinion and even small conflicts but when we hark back to that long past, something of the wisdom of that past helps us to understand each other. And so, we endeavour to maintain friendly relations with this great neighbour of ours, for the peace of Asia depends upon these relations”.

Immediately after the Sino-Indian Agreement (April 29, 1954) Nehru spoke in the Lok Sabha on May 15, 1954 as follows :

“It is a matter of importance to us, of course, as well as, I am sure, to China that these countries, which have now almost about 1800 miles of frontier, should live on terms of peace and friendliness, respect each other's sovereignty and integrity, and agree not to interfere with each other in any way, and not to commit aggression on each other. By this agreement, we ensure peace to a very large extent in a certain area of Asia.

I would earnestly wish that this area of peace could be spread over the rest of Asia and indeed over the rest of the world”.

On September 4, 1959, Nehru made a statement in an altogether different tone :

“I have always thought that it is important, even essential, that these two countries of Asia, India and China, should have friendly, and as far as possible co-operative relations. It would be a tragedy not only for India and possibly for China but for Asia and the world if we develop some kind of hostility. Natural friendship does not exist if you are weak and if you are looked down upon as a weak country. Friendship cannot exist between the weak and the strong, between a country that is trying to bully and the other which agrees to be bullied. It is only when people are more or less equal and respect each other that they can be friends. That is true of nations also. We did work for the friendship of India and China and despite all that has happened and is happening we shall continue to work for it. That does not mean that we should surrender anything that we consider right or that we should give bits of Indian territory to China to please them. That is not the way to be friends with anybody or to maintain our dignity or self-respect”.

India's attitude was expressed in a stiffer language when Nehru addressed the Lok Sabha on April 1, 1961 :

“The House knows well enough how recent developments have created a wide gulf in the relations between India and China. . . . Nevertheless, we have tried to avoid in so far as we can taking steps which may create unbridgeable chasms between the two countries. We have to look at this moment of history not only to the present but to the future, and the future of India and China who are neighbour to each other with vast populations, is of the highest importance to themselves and to the world. So we have tried to steer a middle course between our strong resentment and the steps we actually take in this context. We try not to allow ourselves merely in anger to do something which may create further problems and differences. Broadly, our attitude has been to strengthen ourselves to prepare

for any contingency, and not in the slightest to give in on any matter which we consider important”.

Finally, Nehru's tone became more stringent in the historic broadcast on October 22, 1962.

“I do not propose to give you the long history of continuous aggression by the Chinese during the last five years and how they have tried to justify it by speeches, agreements and repeated assertions of untruths and a campaign of calumny and vituperation against our country. Perhaps, there are not many instances in history where one country, that is India, has gone out of her way to be friendly and co-operative with the Chinese Government and people to plead their cause in the councils of the world, and therefore, the Chinese Government to return evil for good, and even go to the extent of aggression and invade our sacred land. No self-respecting country, and certainly not India with her love of freedom, can submit to this, whatever the consequences may be”.¹⁸

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APPENDIX

EXTRACT FROM "A COLLECTION OF TREATIES, ENGAGEMENTS, AND SUNNUDS, RELATING TO INDIA AND NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES" VOL. I. CALCUTTA, 1862 PAGES 145-46

No LIII.

AN AGREEMENT entered into by CHANGJOI SATRAJAH, SRENG SATRAJAH, CHEENG DUNDOO SATRAJAH, of Naregoon, and TONG DABEE RAJAH, CHANG DUNDOO BRAMEE, POONJAI BRAMEE, of Takhal Tooroom, dated 24th Maug 1250 B.S.

It having been ordered by His Lordship the Governor-General in Council that we should be allowed annually onethird of the whole of the proceeds of Koreeahpara Dwar, viz. 5,000 Rupees, we voluntarily pledge ourselves to adhere to the following terms most strictly:—

1st.—We pledge ourselves to be satisfied, now and for ever, with the above-mentioned sum of 5,000 Rupees, and relinquish all right over any proceeds that may accrue from the Dwar.

2nd.—In our traffic we pledge ourselves to confine our dealings to the established market places at Oodalgooree and Mungledye, and never interfere with the ryots, neither will we allow any of our Booteahs to commit any acts of oppression.

3rd.—We have relinquished all power in the Dwar, and can no longer levy any rent from the ryots.

4th.—We agree to apply to the British Courts at Mungledye for redress in all our grievances in their Territories.

5th.—Should we ever infringe any of the foregoing terms, we shall forfeit our right to the above Pension.

(True translation)
FRANS. JENKINS,
Agent, Governor-General.

TIBET IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS SINCE 1951

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By virtue of its location in the heart of Asia, Tibet has always occupied a special position in Sino-Indian relations. The influence of Tibet on Sino-Indian relations and the Chinese and Indian policies towards Tibet reveal the origin and nature not only of the Chinese claim to Tibet but also of India's relations with Tibet. The Tibetans claim that their early kings belonged to the Sun race, from which the Buddha sprang. According to the legends and the historical tradition of Tibet, which tell of Tibet's links with China and India, Nyathi Tsanpo, the first legendary king of Tibet, went up to Tibet from India via the Manas Valley of Eastern Bhutan.

We may point out here that the history of Tibet has been rewritten several times according to the circumstances and nature of the influence of China and India in Tibet. This process of rewriting history is going on even now. The lamas, especially the lamas of the Tshilhunpo Monastery, have been engaged in it since 1952. The Chinese authorities in Tibet immediately liquidate any lama who shows Tibet's special relationship with India directly or indirectly. It is quite clear from the historical tradition of Tibet that the effort of the Tibetans to escape from the historical and political influence of China led to their orientation southwards in the times of the early kings of Tibet. The rivalry between China and India for supremacy in Tibet also goes back to those times. It is not a recent thing. The great religious king Thisong Detsan provided the forum for the great debate held at Samye over a period of two years in 792-94 for resolving the conflict between the two systems of enlightenment, the "instantaneous system" of China

and the "slow system" of India. However, in this article, our concern is to deal with Tibet as a factor in Sino-Indian relations historically.

The Government of India, which tried to adjust itself to the new situation in Tibet after being rebuffed in the winter of 1950 to mediate between China and Tibet and get them to solve their dispute peacefully, eventually converted its sixteen-year old mission in Lhasa into a Consulate-General under the jurisdiction of its Embassy in Peking in exchange for a Consulate-General for China in Bombay. Most of the old Indo-Tibetan conventions and treaties lapsed automatically, some of them being already totally obsolete, with the change of India's mission in Lhasa into a Consulate-General on 15 September 1952. The change in the juridical character of India's mission in Lhasa into a Consulate-General on 15 September 1952 marked the end of the brief period of political co-operation between India and Tibet on a basis of equality. It also marked India's unequivocal acknowledgement and recognition of the *de jure* and *de facto* supremacy of China in Tibet.

The signing of an agreement by China and India on "Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India" in Peking on 27 April 1954 put the seal of formality on India's acceptance of Tibet as an integral part of China. The agreement permitted Indian trade agencies to function at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok in return for a similar permission to Chinese trade agencies to function in New Delhi, Calcutta, and Kalimpong. It permitted the inhabitants of the border districts of the two countries to cross the borders, as always, to carry on petty trade or to visit friends and relatives. The treaty provisions, dealing with trade and other matters concerning pilgrims between India and Tibet, were supplemented by a note (which confirmed the agreement) subsequently addressed by the Government of India to the Government of China. India undertook in this note to withdraw within six months the military escorts which it had stationed at Yatung and Gyantse ever since the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904 for the protection of the Kalimpong-Lhasa trade route, to hand over to the Chinese authorities in

Tibet all Indian property in Tibet such as communications equipment, including the post and telegraph installations, and the staging bungalows along the trade route from the Sikkim border to Gyantse, and thus to forgo all the transport and communication facilities it had arranged for itself in Tibet. This small military force had been, in the absence of a more suitable arrangement with Tibet (and with China since 1951), one of the planks of the defence of the entire Himalayan glacis.

There was strong criticism in India of this final signing away of Tibetan autonomy by the Government of India. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, in the course of a debate in the Lok Sabha (the Lower House of the Indian Parliament) on 15 May 1959, answered it by pointing to the Preamble to the agreement, which contained the *Panch Sheel* or "Five Principles" of peaceful co-existence. Perhaps Nehru was too naive when he proclaimed: "Live and let live. No one should invade the other... This is the basic principle which we have put in our treaty with China." By that principle the Government of India pledged itself *inter alia* to respect the territorial integrity of China, as also to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of China, in which it now included Tibet. J. B. Kripalani, who condemned it in the sharpest form in the Lok Sabha on 19 August, 1958, described the *Panch Sheel* as "born in sin to put the seal of our approval upon the destruction of an ancient nation which was associated with us spiritually and culturally."

India gave up all her special rights in Tibet even without settling the question of the Indo-Tibetan boundary, although since the early 1930s, the Chinese cartographers, especially the *Sheng Pao* atlas (Peking, 1933) and *A Brief History of China* (Peking, 1953; reprinted 1954), had been showing in their maps certain parts of India as belonging to China. India kept repeating parrot-like that the question of this boundary had been settled by custom, usage, tradition, and international law. She paid heavily for this complacency over the matter when the Chinese invaded India on 22 October 1962.

Following the Chinese aggression, six non-aligned nations of Asia and Africa—Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ghana, Indonesia

and the United Arab Republic met in Colombo on 10-12 December 1962 in an effort to persuade the two great countries of Asia to sit at the negotiation table and try to arrive at a peaceful settlement of their conflict. The proposal formulated by them, however, failed in their object, as China, which accepted them in principle said that negotiations should be without prior commitments of any sort, and India insisted that there should be no negotiations without both sides accepting or rejecting the proposals *in toto*. Despite other efforts to resolve it, the deadlock persists even today.

The Government of Nepal, which established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China on 1 August 1955, accepted the principle of China's sovereignty over Tibet on 20 September 1956 by signing an agreement to maintain friendly relations with the Government of China. It signed an agreement of "Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and Nepal" in 1957 and relinquished the special rights it had enjoyed in Tibet under the Nepalese-Tibetan Treaty of 1856. It had initially regarded the liquidation of the autonomy of Tibet as a threat to its security, but now it gladly signed it away. It was guided by India in foreign affairs following the Indo-Nepalese Treaty of Friendship of 1950. The disappearance of Tibet as an independent entity enabled it to establish its border with China directly. In later years, especially after the assumption of full ruling powers by King Mahendra on 15 December 1960, Nepal found its direct relations with China especially useful as a bargaining point in its relations with India. All differences and misunderstandings between India and Nepal since then, including the present controversy concerning the Indian military presence in Nepal, are the consequence of the Sino-Nepalese understanding over Tibet.

After the Sino-Indian agreement of 1954, there was no contact between India and Tibet. The Dalai Lama and Prime Minister Nehru, on the occasion of the latter's visit to Peking late in 1954, met only a couple of times at social receptions or formal occasions. Naturally they had no opportunity for private talks. However, Nehru invited the Dalai Lama to visit India on the occasion of

the 2,500th Buddha Jayanti in 1956. Mao Tse-tung assured the Dalai Lama (along with the Panchen Lama), in Nehru's presence, that Tibet would enjoy autonomy which no other Chinese Province enjoyed.

Resistance to Chinese rule in Eastern Tibet, which had been growing since 1951, assumed serious proportions by the end of 1955. The burden of the Amdowas, Goloks, and Khampas under the occupation became unbearable. By the spring of 1956 major revolts broke out in Eastern Tibet involving tens of thousands of Khampas engaged in guerrilla fighting against the Chinese. China's unscrupulous policy towards Tibet had resulted in large-scale immigration and colonization in Eastern and North-Eastern Tibet. Consequently revolts occurred there. The building of strategic roads from the border of China to Lhasa during 1951-54 was another source of discontent.

There was little awareness in India of the widespread discontent in Tibet despite the deep interest of the people of India in the Tibetan opposition to the rule of the Chinese occupying forces and despite intermittent reports of disturbances from the increasing number of refugees escaping from Tibet on the plea of pilgrimage to India. Reports of unsettled conditions in Tibet made the people in the Himalaya borderlands greatly uneasy. They also agitated the Buddhists in South Asia. Gyalo Thondup, one of the Dalai Lama's older brothers, who had continued to reside in India after 1951 despite pressure from the Government of China, submitted, along with several of the Dalai Lama's leading officials who had similarly gone into voluntary exile in India, a series of appeals and manifestos to the leaders of the Government of India, describing the ruthlessness of the Chinese policy in Tibet and its likely repercussions in the Himalaya borderlands.

When the Dalai Lama arrived in India on 25 November 1956 to take part in the 2,500th Buddha Jayanti celebrations, not much was known in India about the serious situation in Tibet. The Dalai Lama was then acutely unhappy over the situation in Tibet. As he felt convinced that he could do very little for his people, he almost decided not to return to Tibet

until there was some positive sign of change in the Chinese policy in Tibet. He sought the advice of Prime Minister Nehru and even asked him for asylum in India for himself and the members of his Government. The Dalai Lama's startling request was a great embarrassment to the Government of India for various reasons, not the least of which was that it had given assurances to the Government of China that the Dalai Lama's visit would not be allowed to be used for political intrigue. Nehru, therefore, spoke to Premier Chou En-lai, who was also visiting India then and who promptly assured Nehru that the Government of China would respect Tibetan autonomy as guaranteed by the 1951 agreement. Nehru thereupon assured the Dalai Lama that the state of affairs would improve and advised him to return to his country and work peacefully with the Chinese for the full implementation of the 1951 agreement. On Nehru's advice, the Dalai Lama then returned to Lhasa early in 1957. But China did not keep the assurances it had given to India, despite its policy of placating the Tibetans and despite its decision to put off the implementation of the democratic reforms in Tibet for six years during the period of the Second Five Year Plan. Ruthless armed intervention in Tibet went on mounting. So much so that Nehru (to whom the Dalai Lama had, during his visit to India, extended an invitation to see the situation for himself) had to cancel his proposed visit to Tibet in September 1958 at the instance of the Government of China. Perhaps, the Government of China was actuated by a desire to avoid the certain embarrassment that it would have suffered in the event of any mediatory move being initiated by Nehru in a matter which it had always regarded as a purely domestic affair. Perhaps, also it felt that the embarrassment involved in asking Nehru to cancel his visit was much less. In any case the whole affair did damage to China's image in Nehru's mind.

The last phase of Chinese rule in Tibet before the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in the spring of 1959 laid bare the utter cynicism with which China disregarded the 1951 agreement. When the campaigns designed psychologically to convert the Tibetans into Chinese in 1952-58 failed, China invaded Tibet

with a brutality more savage than the Tibetans had ever known. In effect it questioned even the right of the Tibetans to live in their own native land. The spontaneous national uprising in Lhasa on 10 March 1959 marked the climax of the strained relations between the Chinese and the Tibetans. The supreme but lonely endeavour of the Tibetans to live in absolute freedom from domination by China, which was completely in the tradition of their ceaseless struggle to free themselves from the Chinese yoke, was a bold rejection of their own hasty action in signing away Tibet's autonomy in the spring of 1951. For centuries the Chinese had tried to subordinate the political life and aspirations of the Tibetans to their own, and for centuries the Tibetans had thwarted them. The uprising of Lhasa and the repudiation of the 1951 agreement on 11 March 1959, both unique symbols of the desire of the Tibetans to maintain the political and religious institutions peculiar to their traditions and history, were a part of their ancient and continuing struggle to live in absolute freedom from domination by China.

The Dalai Lama, who escaped from Lhasa on 17 March 1959, entered India on 31 March 1959 and received ready asylum. The telegram from Nehru read: "My Colleagues and I welcome you and send you greetings on your safe arrival in India. We shall be happy to afford the necessary facilities for you, your family and entourage to reside in India. The people of India, who hold you in great veneration will no doubt accord their traditional respect to your personage. Kind regards to you."

The spontaneous and elaborate welcome accorded to the Dalai Lama in India further strained Sino-Indian relations. The Chinese considered it improper and unfriendly for Nehru to arrange a welcome for, and to pay a personal visit to, the Dalai Lama at Mussoorie on 23 April 1959. The Government of China, as well as the Press and other propaganda media in China, accused India of "expansionist" aims in Tibet and criticized the statement on Tibet made by Nehru in the Lok Sabha on 30 March 1959, especially his way of instructing the Chinese how to deal with the situation in Tibet. China was particularly sore over the statement of Nehru that the Khampa

revolt had been going on for three years and that the Government of China had not respected Tibetan autonomy. It declared that the Khampa revolt was protracted precisely because the autonomy of Tibet had been scrupulously respected. It also said that although India's interests demanded friendship and trade with it, India's leaders feared the effect on India's peasants and workers of the Great Leap Forward in economy and culture brought about in China through socialism. It said further that the democratization of Tibet would remove it from the cockpit of international intrigue and that it would be to everyone's advantage in Asia.

Nothing stirred India more deeply than the two Chinese charges that the Tibetans used Kalimpong on Indian soil as "a commanding centre of the rebellion" and that the reference to the developments in Tibet in the Lok Sabha amounted to an interference by India in the internal affairs of China. Nehru repudiated the Chinese accusations and calumnies as void of substance and unbecoming. He also maintained that the Lok Sabha had the right to discuss any subject it thought fit. He rebuked the Chinese for using "the language of the cold war". He further declared:

"We have no desire whatsoever to interfere in Tibet; we have every desire to maintain the friendship between India and China; but at the same time we have every sympathy for the people of Tibet, and we are greatly distressed at their hapless plight. We hope still that the authorities of China in their wisdom will not use their great strength against the Tibetans but will win them to friendly cooperation in accordance with the assurances they have themselves given about the autonomy of the Tibet region. Above all we hope that the present fighting and killing will cease".

India had no political or ulterior ambitions in Tibet. All it desired was a preservation of the traditional connections between India and Tibet. This went with a feeling of deep sympathy for the people of Tibet. The desire to preserve the security and integrity of India was always backed by the desire to maintain friendly relations with China. It was unfortunate that China

and India—the two great countries of Asia—developed feelings of hostility against each other. Friendly relations between them were important from the wider viewpoint of peace in Asia and the world.

Anyway, the Chinese tirade against India, instead of abating, became increasingly virulent. Acts pointedly unfriendly to India now accompanied it. The Chinese authorities in Tibet began to subject Indian nationals, including officials and traders, to various forms of harassment. They made every effort to dissuade Tibetan traders from dealing with their counterparts in India, thereby making it difficult for Indian traders to function normally in Tibet. At the same time, they also attempted, through a hate campaign, to stir up hostility to the Indians among the Tibetans as a counter to the latter's continuing loyalty to the Dalai Lama.

Buddhists from the Himalaya borderlands, from Tawang, Bhutan, Sikkim, Bashar, Spiti, and Ladakh, had long been going to Tibet on trade and pilgrimage, especially to study Buddhism in the monastic schools there. All the principal monasteries of the Nyingmapa, Gelukpa, and other sects of Buddhism in Western, Central, and Southern Tibet maintained dormitories for students from the Himalaya borderlands. The grand lamas of Tibet occupied a place of immense veneration among the Buddhists of these countries. Legends glorified many of these lamas who excelled in learning and occupied positions of great honour in Tibet proper from time to time. All these non-Tibetan scholars and pilgrims, however, returned to their countries by 1960 except perhaps those in the remoter parts of Tibet. Owing, largely, to the compulsion of events in Tibet, national institutes of Buddhist learning were later established in their own countries, especially in Ladakh, Bhutan, and Sikkim.

Indian traders in Central Tibet, especially in Lhasa, faced many difficulties. They could neither travel about in the country nor get transport to convey their goods. Merchandise held by them was either frozen outright or purchased by the Chinese at arbitrary prices. Various payment difficulties were also created. All this was not in keeping with the spirit of the Sino-

Indian agreement of 1954. The Government of India, therefore, did not agree to renew the trade when it expired at the end of the stipulated period of eight years.

The majority of Indian traders in Tibet were from Ladakh, which had a long historical connection with Tibet. The Kaches (Kashmiri Muslims from Ladakh), who spread over large parts of Tibet, numbered several thousands, including those descended from the prisoners captured by the Tibetans in the war with the Dogras of Jammu in 1841-42. The majority of them had been born in Tibet, but had always been regarded by the Tibetans as subjects of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. Many of them had married Tibetan women. On the ground that a Tibetan woman, though married to a foreigner, retained her nationality according to the marriage laws of Tibet, the Chinese authorities in Tibet asked several Ladakhi traders to quit Tibet and leave their wives and families behind.

These Ladakhi traders had their homes and families in Ladakh as well, and they had always considered themselves citizens of India. Up to 1951, the three-yearly caravan, *Lochak*, carrying gifts especially of saffron and shawls from Kashmir for the high lamas of Tibet, had always been an occasion for the members of this community to renew friendship and arrange mutually profitable commercial deals. Most of them were engaged in wool trading, and in importing tea from China and cosmetics from Europe and the United States for the women of the Tibetan aristocracy. The bazaars of Lhasa and Shigatse used to have separate Kache quarters from where they carried on their trades. For generations the Kaches had figured prominently in Tibet's commerce and economy, acting as middlemen even in China's trade with that country. Indeed some Kache merchants are known to have met the first British mission to Tibet in 1774-75 and to have assured George Bogle of the East India Company of their full co-operation in the British endeavour to develop trade between India and Tibet. On the eve of the first Gorkha invasion of Tibet in 1788, the then minor Panchen Lama and his Regent had sent two of them, Mohammed Rajeb and Mohammed Wali, as envoys to Calcutta to tell the

British Governor-General of the difficulties of the Tibetans and to seek his aid against the Gorkha Raja, as the King of Nepal was then called by the Tibetans.

The Nepalese-Tibetan Treaty (Articles 7-9) of 1846 had provided the Kache merchants driven out of Nepal after the conquest of the Kathmandu Valley by Prithvinarayan Shah in 1769 with the same trade facilities and advantages as the Nepalese in Lhasa. On the occasion of the Sino-Tibetan conflict in Lhasa in 1911-12, the Kaches, like the Nepalese, had suffered much loss of life and property. Article IX of the Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulations of 20 April 1908, however, had precluded the Government of India from interceding on their behalf with the Government of Tibet. On 5 October 1912, therefore, they had petitioned the British Resident in Srinagar for compensation for their losses in Lhasa.

Sven Hedin, the great explorer of Central Asia, had procured from the Viceroy of India the honorary title of Khan Bahadur for the famous Ladakhi merchant Ghulam Rasul for various valuable services rendered by him towards the Swede's great programme of pioneering geographical explorations there. Before the disruption of the historical privilege of free trade between Jammu and Kashmir and Tibet, including free transport between Lhasa and the Ladakhi-Tibetan border, Ghulam Rasul's family had held the monopoly of *Lochak*. Hazi Mohammed Siddiq, younger brother of Ghulam Rasul had led the *Lochak* caravan more than half a dozen times.

Many Kaches had ably acted abroad as agents of large Tibetan commercial houses. Ghulam Mohammed had for a long time been the representative in China of the famous Reting Monastery. He had managed Reting's trade affairs in Harbin, Mukden, Tientsin, Peking, and Shanghai. After the death in 1947 of the Reting Rinpoche, Regent of Tibet from 1934 to 1941, he had had a difficult time in Tibet but had never regretted his association with the Reting Rinpoche or his connection with his monastery.

The welfare of these people had been one of the many intricate

problems handled by the Consul-General for India in Lhasa after 1952.

When the Chinese were comparatively powerful in Tibet in 1905-10, the Kaches had been treated well because of their importance to trade. When, therefore, the Chinese set up their regime in Tibet once again under the Sino-Tibetan agreement of 1951, the Kaches had expected to enjoy similar favourable conditions. Although the declaration by China that there were Muslims in China too and that they should therefore no longer look upon themselves as a minority but rather as one of the major ethnic groups of China had had a dampening effect on them, and earlier experience in South Sinkiang (1949-51) and later Chinese behaviour towards Muslims had unmistakably indicated to them the shape of things to come, they had, hoping against hope, found comfort in the Sino-Indian agreement on trade and intercourse with Tibet (1954) as well as in Mao Tse-tung's Hundred Flowers policy of 1957. But after 1959 they no longer saw any hope of trade across the Himalaya. The Indian trade agencies in Tibet and the Chinese trade agencies in India closed down on the expiry of the 1954 agreement on 2 July 1962.

India began to find herself involved in incidents on the Himalaya border as soon as the Chinese troops arrived in Tibet in the spring of 1951 and especially after the conclusion of the Sino-Indian agreement over Tibet in the summer of 1954. There had been a great increase in the military forces of occupation with the completion of the roads from the Sino-Tibetan border to Lhasa by the end of 1954. The North-East Frontier Area (NEFA) of India, the border districts of Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, and Ladakh became the objects of Chinese expansionist designs. The Government of India was even more worried by the Chinese activities against the border states of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, which occupied nearly half of the 2,500-mile Himalaya border between India and Tibet. In these states, especially in Nepal, India did not have the authority to take precautions against Chinese encroachment without the permission of their rulers.

The Government of India was compelled to take precau-

tionary measures after the Chinese began to militarize the Tibetan border with India in 1959. The Chinese designs against India had become fully clear in the course of their enslavement of Tibet during 1951-59. They had forcibly occupied Indian grazing lands and pastures along the Tibetan border. India began a programme of building roads up to the Tibetan border from NEFA to Ladakh, constructing a network of air-fields there, stationing more troops in the Himalaya, and giving them special training and equipment. These measures were taken up reluctantly, for they cut seriously into the Government's appropriations for national economic development.

The Chinese eventually used their military base in Tibet in their aggression on India on 22 October 1962. What did India gain by acquiescing in the Chinese aggression on Tibet in 1950 and by signing away Tibetan autonomy in 1954? This most important question demands serious consideration in the context of the shattered relations between China and India. India's present difficulties and trouble on the Himalaya border are the inevitable consequence of its acquiescence in the Chinese aggression on Tibet in 1950. Unless, therefore, there is a re-solution of the problem of Tibet, the problem of China will certainly continue to bedevil not only Sino-Indian relations but also India's northern defences as well.

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